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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

PERIODICALS & DOCUMENTS

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

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Published quarterly at 8 West King Street, Lancaster, Pa., for the Academy of Political Science, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. Second-class postage paid at Lancaster, Pa., and additional mailing offices.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

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Volume LXXIV *June 1959* *Number 2*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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MINORITY GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY

DURING the most critical hours of negotiation between the United States and Israel over the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the conquered Sinai desert in February 1957, Secretary of State Dulles called eight leaders of philanthropic non-Zionist Jewish organizations to his office. He attempted to persuade them to use their influence with Tel Aviv to bring an Israeli retreat. The passing of the event without major discussion in the newspapers or protest from Jewish organizations signaled a high watermark of sophistication about the interrelatedness of American foreign policies and minority group pressures. Similarly, no one thought it was unusual when congressmen representing large Jewish constituencies leveled blistering attacks on the Administration's policy of pressure against Israel.

Despite general awareness of the mutual impact of foreign affairs and the claims of minority groups, there has been surprisingly little systematic examination of the results of this process. A certain amount of textbook treatment of the influence of minority group pressures on individual foreign policies may be found,[1] and considerable attention has been paid in recent years to the effect which foreign policies have had on the voting patterns of minority groups,[2] but there has been no published work on the long-range consequences in American foreign policy of minority group pressures or on the effect which such influences have had on the American political and social systems. Nor has there been any discussion of the normative aspects of these problems.

[1] Thomas A. Bailey has been especially attentive to the impact of nationality group propaganda on specific foreign policies. *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York, 1955).

[2] Samuel Lubell and Louis Bean have been pioneers in this work. Bean, *How to Predict Elections* (New York, 1948), and Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952) and *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York, 1956). Also Louis Bean, Frederick Mosteller and Frederick Williams, "Nationalities and 1944", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 8, Fall 1944.

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No one can attempt to deal adequately with even one of these issues in a short article, but there is some value, perhaps, in charting the major questions and in suggesting some general hypotheses which can be explored further. The major problem areas can be stated in the form of questions:

(1) What has been the most significant over-all foreign policy consequence of minority group pressures?
(2) What has been the significance for the American social and political systems of the intermingling of such pressures with foreign issues?
(3) Have these results been good or bad?
(4) Can agitation by minority groups in behalf of other nations be justified by democratic theory?

Minority Group Pressures and Their Results

There have been many foreign policy consequences from minority group pressures. National policy toward almost every major nation is affected in some measure by the other-nation loyalties of American minority groups. For the most part such influences are felt sporadically and do not have long-range significance. While there have been dozens of such specific cases, there is one consequence which appears to have been more enduring and to have had greater general meaning than the others. Since our two king-sized minority groups—the Irish and the Germans—have been chronically hostile toward England, the main consequence of the intermingling of minority group pressures and foreign policy has been to inhibit the development of Anglo-American friendship, a basic goal toward which every President and Secretary of State has been more or less committed since 1870.

Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, minority group pressures were not significant determinants of American foreign policy. Attitudes on such questions as the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the annexation of Florida, Canadian adventures, or Cuban expansion were shaped primarily by regional interests. Between 1850 and 1900 seven and one-half million Irish and German immigrants arrived on these shores, and from 1870 on, these two groups bulked large in the voting population. After the Civil War, despite the national priorities given to building the railroads and factories and settling the West, a number of foreign-policy issues strained Anglo-American coöperation.

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As seen from Whitehall and the State Department both British and American interests demanded close coöperation between the two countries. In Europe the British were primarily concerned with keeping Germany or any other continental nation from becoming too powerful. Toward that end London was anxious to frustrate European imperial designs in the Far East and in the Western Hemisphere. This meant supporting American interests in the Orient and the Monroe Doctrine. Since the English coveted no new imperial gains in this Hemisphere, and since they wanted to establish Marquis of Queensberry rules for the Far East, American administrations invariably believed it would be wise to work in close harmony with our English cousins.

Neither foreign office counted sufficiently on Irish- and German-American opinion. But Hibernian views in Boston and German attitudes in New York could be ignored by candidates for national office only at considerable political risk. From 1876 until the beginning of the twentieth century when all presidential elections were fairly close, Irish votes, heavily clustered in the crucial Eastern states, were vigorously solicited. Twisting the lion's tail became a familiar campaign gimmick.

Apprehension in the United States Senate about the Irish vote appears to have had a part in defeating a treaty compromising our fisheries difficulties with Canada in 1888.[3] When the General Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty was smothered in the Senate, the *Boston Pilot* boasted:

> Had Irish-Americanism anything to do with the failure of the English Arbitration Treaty? We trust so, and believe so. We should be very much ashamed of our fellow citizens of Irish blood if they had not done their utmost to baffle this attempt to place this great Republic before the world as a mere colony of Great Britain.[4]

Similarly, Cleveland's attempts to revise the tariff downward were interpreted in Irish quarters as unduly favoring the British.[5] German-Americans were also active. They protested against American policy in Samoa which, after a dispute with Germany and England, culminated in an exchange of fire between German and American battleships.[6]

Minority group pressures were felt even at Whitehall. The British foreign office became increasingly sensitive to the voting

[3] Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 439.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 492.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 440, 441.
[6] Bean, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

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power of such groups in the United States, and its surrender to President Cleveland's ultimatum during the Venezuelan boundary crisis was prompted in part by Irish-American jingoism.[7] The strength of anti-English minority feeling in this country was in some measure responsible for British reluctance to pronounce an open-door policy for China before the United States made its own position clear.[8] The apparent congruence of British and American interests in the Far East as well as in this Hemisphere called for close working relations and joint policy action, developments which were inhibited by the political influence of minority groups.

Despite these events, issues of foreign policy were generally not as important to Americans during the last half of the nineteenth century as during the first half of the twentieth. During the last four decades the concordance of interest of both countries in preventing a shift of power to the east, first to Germany, and later to Soviet Russia, was—at least as the two foreign offices tended to see it—a matter of life and death. Again minority group pressures blocked the emergence of the close Anglo-American ties sought by Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman. German-American and Irish-American opinion strongly tended to oppose American intervention in both World Wars.[9] American leaders in the months preceding our entry into both conflicts—Wilson, House and Lansing in the first instance and Roosevelt, Hull, Stimson and Knox in the second—wanted to extend all possible help to England short of war against Germany. But German- and Irish-American public opinion stood in their way. One newspaper catering to German readers in Milwaukee and St. Louis went as far as to defend the sinking of the *Lusitania* during the 1916 election campaign.[10] When we were close to war during the summer months of 1940, Franklin Roosevelt keenly felt the pressure of minority group opinion. According to Secretary of War Stimson, the President's sensitivity was so great that he hid the seriousness of the crisis rather than risk the reaction of a hostile public opinion.[11] In his private letters Roosevelt wrote in 1940

[7] Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 486. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 527.

[9] Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, chapter 7.

[10] R. A. Billington, "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. LX, March 1945, pp. 44-64.

[11] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1948), pp. 367, 370.

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and 1942 of "wild Irish" nationalist and isolationist opposition to his policies.[12]

Minority group opposition to the war was submerged in the wave of patriotic nationalist sentiment which swept the nation after Pearl Harbor. But a resurgence of German- and Irish-American isolationism broke loose in new form after Yalta and the Communist success in China. Responsive to Senator Joseph McCarthy's charge against Democratic foreign policies as "twenty years of treason", the new German and Irish isolationists were militantly anticommunist, but despaired of working with England to forge common policies. Revenge was focused on Dean Acheson, a chief architect of the post-war Anglo-American alliance, who, with his moustache, striped trousers, Yale-Harvard training and Oxford degree, seemed to symbolize the pro-British American foreign policies of the last two decades.

The persistence of chronic German- and Irish-American Anglophobia during the past eighty years has been an important internal factor in the making of American foreign policy. Its total effect has been to stall presidents and secretaries of state in their efforts to implement what they perceived to be a harmony of English and American interests.

Foreign Policy Issues, Minority Groups, and American Society

When the United States is involved in European affairs, tension between nationality groups is sharpened. Involvement inevitably means taking sides, and taking sides in a European dispute means taking sides between nationality groups at home.[13] That was clearly seen in Jewish and Irish neighborhoods during the thirties when anti-Semitism and isolationism often coalesced. Outbreaks of violence became commonplace as the debate over intervention progressed. Protestant hostility toward the Catholic Church was given a boost by President Truman's abortive decision to send an ambassador to Vatican City in 1948. The point is so obvious

[12] Basil Rauch, *Selected Speeches, Messages, Press Conferences, and Letters of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1957), pp. 255, 311.

[13] Roy Peel wrote in 1935 in his thorough *The Political Clubs of New York*, "There have been Chinese, Greek, Italian, Mexican, Czechoslovak, Russian, Polish . . . political clubs in New York which have carried on intense campaigns for the furtherance of some alien program or for the building up of an American attitude favorable to the aims of foreign groups with which they have been associated" (New York, 1935), pp. 266, 267.

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that it needs little illustration. Foreign policy issues which divide ethnic or religious groups in this country will exacerbate the tensions between them.

What may not be so readily seen is the extent to which minority groups pin their hopes for status at home on the turns of American policy abroad. German-Americans, well on their way toward achieving high group status in American life, were suddenly identified with the hated Huns during the First World War. German music, literature and language were disparaged. Japanese-Americans in the months after Pearl Harbor were forced into concentration camps and the phrase "dirty Jap" joined the list of epithets little American schoolboys shouted at each other. Japanese business men were boycotted and Japanese homes threatened.

Just as conflict between the homeland and the United States redounds to the detriment of status-seeking nationality groups, the successes of the old country reflect credit on those groups in the eyes of fellow Americans. When Mussolini's engineering talents were extolled in the American press during the middle 1930's, the spirit of Italian-Americans was notably primed. Subsequently the "stab in the back" which Roosevelt accused Mussolini of giving France in 1940 deflated Italian pride at home. The *amour propre* of American Jewry received a considerable boost with the Allied triumph over Hitlerism, and later after the establishment of the state of Israel. The emergence of the Jewish homeland has undoubtedly been responsible in part for the decline of anti-Semitism in recent years.

In a real (although subtle) sense foreign nations pay back American minority groups for successful lobbying in Washington. The emergence of the state of Ghana will probably provide a wonderful example of logrolling. American Negroes are proud of Ghana and want her to succeed not only for Ghana's sake but for what success in Africa will mean to our own Negroes in their quest for equal rights. In turn, the largest of our minority groups will soon lobby for Ghana just as American Jews now do for Israel and Irish-Americans for Ireland. The appearance of Martin Luther King at the majestic ceremonies at Accra on Ghana's independence day symbolically linked the American Negro's drive for status at home with his power to help Ghana in Washington.

Since issues of foreign policy raise the hopes and fears of minority groups at home, minority group cleavages tend to be

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emphasized at the expense of other schisms. Minority group loyalties, bolstered by the process, tend to cut across economic class lines, and one result is the mitigation of class conflict. It has been pointed out elsewhere that the introduction of foreign policy issues into a presidential campaign draws income groups closer together in their voting behavior.[14] American Jews, for an extreme example, gave over 90 per cent of their presidential vote to Roosevelt during the 1940's, virtually ignoring class lines.[15] To the extent that Jews were drawn together on the meaning of Hitler, the Poles on the significance of Yalta, and the Italians on the importance of Mussolini's achievements, there was less deepening of class cleavages in American life. Perhaps this has been the most significant effect on the American social system of the mutual interplay of minority group pressures and foreign policy issues.

Foreign Policy, Minority Groups, Congress, and the Party System

There have been other consequences which bear more directly on two of our most important political institutions: the Congress and our political party systems. The interaction of minority group pressures and foreign policy appears to have encouraged congressional participation in foreign affairs and a concomitant weakening of party discipline and responsibility. Hardly a week passes without the introduction of a congressional resolution or memorial celebrating the independence date of a foreign nation or the birth date of a European national hero. Minority group pressure at the grass roots prompts congressmen to call for investigations of Yalta or American–Saudi Arabian discrimination against Jews at the Dharan air base. Irish and Lithuanian freedom movements may not take hold in the State Department but they find many champions in Congress. Party discipline, ever weak in our highly pluralistic society, is further strained by the interest which congressmen take in promoting the foreign policy aims of minority groups in their districts. Even stalwart Senate Republicans such as H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts protested against the Eisenhower-Dulles threats to Israel in the fall of 1956.

[14] Lawrence H. Fuchs, "Some Political Aspects of Immigration", *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Spring 1956, p. 278.

[15] *Idem, The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe, 1956), chapter v.

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The main reason congressional participation in foreign affairs is increased by the pressure of minority groups is that there are many points of access to congressional power. In a close congressional district the militant opinion of even a small minority cannot easily be ignored. The President is generally less vulnerable to such pressures because he has a large constituency and most of it is indifferent to the fate of this or that particular group claim.

Normative Issues

The hypotheses offered thus far—that Anglo-American friendship has suffered, that class tensions have been mitigated, that party discipline has been weakened, and congressional interference in foreign affairs spurred by the interaction of foreign policy and minority group pressures—are meant to be taken as suggestions. They are each subject to qualifications; for example, Polish pressure before the American entry into the Second World War tended to promote American aid to Britain, ethnic and class lines sometimes virtually coincide as in the case of the Yankees and Irish in Boston, and the Jewish minority, because of its fidelity to the Democratic party in recent decades, was probably much more influential with the Truman Administration in 1948 than it was in Congress. Despite these and other reservations, the hypotheses offered above appear to be warranted and—it is hoped—are worthy of further analysis.

Questions of fact are open to empirical inquiry. Questions of value are not, but often they are the most important questions. There are two basic ways to approach the normative aspects of this general problem. The first is to ask whether minority groups are justified in pleading the interests of other nations in the field of foreign policy. The second is to inquire whether the actual consequences of the interaction of minority group pressures and foreign policy issues have been good or bad.

Judging the Results

Assuming the hypotheses suggested here to be valid, the answer to the second question will depend primarily upon the values attached to the Anglo-American alliance, economic class struggle, the primacy of the executive in foreign affairs, and party responsibility. No one is likely to approve of all major policy results ascribed to minority group pressures. It would require

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extraordinary eccentricity to favor isolationism, McCarthyism, the emergence of the state of Israel, liberalization of our immigration statutes, and denunciations of the Yalta agreements. Yet all of these developments in some measure reflect the impact of minority group pressures.

It is possible to argue that the mutual impact of minority group claims and foreign policy has generally had a deleterious effect on American interests since 1870 to the extent that it has hampered the development of closer Anglo-American relations. It is also possible to maintain the opposite, that minority group pressures, having fortified our independence from Great Britain, gave us greater freedom of action to protect American interests. An advocate of this view might insist that the development of American power would have been seriously delayed if we had let our English friends talk us out of the Spanish-American War; or that minority group pressures to keep us out of the First World War were wholesome, and, had they prevailed, we would have been spared the misery of war and its sorry aftermath.

A proponent of the first view could rhetorically ask whether American interests would have been more or less secure, had the two nations acted in concert before the two World Wars and later in the Middle East and Far East in countering Communist expansion.

In a similar vein it is possible to argue both sides of the question of class conflict. To those who view class conflict as a serious threat to American society, the dulling of class tensions by widespread ethnic and religious conflict has been a salutary thing. For those who feel that the obscuring of class consciousness has tended to prevent the emergence of a richer life for workers and lower-class groups generally, the proliferation of nationality group tensions has divided Americans in the wrong places and tended to leave their most important needs unfulfilled.

Have the promotion of congressional participation in foreign affairs and the loosening of party discipline and responsibility been good or bad? Since these are two of the central issues in the study of American government, it would be unnecessarily ambitious to outline both sides of this argument here. For most teachers and close students of American government the answer to the question posed above would be negative. But even on these issues scholarly counsels are divided, and among laymen there are probably at least as many who would, in the abstract, defend

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congressional as opposed to executive power and applaud the independence of elected officials from central discipline rather than deplore the want of it.

It should be observed that the social and political consequences of the intermingling of minority group pressures and foreign policy issues, while interesting and even significant, have been far from crucial. There have been other important factors keeping us from closer contact with Great Britain;[16] there have been other salient brakes on the development of class conflict in America.[17] Other factors produce fission in American political parties, and Congress would still have to be reckoned with in the making of foreign policy even if our population were less heterogeneous.[18] The main point is that the mutual impact of minority group pressures and foreign policy questions has contributed to—not determined—the political and social developments discussed above.

The Justification of Other-Nation Loyalties

The really vital normative question has been saved for the last. By what political principle can the other-nation loyalties of American minority groups be justified? Or to put it in more pragmatic terms: Can the other-nation loyalties of American minority groups be reconciled with the national interest demands of foreign policy? The problems wrought by plural loyalties in a democratic society have recently received considerable attention, but the specific issue raised here has barely been dealt with anywhere.

Again it is possible to make a strong case on each side of the question. Although minority groups are not going to stop their

[16] The isolationism of such men as the late Robert Taft, ex-Senators John Bricker and William Jenner and of the *Chicago Tribune* cannot be explained in ethnic terms. They belong to an earlier tradition of Anglophobia which derives from the original American rejection of England and Europe.

[17] Ethno-religious pluralism is obviously only one of the factors mitigating class conflict in the United States. Mass production and consumption habits, the Horatio Alger tradition, genuine class mobility and many other factors have made their mark.

[18] The organization of our parties as loose federations of state organizations, which in themselves lack cohesion, based on geographic and occupational diversity as well as ethno-religious group pluralism, prohibits discipline and cohesion at the national level. Possessing the money power, Congress must be involved in foreign programs in ample measure.

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special pleading even in the face of strong argument, the issue is not wholly academic. The question of legislative censorship does not arise. But there are students of foreign affairs who urge the public to be alert against what they believe to be the narrow and emotional claims of minority groups.[19] The persistence of other-nation loyalties has also been presented as an argument against liberal immigration policies.[20] There is even a small but articulate Jewish organization which constantly condemns other Jewish groups for their loyalty to Israel.[21]

It is easy to agree that any pressure group, whether concerned with domestic or foreign policy, ought to seek some larger interest beyond its own self-aggrandizement. But the overwhelming tendency of all pressure groups is to find congruence between their own claims and the public interest, and they rarely perceive any clear-cut conflict between the general welfare and the group interests they espouse. This is no less true of the Sons of Italy or the Democratic Lithuanian Club of Chicago than it is of the National Association of Manufacturers. Despite the myopia of pressure groups, there are times when the interests of the American Medical Association and the public interest clash or when what is good for the Fatherland may not be good for the rest of us. The dilemma is a classic one for free societies. It can be resolved, in the abstract at least, by defending the right of any association to agitate in behalf of its special interests while insisting on its corollary responsibility to seek the public interest.

The troublesome quality about minority group agitation in the field of foreign policy is that the consequences of successful pressure—as in the case of Communist agitation—might destroy the very system of free association and discussion which permits it. Propaganda to keep Americans from adopting a national plan for public health insurance may be pernicious, but, no matter

[19] An example may be found in Norman A. Graebner, *The New Isolationism* (New York, 1956), p. 6.

[20] Robert A. Divine, *American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952* (New Haven, 1957), p. 8.

[21] The American Council on Judaism is the name of the organization. Its chief spokesman appears to be Alfred M. Lilienthal who has written two books to alert the public against the danger of Zionist claims: *What Price Israel* (Chicago, 1953); and *There Goes the Middle East* (New York, 1957). The other point of view is stated in familiar terms by Oscar Handlin in chapter xii, "Israel and the Mission of America", in his *Race and Nationality in American Life* (Boston, 1957).

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how successful, it can always be met by counter pressure. A conflict of interest between medical doctors and the rest of us is not likely to threaten the core of freedom itself. This democratic dilemma can be restated through an old question: Should a free society tolerate group loyalties even at the possible expense of freedom? The principal reply invariably is that toleration of these loyalties is actually the main test of freedom. That is the primary argument advanced in two recent books on loyalty by Morton Grodzins and John H. Schaar.[22] The brief is a familiar one. Freedom is not divisible. It cannot be shut off for one kind of pressure group and permitted for another. Even assuming, as these authors do not, that the courts can and should judge the value of free speech against other values such as the preservation of the nation, there is usually no problem when other-nation loyalties are concerned. Greek-Americans desire freedom for Cyprus; Irish-Americans seek the union of all of Ireland. Neither group urges the overthrow of the United States government.

Another defense of minority group pressures derives from the pluralist conception of loyalty. Without accepting Schaar's dictum that one loyalty is as good as another,[23] it seems fairly clear that loyalty to the political community is actually a product of loyalties to lesser associations. Grodzins puts it thus: "The very existence of such groups provides possibilities for sharp clashes between national and other loyalties. But, paradoxically, these other loyalties are also the most important foundation of democratic loyalty."[24] In short, democratic authority must be grounded in consent, and consent will not be forthcoming when the needs and loyalties of lesser groups than the state are not met at least half way. Let the Germans, the Poles, and the Jews propagandize against official foreign policy. The alternative would alienate them and in some measure destroy the very foundations of national cohesion. When 6,000 Americans of Japanese descent formally chose Japanese rather than American loyalty in 1943 it was, Grodzins maintains, because they had been persecuted and kicked around.[25]

Another defense of minority group pressures rests on a rough restatement of John Stuart Mill's classic salute to Liberty. Mill

[22] Morton Grodzins, *The Loyal and the Disloyal* (Chicago, 1956). John H. Schaar, *Loyalty in America* (Berkeley, 1957).

[23] Schaar, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[24] Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 29. [25] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

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defended freedom for its value to both the speaker and society. The claims of minority groups may sometime coincide with the national interest. Who can say that Italian and Jewish agitation for a liberal immigration policy, hotly opposed by some of America's best-advertised patriots, will not strengthen the power of the United States in the long run? Moreover, since even noxious speech may embrace partial truth, the most self-seeking minority claims may have something in them which will enhance the public interest; and since good ideas are strengthened through tests of strength against bad ones, good policies will be made better after contesting proposed bad ones.

There is one important argument in behalf of minority group pressures on foreign policy. It is that foreign policy is too important to be left to the experts. Were it not for the propaganda of nationality groups, public apathy and expertise might take over. Polish-Americans may have been excessively zealous in their denunciations of Yalta, but because of Polish agitation the rest of us came more quickly to a clearer appreciation of the Soviet threat.

The Justification of Control

Although freedom may be the final test of the democratic society, democratic nations do invariably limit free speech when it is threatening enough. The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, amended in 1939, required all groups[26] advancing propaganda on behalf of a foreign principal to register. A provision of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 (the Smith Act) and certain provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (the McCarran Act) hamstring speech in defense of national unity. The McCarran Act obliges "communist-front" and "communist-action" groups to register with the Attorney General and to label the source of their propaganda. The Smith Act makes it a crime to advocate or teach the overthrow of the government by force or violence, or to join or help organize any group that so advocates.

The justification for such laws, especially the more recent legislation, is twofold: Communists agitate for other-nation interests to the detriment of American security; their agitation will tend to destroy the nation. Minority groups also lobby for other

[26] Although the law was broadly drawn, minority nationality groups were not included.

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nations, and, in some instances such as German-American pressure prior to World War II, their success might possibly extinguish freedom here.

That the values of freedom and national unity demand reconciliation in a democracy is obvious. It is less than obvious that the freedom of minority groups to lobby for other-nation interests ought to be curbed, and it may be impossible to apply methods of control which conform to the standards of a free society. Nonetheless, a strong case can be made for self-regulation or censorship through public awareness.

There is also another side to the pluralist argument that national unity rests on loyalties to lesser associations. The militancy with which ethno-religious groups struggle to mold foreign policies often brings them into head-on conflict with each other, as has already been pointed out. The deepening of tensions between ethno-religious groups sometimes resulting in violence is not productive of social cohesion. Rising conflict between Japan and the United States embittered already tense contacts between the Nisei and other groups in California. National unity depends on harmony between subcultural groups as well as on the sustenance of their group loyalties.

The next three issues are closely related. It has been maintained, in defense of minority group influences on foreign policy, that self-seeking claims may, after all, be in the national interest, that such influences help to keep foreign policy from becoming the cloistered property of a few experts, and that public debate on foreign policy is a good thing in a democracy. These issues all touch on the question of the rôle of public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy.

If public attitudes on foreign policy are unstable and unsupported by information,[27] then the service which minority groups perform in forcing broader public attention on foreign policy may turn out to be no service at all. It may also be argued that minority group propaganda is emotional and narrow, and cannot help to clarify debate. The parochial claims of nationality groups are not likely to elevate public thinking. The best judge of the compatibility of minority group propaganda and the national interest is not the minority group itself or an inflamed and unin-

[27] Gabriel A. Almond, among others, makes this point in arguing for an elite-made foreign policy. *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950), especially chapters iv and vii.

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formed public opinion but the elected and appointed officials responsible for making foreign policy. Foreign policy making is highly specialized and technical and demands expert and not public direction.

These are the two briefs which can be advanced as justification for or against minority group activity in foreign affairs. To develop these arguments in detail has not been my purpose. Nor has it been my aim to take sides. As in the discussion of consequences to our social and political system from the interaction of foreign policy and minority group influences, I have endeavored to show the extent to which these issues are real and touch directly on important value conflicts.

Summary

This article is meant to be exploratory and suggestive. An attempt has been made to block out the major empirical and normative questions evolving out of the intermingling of minority group interests and foreign policy in the United States. Hypotheses and arguments have been advanced for further investigation.

It has been suggested that the major over-all result of the mutual impact of foreign policy and minority group claims has been to thwart Anglo-American friendship. Other consequences, it has been proposed, have been the mitigation of economic class conflict, the elevation of congressional participation in foreign affairs and the loosening of party discipline.

It was pointed out that judgment on the process—the interplay of foreign issues and minority group pressures—will, in some measure, rest upon judgment of its consequences. Assuming the major results outlined above to be valid, it is possible to evaluate them in terms of one's view of the Anglo-American alliance, of class conflict in America, and of party responsibility and congressional participation in foreign affairs.

It was then suggested that the most crucial normative question—the problem of justifying minority group claims on behalf of other nations—was at the core of any controversy over this process, and, without elaboration, the principal arguments on each side of the issue were set forth.

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AUG 10 1959 INDEXED

THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

CHILD OF THE COLD WAR*

IN THE five years following World War II, the United States was able to pursue its policies in Japan with remarkably little direct interference from the Soviet Union. While the United States experienced and still experiences countless frustrations in its German policies because of Soviet opposition, the Americans managed to do pretty much as they pleased in Japan.

The inability of the Soviet Union to participate effectively in the Allied Occupation of Japan stemmed largely from her lateness in entering the war against Japan. On July 26, 1945, in Potsdam, the United States and Great Britain, with Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence, issued a declaration which stated the terms for a Japanese surrender. The Potsdam Declaration was drafted principally by the United States.[1] Since the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan when the Potsdam Declaration was issued, Russia had no voice in the forming of this historic document, which outlined

* A paper read at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, held in New York, April 1-3, 1958. A Japanese version of this paper was issued by the Secretariat of the Japanese Government Commission on the Constitution (Kempo Chosakai) in June 1958, and substantial revisions have subsequently been made. The author is grateful to the following for helpful suggestions: Dr. Hugh Borton, Mr. Joseph Gordon, Mr. Etsuro Horii, Dr. Gunji Hosono, Professor John M. Maki, Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Dr. Yasaka Takagi, Professor Robert E. Ward, and Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes. The author is especially indebted to Dr. Kenzo Takayanagi, Chairman of the Commission on the Constitution, for the privilege of discussing questions concerning constitutional revision at length with him and other members of the Commission in Tokyo and Hakone in August 1958 and February 1959. The Commission on the Constitution was established by the Japanese Diet in 1956 to study the origins, operation, and possible revision of the Japanese Constitution. Opinions expressed are those of the author. For an extensive bibliography of materials in Japanese and English on the new Japanese Constitution, the reader is referred to *Gaisei (Foreign Affairs Quarterly)*, Summer 1957.

[1] The Potsdam Declaration was based on a paper originally prepared by two U. S. State Department officials, Dr. George H. Blakeslee and Dr. Hugh Borton, a full year before the Potsdam Conference. F. C. Jones, Hugh Borton and B. R. Pearn, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Far East, 1942-1946* (London, 1955), p. 311n.

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Allied post-war policy for Japan. When the Potsdam Declaration was published, the Soviet Union protested that it had not been consulted. Fourteen days later, when Russia entered the war against Japan, she announced her support of the Potsdam principles. The issuance by the Western Allies of the Potsdam Declaration independently of the Soviet Union foreshadowed the predominantly American character of the Occupation and ultimately a separate Western peace with Japan.

Shortly before Japan's final capitulation, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov suggested that there be two Allied supreme commanders in Japan: Marshal Vasilievski and General MacArthur. United States Ambassador Harriman protested that in view of the comparative war efforts in the Pacific of the United States and the U.S.S.R. it would be unthinkable that any but an American should be Supreme Commander in Japan. Stalin later concurred with President Truman in the appointment of MacArthur as Supreme Commander.[2]

It was the United States that drew up General Order Number One, which partitioned the Japanese Empire among the Allied Powers for accepting the surrender of Japanese forces.[3] Premier Stalin, after studying the American draft, asked that the U.S.S.R. be permitted to occupy southern Sakhalin and northern Hokkaido in addition to the areas already assigned to the Soviet Union. Truman agreed to the Soviet occupation of southern Sakhalin, but not of northern Hokkaido, thus preventing the Russian occupation of any part of the home islands of Japan. Truman had recently experienced Russian stubbornness concerning Germany, Poland and the Balkans at the Potsdam Conference, and was determined that he would "not allow the Russians any part in the control of Japan".[4]

The United States planned to have the deciding voice in the Occupation of Japan while the other Allies would be permitted only to air their views in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

[2] Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East* (London, 1953), p. 107. In separate messages to Truman, Attlee and Chiang also concurred in the selection of MacArthur, according to information kindly supplied by Dr. Borton.

[3] Text in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan* (Washington, no date [1950?]), II, 423-436. These volumes will subsequently be cited as *Political Reorientation*.

[4] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*. Volume One: *Year of Decision* (Garden City, 1955), pp. 439-446.

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The Soviet Union, however, refused to participate in this Advisory Commission because of its purely consultative character. The Russians furthermore declined an invitation to send Soviet occupation forces to Japan to serve under an American general.[5] Japan was not divided into occupation zones to be administered by the different victorious Powers as were Germany, Austria and Korea. Instead, the Japanese homeland was occupied by American and British Commonwealth forces under the supreme command of a single American general. The nonparticipation of Russia and the overwhelming predominance of the United States in Japan were thus established from the beginning. The autocratic temperament of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was to preserve and enhance the American predominance. The policies of the United States on Japanese constitutional reform would be greatly influenced by its determination to maintain its unilateral control in Japan.

For four months the victorious Powers were unable to agree on the organization of Allied control machinery for Japan. Thus General MacArthur was able to interpret and apply American interpretations of the Potsdam Declaration[6] largely as he saw fit.

Japan's surrender had taken the form of the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, which called for the establishment of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" in accordance with the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people." On October 4, 1945, General MacArthur strongly urged Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Vice-Premier of the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet, to take the leadership in liberalizing the Japanese Constitution. The General introduced the Prince to Mr. George C. Atcheson, Jr., SCAP's Political Adviser, and suggested that Konoye meet with Atcheson from then on.[7] Atcheson represented the American State Department in Japan.

[5] *Political Reorientation*, II, 441. It seems, however, that once the Russians volunteered to send 20,000 troops to help in the occupation, but MacArthur threatened to resign if the offer was accepted. *Cf.* Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Principles, and Programs* (New York, 1954), p. 728.

[6] "U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan", in U. S. Department of State, *Occupation of Japan* (Washington, 1946), pp. 73-78, and *Political Reorientation*, II, 423-426.

[7] Dr. Yasaka Takagi, a close associate of Konoye, gives a brief, authoritative account in English of Konoye's activities in connection with constitutional revision in *Toward International Understanding* (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 114-123. See also Theodore McNelly, "Domestic and International Influences on Con-

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On October 9, the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet was replaced by the government of Baron Shidehara. Although Prince Konoye was no longer a cabinet member, on October 11 he obtained a commission from the Emperor to investigate "whether the Constitution needed revising and if so to what extent". Mr. Atcheson and other State Department people had a number of private conferences with Konoye and his advisers and indicated points in the Japanese Constitution which the Americans felt needed revision.[8] Although there was considerable agitation among the victorious Powers for the abolition of the Japanese monarchy, Mr. Atcheson did not demand the elimination of the emperor system, but rather outlined democratic reforms which would make possible the retention of the throne.

During the period of the Atcheson-Konoye conversations, Mr. Atcheson, on October 17, received the following very important instructions from Secretary of State Byrnes:

> There should be assurance that the Japanese Constitution is amended to provide for Government responsible to an electorate based upon wide representative suffrage. Provision should be made that executive branch of Government derive its authority from and be responsible to the electorate or to a full representative legislative body.
>
> If Emperor institution is not retained constitutional safeguards against that institution will obviously not be required but provision should be made for (1) complete control by an elected congress of financial and budgetary matters, (2) guarantee of fundamental civil rights to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction, not repeat not to Japanese only, and (3) action by head of state only pursuant to authority expressly delegated to him.
>
> If Emperor is retained following safeguards in addition to those enumerated above would be necessary: (1) a cabinet to advise and assist the Emperor should be chosen with advice and consent of and responsible to representative legislative body, (2) no repeat no vote [veto?] over legislative measures should be exercised by other bodies such as House of Peers or Privy Council, (3) Emperor should be required to initiate amendments to constitution recommended by cabinet and approved by legislative body, (4) legislative body should be permitted to meet at will, and (5) any ministers for armed forces which may be permitted in the future should be

stitutional Revision in Japan, 1945-1946" (Columbia University doctoral dissertation, 1952, published on microfilm by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan), chapter ii.

[8] Mr. Atcheson's advice to the Japanese is summarized in *Political Reorientation*, I, 91, and Takagi, *op. cit.*, p. 115n.

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civilians and all special privileges of direct access to throne by military should be eliminated.[9]

The instructions left open the question of whether the Emperor was to be retained or not. The provision concerning "armed forces which may be permitted in the future" is notable because later General MacArthur was to insist that the Constitution renounce war and armed forces.

There was a widespread feeling among the Allies that Konoye, because of his alleged war guilt, should not direct constitutional revision in Japan.[10] Furthermore, the office of the Lord Privy Seal, with which Konoye was connected, was not responsible to either the Diet or the Cabinet, so that there was no democratic basis for Konoye's efforts.

It is said that the parleys of the American State Department people in Japan with Prince Konoye angered the Supreme Commander, and he directed them to cease communicating with Konoye. SCAP Headquarters on November 1 announced that MacArthur had not chosen Konoye to reform the Japanese constitution.[11] It early became clear that General MacArthur,

[9] These instructions were mentioned with no indication of their substance in George H. Blakeslee, *The Far Eastern Commission: A study in International Cooperation* (Washington, 1953), p. 44. In November 1958, the State Department kindly provided the present author with the three relevant paragraphs here quoted, which make up part of the instructions of October 17. The instructions to Atcheson corresponded in spirit with the suggestions which he was giving the Konoye group, but there appear to be variations in detail.

[10] See *New York Times* editorial, October 28, 1945.

[11] The thesis that Konoye's efforts were repudiated by MacArthur in order to diminish State Department influence in Japan is developed in McNelly, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-47, based on talks with former State Department officials. However, Konoye's adviser, Dr. Takagi, indicated to the author in August 1958 his view that the repudiation of Konoye was primarily the result of the opposition of Konoye's political enemies in Japan.

It is sometimes said that an interpreter's mistake led Konoye to believe *erroneously* that MacArthur had urged him to assume leadership in revising the Japanese Constitution. However, Japanese close to Konoye insist strongly that MacArthur unequivocally indicated his intention that Konoye initiate a study of constitutional revision. The interpreter concerned was the best English translator then in the Foreign Office, Katsuzo Okumura, who later became Japan's Ambassador to Switzerland. (Commission on the Constitution, *Ninth Session of the Subcommittee on the Enactment of the Constitution, July 24, 1958*, p. 14.) The mere fact that the important Atcheson-Konoye talks stemmed from the MacArthur-Konoye conference would seem

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rather than the State Department, was running things in Japan.[12]

Prince Konoye did not suspend his activities simply because he had been disowned by SCAP. Assisted by Professor Soichi Sasaki and other experts, Konoye continued his investigations and made a report of his recommendations to the Emperor late in November. Konoye advocated the alteration of the Constitution to strengthen the Diet but not to destroy the principle that sovereignty resided in the Emperor.[13] In December, SCAP Headquarters indicted Konoye as a war criminal, and he committed suicide just before being arrested by the Americans.[14] Konoye's efforts to revise the

to indicate the clear intent of the American side that Konoye play a leading rôle in constitutional revision.

Political Reorientation (I, 91n) states that, as a result of one interview with MacArthur and one interview with Atcheson, Konoye made the "unwarranted assumption that MacArthur had personally charged him with the work of revision of the Constitution, whereas in fact he was being spoken to not only in the most general terms, but merely as a responsible member of the Japanese Cabinet." However, nearly all of the Atcheson-Konoye conversations were held when Konoye was no longer a member of the Cabinet.

[12] Throughout September and October, MacArthur had been establishing various "special staff sections" headed by military officers to direct civil affairs in Japan. The State Department people were later to be assigned to the Diplomatic Section, where they would not concern themselves with internal Japanese politics. For accounts of the early history of military government in Japan, see Carl J. Friedrich and associates, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York, 1948), pp. 318-354, and Paul A. Linebarger, Djang Chu and Ardath Burks, *Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan* (Princeton, 1956), pp. 445-486.

[13] The Konoye outline was published in the *Mainichi Shimbun* in late December 1945 and is reproduced in Isao Sato, *Kempo Kaisei no Keika* [*The Progress of Constitutional Revision*] (Tokyo, 1947), pp. 275-277. English translation in McNelly, *op. cit.*, pp. 382-386. A more authentic Japanese version, together with the draft Constitution recommended to the Emperor by Dr. Sasaki, was published by the Commission on the Constitution in July 1958.

[14] Konoye's fate might have been different if Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew had not resigned on August 15, 1945, or if Grew had accepted Secretary Byrnes's invitation to become Political Adviser to General MacArthur. As Ambassador to Japan, Grew had supported Prime Minister Konoye's request, which was not granted, for a personal conference with Roosevelt in 1941. Grew believed that such a conference might have averted the war. During the conflict, Grew had advocated retaining the Japanese Emperor, and he was gratified to see the United States government follow his line of thought. Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945* (Boston, 1952), II, 1521-1526.

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Constitution, like his efforts to bring about a peace in 1945, were primarily intended to preserve the Japanese throne.

In October, just as Konoye was beginning his investigations, General MacArthur directed the new Shidehara Cabinet to reform Japan's system of government. This would, he insisted, "unquestionably involve the liberalization of the Constitution".[15] However, Premier Shidehara publicly stated that it was unnecessary to alter the text of the Imperial Constitution in order to achieve democracy. He believed, as did many conservatives, that suitable legislation enacted by the Diet, such as laws expanding the franchise and the like, would be sufficient.[16] However in response to MacArthur's prodding, Shidehara appointed a committee of scholars and bureaucrats headed by Minister of State Joji Matsumoto to investigate "whether the Constitution needed to be revised and if so to what extent".[17] The Matsumoto group was very lukewarm toward any substantial changes in the Constitution. Only toward the end of December did they actually decide to draft concrete proposals for revision.

The December 1945 meeting of Big Three Foreign Ministers in Moscow set up an eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission (FEC) —including the Soviet Union—to formulate policy for the occupation of Japan. The United States, like the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China, would enjoy the power to veto proposed decisions of the Far Eastern Commission. The United States also would have the power to issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arose not already covered by the Commission's policies. However, "any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control, or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission." Thus it would appear that constitutional reform in Japan could not be unilaterally carried out by American Occupation authorities. General MacArthur protested that he had not been consulted in the matter of setting up the Far Eastern Commission and the four-

[15] *Political Reorientation*, II, 741.

[16] *Yomiuri*, October 13, 1945, cited by Isao Sato, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[17] An authoritative account in English of the work of the Matsumoto Committee is given by Tatsuo Sato, "The Origin and Development of the Draft Constitution of Japan", *Contemporary Japan*, vol. XXIV, Nos. 4-6, 7-9, 1956.

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Power Allied Council for Japan, and he bitterly opposed the internationalization of the Occupation.[18]

During the war, in December 1944, there had come into being in Washington the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC, pronounced "swink"), composed of representatives of the Departments of State, War and Navy. This highly influential body, whose existence was unknown to the general public, formulated the United States surrender and post-surrender policies for Germany and Japan, and drafted the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender signed by the Japanese in September 1945.

On January 7, 1946, a few days after the decision of the Moscow Conference to establish the Far Eastern Commission, SWNCC drew up a policy on "The Reform of the Japanese Governmental System", usually designated as "SWNCC-228".[19] The purpose of the paper was to "determine the constitutional reforms which the Occupation authorities should insist be carried out in Japan". On January 11 the paper was forwarded to MacArthur for his "information", but the phraseology made it clear that the United States government expected the Supreme Commander to carry out the policies contained in the paper.[20]

The fourteen-page SWNCC document gave every appearance of being based on the State Department instructions to Atcheson of October 17. All of the October 17 provisions were to be found in the SWNCC paper, frequently expressed in identical terms. SWNCC-228 also included a long scholarly "Discussion" which analyzed the defects of the Imperial Constitution of 1889 and revealed the thinking behind the proposed revisions. SWNCC-228 specified that "The Japanese should be encouraged to abolish the Emperor system or reform it along more democratic lines". However, "Only as a last resort shall the Supreme Commander order

[18] *Political Reorientation,* II, 744.

[19] This important document is summarized in Blakeslee, *op. cit.,* p. 45, and relevant sections are quoted in Robert E. Ward, "The Origins of the Japanese Constitution", *The American Political Science Review,* vol. L, No. 4 (December 1956), pp. 980-1009. The State Department, however, had not provided Professor Ward with the complete document. The Department supplied the Commission on the Constitution with nearly all of the paper in 1958, and the Commission published the text and a Japanese translation in April 1958. The Department later kindly provided the author with a thermofax copy of what appears to be the complete text.

[20] Blakeslee, *op. cit.,* p. 45. Under the terms of reference of the FEC, the United States was not empowered to issue interim directives to SCAP concerning constitutional reform.

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the Japanese Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they have been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future."

On January 30, the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (the predecessor of the Far Eastern Commission) visited MacArthur in Japan. The General indicated to the members that he was not then taking action on constitutional reform because the Moscow Agreement of December, which set up the FEC, had deprived him of authority in the matter. He said, however, that he hoped the Constitution would be reformed in such a way that the Japanese would regard the resulting document as a Japanese product. A constitution imposed by bayonets, he said, could not outlast the Occupation.[21]

In January and February 1946, the Liberal and Progressive parties were advocating constitutional amendments to enhance the powers of the Diet without altering the principle that sovereignty resided in the Emperor. The Social Democrats advocated some modification of the principle of imperial sovereignty.[22] The Communists demanded the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal and advocated the establishment of a Japanese People's Republic.

Cabinet Minister Matsumoto and his committee on constitutional reform began to work overtime, and on February 1 the *Mainichi Shimbun* published what it claimed was the Matsumoto Committee's "tentative draft".[23] The *Mainichi* version of the Matsumoto proposals was widely criticized in Japan as too conservative. Although the published text reflected the thinking of the Committee fairly accurately, a government spokesman denied that it represented the work of the Committee.

The Matsumoto group, unlike the Konoye group, had failed to get American advice before embarking on its investigation. General MacArthur found the Matsumoto proposals unacceptable because they were too reactionary. He did not wait for the Cabinet to submit formally its proposals to him,[24] and on February 3, he

[21] Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[22] Japanese texts of Liberal, Progressive and Socialist party outlines are found in Isao Sato, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-297. English translations in McNelly, *op. cit.*, pp. 387-403.

[23] Japanese text in Isao Sato, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-288. English translation in *Political Reorientation*, II, 611-616.

[24] *Political Reorientation*, I, 101, states that the Japanese government submitted a "Gist Revision of the Constitution" and a "General Explanation

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directed his Government Section to prepare immediately a constitution to serve as a "guide" for the Shidehara Cabinet as "the most effective method of instructing the Japanese government on the . . . principles he considered basic".[25]

The Supreme Commander directed that the "guide" provide that the Emperor be "at the head of the state" and that his powers be "exercised according to the will of the people". The draft was also to state that

> War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.[26]

The constitutional ban on war and arms had been originally suggested to MacArthur by Prime Minister Shidehara on January 24, 1946,[27] and was incorporated in the draft Constitution as a

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of Constitutional Revision" to the Supreme Commander on February 1. However, authoritative Japanese sources indicate that these were not presented to SCAP Headquarters until several days *after* MacArthur had ordered his Government Section to prepare a rejection of the Matsumoto proposals and to prepare a draft Constitution. Commission on the Constitution, *Fifth General Meeting, November 6, 1957,* p. 9.

[25] A rather frank account of the origins of the SCAP draft Constitution is contained in *Political Reorientation,* I, 101-112. This account, however, is written from the point of view of Government Section and scarcely mentions the policies of the Far Eastern Commission and the attitudes of the various Allies concerning the Japanese Constitution. The Far Eastern Commission was still alive and functioning early in 1950 when the SCAP report was published, and it seems most unlikely that Government Section would admit officially that its policies on constitutional reform were designed with an eye to frustrating the desires of some of the Allies.

[26] The text of MacArthur's famous "Three Points" is given in *Political Reorientation,* I, 102. The lawyers in Government Section did not include "even for preserving its own security" in their draft of February 13, 1946, nor did this phrase appear in subsequent versions.

[27] See Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York, 1956), pp. 257-258, and letter of General MacArthur to Dr. Takayanagi, Chairman of the Commission on the Constitution, December 10, 1958. Evidence exists to the effect that the no-war clause was suggested by Shidehara as a means of preserving the Emperor system. (Commission on the Constitution, *Twenty-fourth General Meeting, January 21, 1959.*) It is said that Shidehara had drafted the Emperor's New Year's Rescript of January 1,

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result of the General's enthusiastic advocacy. Such a provision had nowhere figured in the October 17 instructions to Atcheson, SWNCC-228, or the informal Matsumoto proposals. Indeed, all of these plans clearly contemplated the possible reëstablishment of the armed forces. Although the documentary instructions from Washington to the Supreme Commander which we have cited leave open the question of the fate of the Emperor, MacArthur could not remove the Emperor without the consent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whether or not the final decision to retain the throne was made by General MacArthur, the preservation of the Emperor was his fixed purpose.[28]

The Government Section worked in extreme secrecy between February 4 and 10 to produce its draft Constitution.[29] On February 13, 1946, General Courtney Whitney, Chief of Government Section, presented the draft Constitution to members of the Japanese Cabinet with the understanding that if they did not accept its essential principles, MacArthur would present it over their heads to the Japanese people. Whitney also said that if the Cabinet refused to adopt the principles of the MacArthur Constitution, the Americans could not guarantee "the person of the Emperor".[30]

1946, primarily in order to make the Emperor more acceptable to Allied opinion. In that famous Rescript the Emperor renounced his divinity.

[28] See letter of General MacArthur to Dr. Takayanagi, of December 5, 1958. The "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan", of November 7, 1945, had stated, "You will not remove the Emperor or take any steps towards his removal without prior consultation with and advice issued to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff." *Political Reorientation*, II, 429-439.

[29] The original mimeographed text of the Whitney draft Constitution, as presented to the Japanese Cabinet on February 13, 1946, was published in *Kokka Gakkai Zassi (The Journal of the Association of Political and Social Sciences)*, vol. LXVIII, No. 1, p. 2 (September 1954), and in *Contemporary Japan*, vol. XXIV, Nos. 4-6, 7-9, 1956. One of the original mimeographed copies is in the Japanese Diet Library.

[30] Tatsuo Sato, "Nihon Kempo Seiritsushi" ["History of the Formulation of the Japanese Constitution"], *Jurisuto*, No. 82, cited by Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 997. Tatsuo Sato was formerly Chief of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau and served on the Matsumoto Committee. He is now Senior Specialist (on Constitution) of the National Diet Library. His close association with the formulation of the Constitution and thorough scholarship lend much authority to his long series of articles on the Constitution in *Jurisuto*. See also Tatsuo Sato, *Nipponkoku Kempo Tanjoki* [*Record of the Birth of the Japanese Constitution*] (Tokyo, 1957).

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Dr. Matsumoto felt strongly that General Whitney brought up the question of the "person of the Emperor" as a threat to indict the Emperor as a war criminal if the Japanese did not accept the American draft.[31] It seems certain, however, that Whitney intended no such threat at all—he simply meant to advise the Japanese on what they would have to do to save the Emperor in the light of the objective situation. The trial of the Emperor as a war criminal and the abolition of the throne were widely advocated among the Allies. There was much criticism that the American Occupation of Japan was too soft toward the aggressors in World War II. Furthermore United States policy, expressed both in the October 17 instructions to Atcheson and in SWNCC-228, demanded that either (1) the throne be eliminated or (2) the prerogatives of the Emperor be greatly curtailed.

MacArthur had stoutly resisted British and Russian efforts to try the Emperor as a war criminal. He believed that if the Emperor were indicted, at least one million reinforcements would be needed in Japan, and military government would have to be set up throughout the whole country.[32] The Emperor had personally helped to bring about the Japanese surrender without the need for an Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland, and for the past five months the Emperor's government had been obediently enforcing American directives.[33]

Colonel Charles L. Kades and Commander A. Rodman Hussey, of Government Section, had a private conference with Chief Cabinet Secretary Wataru Narahashi. Narahashi has described this conversation as follows. Kades and Hussey told him in strictest

[31] Statement of the late Dr. Matsumoto to Liberal Party Constitution Investigation Committee, July 7, 1954. Other Japanese at the meeting did not interpret Whitney's statements in the same manner as Dr. Matsumoto. General Whitney does not refer to such a "threat" in his account of the famous February 13 meeting. He says, however, that he mentioned "atomic sunshine". (Whitney, *op. cit.*, pp. 250 *et seq.*) General Whitney's letter to the Commission on the Constitution makes it clear that he had no intention of threatening to put the Emperor on trial. The Americans pursued humanitarian policies in Japan, he pointed out, rather than the harsh—even brutal—policies advocated by some Allied governments.

[32] Whitney, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

[33] The policy of the United States to "use but not support" the Imperial Government had been advocated throughout the war by former Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew. The timing of the Japanese surrender had been decisive in the preservation of the Japanese throne. See Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, 1954).

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confidence of secret reports that the Soviet Union and two or three other members of the Far Eastern Commission were planning to direct MacArthur to issue a republican constitution for Japan which would eliminate the throne. If an attempt was made to carry out such a policy, they said, extreme confusion and popular disturbances directed against the Occupation would result. Kades and Hussey admitted that it was unreasonable to insist that the Japanese Cabinet draft in the short period of two weeks a constitution based on the American document. However it was absolutely necessary that the Japanese government forestall a Far Eastern Commission draft by sponsoring a constitution sufficiently drastic that the FEC could make no objections to it. The SCAP draft, Kades and Hussey said, was intended for Japan's own benefit.

Narahashi was cautioned to keep this information secret not only from the public but also from SCAP's Political Adviser, Mr. Atcheson, in order to avoid complications with the State Department. If he let word of the conference leak out, he would be punished. The Cabinet Secretary then told members of the Cabinet of his conversation with the American officials and advanced his belief that the SCAP draft Constitution would act as a "lightning rod" to prevent great damage.[34]

On February 21, MacArthur explained the situation in the FEC to Premier Shidehara. He reportedly complained that the FEC and its policies were making his position very difficult and he did not know how much longer he could remain at his post. He said that there was no essential difference between the Japanese and American draft constitutions. The purpose of the American draft, he asserted, was to preserve the Emperor. The Supreme Commander also emphasized the importance of constitutional disarmament in the light of international opinion.[35]

The Cabinet was afraid that if it did not adopt the SCAP draft, the Far Eastern Commission might force it to adopt a republican constitution abolishing the throne.[36] Cabinet members also feared that if they did not accept the MacArthur draft, SCAP Head-

[34] Commission on the Constitution, *Fifth General Meeting, November 6, 1957*, pp. 24, 44.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 33. Whitney, *op. cit.*, p. 254, states that on February 22 the Emperor "commanded" a hesitant and divided Cabinet to accept the MacArthur draft as a basis for constitutional revision, saying, "upon these principles will truly rest the welfare of our people and the rebuilding of Japan".

[36] Commission on the Constitution, *Fifth General Meeting, November 6, 1957*, p. 30.

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quarters would publish it and the newspapers would approve it. In this case, the Shidehara Cabinet might be forced to resign and a cabinet which supported the MacArthur Constitution would come into being. Politics in Japan would then veer sharply to the left.[37]

In response to much urging from both the Cabinet and the American side, Minister of State Matsumoto prepared an adaptation of the American draft and brought it to SCAP Headquarters on March 4. After Dr. Matsumoto's departure, Government Section officials suddenly insisted that final Japanese and English versions be prepared immediately for approval by higher authorities. There ensued, on March 4 and 5, a hectic 36-hour overnight session of Japanese and American officials to produce a text acceptable to the Americans. The final document conformed very closely to the original Government Section draft in both essentials and nonessentials. The most important of the concessions to Japanese views was that the Diet would consist of two chambers rather than of only one. The proposed Constitution would deprive the Emperor of all of his prerogatives and vest sovereignty in the people. It was replete with New Deal philosophy and was more radical than any of the proposals of the leading parties except the Communist.[38] It reduced the Emperor's rôle to that of "the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people".

On the afternoon of March 5, Headquarters forwarded ten copies of the final English version to the Cabinet together with an inquiry as to whether or not the Cabinet would accept it before the day was over. If the Cabinet chose not to accept the draft, the American-proposed Constitution would be made public in the evening. It seemed to the Cabinet that if the American side published the draft, the Japanese side could not very well avoid publishing it too. Late in the day the Cabinet reached the decision that there was no alternative left but to adopt the draft Constitution as it then was.

[37] Commission on the Constitution, *Seventh General Meeting, December 4, 5, 1957*, p. 75.

[38] The February 13 draft had contained what Dr. Matsumoto thought was the "Red Provision": "The ultimate fee to the land and to all natural resources reposes in the State as the collective representative of the people". Perhaps this clause was intended merely as a statement of the principle of eminent domain. It was removed on the request of the Japanese. SCAP's policies in Japan were more socialistic than was generally realized in the United States, where the General gained a reputation as a rock-ribbed conservative.

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In the evening, when the Prime Minister showed the proposed Constitution to the Emperor, his Majesty said he supposed that there was no other course. However he expressed hopes that it would be possible to preserve the court nobility and the imperial prerogative relative to the revision of the Imperial House Law. But the Cabinet feared possible domestic and international repercussions if the draft were altered, and no action was taken on the Emperor's comments.

An hour or two later, Premier Shidehara told his Cabinet:

> We are making an extremely grave commitment in accepting such a Constitution as this. Perhaps this commitment will also bind our posterity. When this draft is made public, some will applaud and others will keep silence. The latter will undoubtedly be highly indignant at bottom towards us. However I believe that we are following the only possible course in view of the situation confronting us.[39]

Some ministers wiped tears from their eyes.

On March 6, 1946, the Cabinet published the American-inspired Constitution as its own proposal and made public an imperial rescript indicating the Emperor's approval of the democratic principles of the draft and implying that the Cabinet had drawn up the proposal on his orders. General MacArthur also published his "emphatic approval" of the document.

The Far Eastern Commission was now faced with the *fait accompli* of a draft Constitution publicly approved by the Japanese Cabinet, the Emperor of Japan, and the Allied Supreme Commander. MacArthur's Headquarters was normally expected to issue formal written directives to the Japanese Cabinet when Allied policy required specific action by the Imperial Government. However, no such written directive (or "SCAPIN") was ever issued directing the Cabinet to revise the Constitution.[40] Thus MacArthur and the United States government could not be held responsible by the other Allied Powers for initiating such a radical policy. Instead, SCAP and the Secretary of State maintained the myth that the Japanese had originated the idea, that they had a perfect right to democratize their form of government, and that the Supreme Commander was only encouraging them in the laudable enterprise.

Some members of the Far Eastern Commission were extremely

[39] Commission on the Constitution, *Seventh General Meeting, December 4, 5, 1957*, pp. 75 *et seq.*—translation by the present author.

[40] Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century* (New York, 1955), p. 401.

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indignant and felt strongly that MacArthur had exceeded his authority and infringed on the powers of the FEC in the matter of reforming the Japanese Constitution.[41] However, their position was weak because the American veto power in the Commission could prevent it from adopting policies opposed by the United States. Furthermore, the Commission was not empowered to deal with SCAP directly. It communicated its policies to the American State Department, which through the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur.

The Far Eastern Commission, however, demanded that the Supreme Commander point out to the Japanese people that his approval of the draft Constitution did "not preclude favorable consideration of other proposals or drafts which may be submitted to the Diet for study and comparison".[42] MacArthur allotted scarce paper supplies to the "Society for the Popularization of the New Constitution" so that a copy of the draft Constitution might be delivered to every home.[43] SCAP circles were prone to refer to their proposal as "the New Constitution" even before it was enacted by the Diet.

During the critical food shortage of May 1946, a series of leftist-led mass demonstrations in Tokyo induced General MacArthur to issue a public "Warning Against Mob Disorder and Violence".[44] The Supreme Commander had been initially instructed by the United States government not to intervene in any efforts by the Japanese people to change their form of government by force, unless the security of Allied forces was endangered.[45] However, he abhorred the thought of civil war in Japan,[46] and it was clear that any change in Japan's form of government would have to come about through nonviolent methods.

In July the Americans in the Far Eastern Commission were able

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 405. The running controversy between MacArthur and the FEC over their respective powers concerning constitutional revision is detailed in Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-65.

[42] Text in *Political Reorientation*, II, 658. In the same policy statement the FEC also expressed its desire that the Supreme Commander inform the Japanese government that the Commission would have to pass on the final draft of the Constitution to determine whether it was consistent with the Potsdam Declaration before it could be acted on by the Diet or become finally valid.

[43] Whitney, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

[44] Text in *Political Reorientation*, II, 750.

[45] "U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan", cited in note 6.

[46] Whitney, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-247.

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to persuade the Commission to adopt the points contained in SWNCC-228 as FEC's "Basic Principles for a New Constitution".[47] The Communists were the only political party to oppose MacArthur's draft Constitution. They continued to advocate the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal, and the establishment of a Japanese People's Republic.[48] The Japanese Communists had an ally in the FEC: the Soviet representative, who also opposed the MacArthur Constitution.[49]

Conservatives in the Diet expressed fears that the draft Constitution would impair the traditional "national polity" *(Kokutai)* by transferring sovereignty from the Emperor to the people.[50] It was also feared that the no-arms clause would endanger Japan's security. However, Diet members seemed to believe that the passage of the democratic Constitution was necessary to bring an early end to the Allied Occupation and approved the draft Constitution by nearly unanimous majorities. Although the new Constitution provided for separation of church and state, His Majesty announced the promulgation to his ancestors in special ceremonies at three shrines.

The Australians and others in the Far Eastern Commission, however, believed that the new Constitution was not an expression of the free will of the Japanese people.[51] In October 1946, the Commission adopted a policy providing that both the Diet and the FEC "review the situation with respect to the Constitution" between May 3, 1948, and May 3, 1949, and that the Commission might require a referendum or other procedure to ascertain Japanese opinion on the Constitution.[52] But General MacArthur, always reluctant to recognize the prerogatives of the international body, did not inform the Japanese government of this policy until the Commission threatened to make the policy public.[53] The Diet did not formally review the Constitution during the specified

[47] Text in *Political Reorientation*, II, 661.

[48] Text of Communist draft Constitution appears in Isao Sato, *Kempo Kaisei no Keika* [*The Progress of Constitutional Revision*], pp. 297-311.

[49] Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[50] The Diet debate on the draft Constitution is described in Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, *The New Japan* (Minneapolis, 1956), pp. 127-163.

[51] Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[52] *Political Reorientation*, II, 668.

[53] FEC policy decision of December 6, 1946, in *ibid.*, p. 678. MacArthur's letter to Prime Minister Yoshida of January 3, 1947, in *ibid.*, p. 681. The author is indebted to Dr. Borton for information on this point.

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period, nor was any plebiscite held. Japanese officials and the Supreme Commander felt that to review the Constitution under foreign pressure would undermine its prestige.

The struggle over the drafting and adoption of the Japanese Constitution may be regarded as a three-way affair. The conservative Japanese officials strove to preserve the imperial institution essentially unchanged. The Americans, both in Tokyo and in Washington, endeavored to preserve and reform the throne as a basis for stability and democracy. International communism, represented by the Japan Communist party and the Soviet Union, sought to abolish the throne and establish a Japanese People's Republic.

The Korean War dramatically demonstrated the strategic importance of Japan. MacArthur in 1946 had hailed the renunciation of war and arms as the "foremost" provision of the new Constitution. He now encouraged the Japanese to establish a National Police Reserve, which would serve as the nucleus for a new Japanese Army. The rearmament of Japan thus began in 1950. Ever since, the problem of Japanese rearmament has been confused with debate concerning its constitutionality.

The lack of enthusiasm of the Japanese people for the anti-communist cause in Korea suggested to the American State Department the desirability of giving Japan a stake in the cause of national independence.[54] Mr. Dulles therefore offered the Japanese a peace settlement granting them their independence but providing for the right of the Americans to maintain bases in Japan. The 1951 peace treaty encouraged Japan to repudiate the no-armaments clause of her Constitution by spelling out her sovereign right of individual and collective self-defense. The Security Pact signed on the same day provided that "Japan will increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression." Thus the Cold War has apparently played havoc with the disarmament provisions of the MacArthur Constitution.

Vice President Nixon, in December 1953, told the Japanese that the former American policy of disarming Japan had been a mistake. The Japanese-American Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 and the 1958 Quemoy crisis raised further doubts as to the wisdom of the disarmament clause. At the same time, the apparent need for more effective control of Communist activities within Japan led to interpretations of the Constitution not originally con-

[54] Borton, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

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templated. To strengthen central control over the police and the educational system, local autonomy provided for in the Constitution was weakened. Freedom of expression and the right to strike were interpreted less broadly.

In order to strengthen the executive branch and enhance the prestige of the national bureaucracy, it is now being widely urged that the Emperor be restored to his pre-war position as something more than a symbol. Prime Minister Kishi, long a leader in the constitutional revision movement, has advocated a change in the Constitution to provide that the Emperor be "Head of the State", rather than merely "Symbol of the State".[55] In 1956, the Japanese Diet voted to create a special commission (Kempo Chosakai) to investigate the origins, operation and possible revision of the present Constitution. Other Occupation reforms, such as the purge and the breaking up of zaibatsu monopolies, have been watered down, repudiated or reversed to meet the international situation. The MacArthur Constitution might suffer a similar fate.

Conservative Japanese emphasize the alien origin of the new Constitution as a good justification for its alteration.[56] Unfortunately the appearance of imposing a constitution on Japan seems to have affronted the national pride of some Japanese and may have strengthened the antidemocratic and reactionary attitudes the Constitution was intended to destroy. Such unhappy results of the procedure of its creation would seem especially ironic since some of its principal features, especially disarmament, now run counter to American policy.

It must be noted, however, that not all Japanese feel that the

[55] See "The Atlantic Report: Japan", *The Atlantic,* vol. 200, No. 4 (October 1957), pp. 19-23. Kishi served as chairman of his party's Constitution Problem Investigation Committee before becoming Prime Minister.

[56] For one example, see Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "Nihonkoku Kempo no Shinseikatsu to Jishu Kempo no Hitsuzensei" ["The Actual Nature of the 'Constitution of Japan' and the Need for a Voluntary Constitution"], *Gaisei,* Summer 1957, pp. 48-59. It would be a mistake, however, to say that all of the Right advocates revision and all of the Left opposes revision of the new Constitution. Former Prime Minister Yoshida, for example, opposes revising the present Constitution, which he regards as well calculated to preserve the throne.

The strong showing of the Socialists in the elections for the House of Councillors in July 1956 assures them of control of more than one third of the seats in that Chamber, making constitutional change improbable at least until after the next elections for the Upper House in 1959. Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan* (Cambridge, 1957), p. 329.

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American-drafted Constitution was an "imposed constitution" *(oshitsuketa kempo)*. A number of leading statesmen and scholars feel that the events leading to the adoption of the new Constitution should be viewed in the light of an international situation which impelled both General MacArthur and the Japanese government to fend off the harsh policies advocated by some Allied Powers—policies which could easily have resulted in disaster for Japan. The distinguished Chairman of the Commission on the Constitution, Dr. Kenzo Takayanagi, upon his return from an investigation in the United States in 1958, reported his opinion that the 1947 Constitution had not been imposed upon Japan.[57]

In the light of the frustrations and catastrophies in Germany and Korea which resulted from sharing control of those countries with the Soviet Union, it would seem that General MacArthur and the Japanese had good reason to fear the efforts of other Allies to interfere in the occupation of Japan. The *fait accompli* of the March 6 draft Constitution was viewed by MacArthur's staff as a victory over Russian intrigues to intervene in the American Occupation of Japan.[58] Thus regarded, the new Japanese Constitution was clearly a product of the Cold War. If there had been no tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, constitutional reform in Japan would have had quite a different history.

Ever since Commodore Perry's visit to Japan in 1853, international politics have been decisive in the development of Japan's legal and political institutions. The legal and constitutional reforms of the Meiji period (1869-1912) were designed largely to hasten the end of the "unequal treaties" which had been imposed on Japan by the European Powers and the United States. In the middle of the twentieth century, with MacArthur and the Cold War, diplomatic considerations once again have governed constitutional development in Japan. The new Japanese Constitution was a child of the Cold War. It could conceivably become a casualty of the Cold War.

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[57] Commission on the Constitution, *Twenty-fourth General Meeting, January 21, 1959.*

[58] Whitney, *op. cit.*, pp. 247, 257.

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ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO DEMOCRACY: THE EXAMPLE OF ISRAEL

EACH generation seems to work out its own definition of democracy. Since the totalitarian states have imitated many of the more external signs of democracy such as elections and party systems, an effort has been made to establish a definition which will clearly distinguish totalitarian from democratic régimes. There is a strong tendency to call a state democratic if the governmental power can be transferred from one party to another in a regularized way; that is, peacefully and in accordance with the rules of the constitution.[1] The party in office must not use its power to block the return of the other party or parties. Any attempt to do so is a violation of the rules of the game and is in itself an argument for a change of administration. In short, it is to the system and not to a leader or a party that the supreme loyalty of the voters is directed.

The frequent alternation of parties, it is further argued, keeps the government in harmony with the shifting distribution of power in society. Social changes quickly have their influence on the political situation and on the policies that are pursued. The equilibrium of the political system is maintained.[2]

It is obvious that this understanding of democracy draws heavily on Anglo-Saxon experience with a two-party system and the rule of law. But is the Anglo-Saxon form the only possible form of democracy? A priori this would hardly seem likely. It is the purpose of this article to describe what may be regarded as an alternative form, and to try to explain some of the political, economic and social conditions in which it appears and is maintained.

We shall use the government of Israel as our example of a politi-

[1] For some relevant discussions, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York, 1950); S. M. Lipset, M. A. Trow and J. S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, 1956); Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1950); H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946), pp. 225-26, 242; S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Political Sociology* (Tel Aviv, 1955), pp. 28-30 (in Hebrew).

[2] See Talcott Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System", in Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck, eds., *Continuities of Social Research*, Vol. III: *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959).

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cal system which is democratic and yet different from the Anglo-Saxon model. Among the basic features of the Israeli government are a multiple party system and coalition ministries in which one center party (Mapai) is always present and always stronger than the other parties. To leave this party out of the ministry is simply not a part of the accepted procedures of the system. The party is one of the political institutions of the country and is identified with the state in the minds of many voters. In fact, too, because of its long term of office it has permeated the governmental, administrative, economic and other institutions of Israel. Yet that country is democratic, for shifts in public opinion and in the distribution of social power lead to changes in governmental policy and the vital harmony between state and society is maintained.

Having analyzed the Israeli system in the main body of our paper, we shall devote some concluding paragraphs to a comparative note. Its purpose is to stimulate analysis of some other political systems that are also democratic but different from the Anglo-Saxon model of democracy.

I. *Mapai: A Case of an Institutionalized Party*

A. *Mapai—a Dominant Center Party*

An analysis of Mapai (Labor party) is the key to an understanding of the Israeli political system. Mapai gained more votes in all three elections to the *Knesset* (parliament) than any other party. Actually it obtained more seats than the next three parties combined. (See Table 1.)

Mapai has been the major party in all eight Israeli governments during the ten-year period following the establishment of the state of Israel. Usually it has held nine out of sixteen portfolios in the various coalitions, always including the key ones of prime minister, defense, foreign affairs, police, treasury, and education, leaving to other parties the post office, welfare, justice, agriculture, interior[3] and other secondary ministries. Thus Mapai has been the dominating political force in the Israeli government.[4]

[3] The Interior Ministry has limited political significance in Israel because it has no control over the police force (which is under the control of a separate ministry), because its budget—like the budget of all ministries—is under scrutiny of the Treasury, and because the local municipalities have a strong tradition of political independence.

[4] B. Akzin, "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy", *Journal of Politics*, vol. XVII, 1955.

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TABLE 1

SEATS GAINED BY PARTIES AT THE THREE *Knesset* ELECTIONS

	1949	%	*1951*	%	*1955*	%
Mapai	46	38.3	45	37.5	40	33.3
Herut	14	11.7	8	6.7	15	12.5
General Zionists	7	5.8	20	16.7	13	10.8
Ahdut HaAvoda	19	15.8	15	12.4	10	8.3
Mapam					9	7.5
Hapoel Hamizrahi	16	13.3	8	6.7	11	9.2
Mizrahi			2	1.7		
Agudat Israel			3	2.5	6	5.0
Poaley Agudat Israel			2	1.7		
Communists	4	3.3	5	4.2	6	5.0
Mapai Arab parties	2	1.7	5	4.2	5	4.2
Progressives	5	4.2	4	3.3	5	4.2
Sephardim	4	3.3	2	1.7	..	..
Yemenites	1	0.8	1	0.8	..	..
Minor parties	2	1.7	..	...	..	..
	120	99.9	120	100.1	120	100.0

Mapai's control over the political life of the country goes far beyond a strong control of the government. Israel differs from other societies by having three major national political organizations, each with a "government" of its own. In addition to the regular government the Jewish Agency and the General Federation of Labor *(Histadrut)* have important political functions. The former is the major agency which recruits financial aid for Israel from Jews in the Diaspora and organizes migration to, and settlement in, Israel. The scope of its activities is well illustrated by the size of its budget, which was 211.5 million Israeli *lirot* (about 122 million dollars) for 1958-59, compared with the budget of the Israeli government, which amounted to 969 million Israeli *lirot* in 1957-58.

The political significance of the Jewish Agency will be clarified by examinations of the political significance of immigation. According to Israeli law new immigrants become citizens upon arrival in the country and immediately obtain the right to vote. Since the Israeli political parties have cognate parties in the Jewish communities abroad, regulation of immigation has direct political consequences.

The Jewish Agency is governed by a coalition of all the major Israeli parties except the Communists. As in the government of the state of Israel, Mapai has more representatives on the Executive

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Board of the Jewish Agency than any other party.[5] More than that, its members hold important positions, as for instance chairman of the board in Jerusalem, heads of the departments of settlement, of absorption of new immigrants, of education and youth.

The third national political organization of extraordinary importance is the General Federation of Labor. Its special position in Israeli society has often been discussed.[6] The *Histadrut* is governed by an Executive Board elected by a national convention. The elections are organized according to the proportional system and representation is by political parties. The Board is a coalition government in which all the major *Histadrut* parties except the Communist participate. Mapai has an absolute majority in the *Histadrut* (see Table 2). In 1957, eight out of thirteen members

TABLE 2

POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF *Histadrut* CONVENTIONS, V-VIII, 1942-1955

	V April 1942	*VI* Jan. 1945		*VII* May 1949	*VIII* Feb. 1955
	%	%		%	%
Mapai	69.3	53.7	Mapai	57.06	57.54
Hashomer Hatzair	19.2	20.7	Ahdut HaAvoda	34.40	14.61
Left Poale Zion	5.8				
Unity of Labor Party	..	17.7	Mapam		12.54
Haoved Hatzioni	..	3.0	Progr.	3.8	5.25
Aliya Hadasha	..	3.0			
Revisionists	..	0.2			
Religious Workers	..	1.0	Rel. Wkrs.	2.0	1.96
Yemenites	..	0.5			
Unattached	..	0.2			
General Zionists Worker	3.5	..	Gen'l. Zionists	..	3.01
Proletarian Group	2.2	..	Communists*	2.6	4.09
Total	100.0	100.0		99.86	99.80
Valid Votes	81,198	106,420		130,670	410,435

* Varying composition between 1949-55.

[5] The Zionist Congress elects two branches of the executive board, one seated in Jerusalem and one in New York. The Jerusalem branch is believed to have more political significance. Mapai had five out of eleven members, including the chairman, on the board elected by the 23rd Zionist Congress in August 1951. In New York, Mapai had two members out of eight.

[6] See Margaret L. Plunkett, "The *Histadrut:* The General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 155-182.

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TABLE 3

CONSTITUTION OF THE FOUR ASSEMBLIES OF THE ELECTED

	I 4-19-1920		*II* 12-6-1925			*III* 1-15-1931			*IV* 8-1-1944 [d]	
	Seats	%	*Seats*	%		*Seats*	%		*Seats*	%
Ahdut HaAvoda	70	22.3	54	24.4	Mapai	31	43.7		63	52.9
Hapoel Hatzair	41	13.1	30	13.6	Poalei Zion	1	1.4		..	
Communists	..	...	6	2.7		2	2.8		21	17.6
Yemenites	12	3.8	20	9.0		3	4.2		..	
Other Oriental Lists	60 [a]	19.1	20	9.0		[c]	..		..	
Religious Parties	64	20.4	19	8.6		5	7.0		17 [e]	14.3
Revisionists	..	...	15	6.8		15	21.1			
Var. Middle Class Lists	67 [b]	21.3	44 [b]	19.9		14	19.7			
League for Women Rights	..	...	13	5.9				Aliah Hadasha	18	15.1
	314	100.0	221	99.9		71	99.9		119	99.9
Registered Voters	28,755		64,714			89,656			303,000	
Valid Votes	22,257		36,737			50,436			202,448	
Valid Votes, per cent of Reg.	77.0		56.7			56.2			67.0	

[a] Includes: Sephardim, 54; Bucharim, 5; Gurgim, 1.
[b] 10 lists in 1920, 13 in 1925, 3 in 1931.
[c] Sephardim votes included 6 Middle Class, 5 Revisionists, 4 Mapai.
[d] Sephardim, General Zionists and Revisionists boycotted the elections.
[e] Only Hapoel Hamizrahi participated.

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of the Executive Board of this organization belonged to Mapai. Thus Mapai is not just the major partner in the government of the state; it is also the strongest political force in the Jewish Agency and the ruling party in the *Histadrut*.

Mapai domination in the political realm antedates the establishment of the Israeli state. The Jewish community in Palestine had a semiautonomous political status under the British mandate. A political organization was established in 1920 and later was formally recognized by the British government. While the organization officially had only education and welfare functions, attempts were made by the Jewish community, in its struggle for full political independence, to increase the functions and the significance of this organization. Its semiofficial parliament was called Assembly of the Elected[7] and the "government" elected by it was named The National Committee.[8] (See Table 3.)

Mapai originated in 1930 from a merger of two smaller parties. Since then it has become a major political party in the *Histadrut* (see Table 2) and an important political factor in the Zionist Congress. Mapai showed its power for the first time in the 1931 elections to the Assembly in which it obtained 43.7 per cent of the vote and gained control of the National Committee. From this election till the day a premiership was created in the first Israeli government, a Mapai member was the head of the National Committee. Thus it can be said that Mapai has been in office twenty-eight years and has never been replaced.

B. *Mapai—an Institutionalized Party*

Does this mean that Mapai cannot be replaced? There are countries in which one party remained in office for similar periods (Democrats in the United States for twenty years; Liberals in Canada for twenty-two years, in one province—Manitoba—for forty-three years) and was ousted by legitimate procedures. Can Mapai be ousted in a similar way? While there is no unqualified answer to this question, a number of factors make such a change quite unlikely in the near future, short of a major economic crisis or an international rupture.

The multi-party system and the coalition structure of the government are important factors. We suggest *that if parties elicit strong ideological commitments and the center party is relatively large, no stable government can be formed without the center party.* Mapai is such a center party, with a "hard core" of more than 30 per cent

[7] *Asefhat HaNivharim.* [8] *HaVaad HaLeumi.*

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of the votes. Thus Israel had a "Right" coalition—Mapai with General Zionists and other parties (December 23, 1952-January 26, 1954)—a "Left" coailtion—Mapai with Ahdut HaAvoda, Mapam and other parties (November 3, 1955)—and a center coalition—Mapai with the Progressive party and some religious parties (March 10, 1949-November 1, 1950), but never a government without Mapai. *There seems to be no basis for a coalition without Mapai.* The only way to create a government without Mapai which would have the confidence of the absolute majority of the *Knesset* is by a coalition which would include parties of the Left or of the Right. In a country like Israel where ideological commitments to parties play an important rôle, such a coalition is not a realistic alternative.

The fact that parties other than Mapai have no realistic chance to become coalition leaders and must choose between permanent opposition and more or less minor coalition partnerships creates in them "irresponsible" tendencies. The term "irresponsible political behavior" is usually applied to extreme parties which have no or little chance of coming into office and therefore make promises to the voters and claims upon the government that they would not be able to fulfill, were they to obtain office. The Communists and Herut (extreme Right) come close to this type of total opposition party. But there is another type of irresponsibility which develops when one party seems to be a constant and dominant partner of coalitions. Other parties tend then to become irresponsible in the sense that they are ready to bargain about many issues of public interest in order to be included in the coalition and as a price for staying in it. As they have to choose between being an insignificant opposition or a minor member of the coalition, they often choose the latter. The religious parties in Israel have often followed such a pattern.[9] Irresponsible politics in turn causes some voters to shift to the major party which "does the job" and manifests responsible leadership. This validates the claim of the Mapai spokesman that there is no alternative to the party in office. Thus a vicious circle is created: one party remains in office for a long time; this creates irresponsibility in other parties; and this in turn strengthens the position of the party in office.

What are the social conditions on which this political structure is based? How permanent are those conditions? Would it be conceivable that in the next elections to the *Knesset* (in 1959) about

[9] Amitai Etzioni, "Kulturkampf ou Coalition: Le Cas d'Israel", *La Revue Française de Science Politique,* vol. VIII, No. 2 (June 1958), pp. 311-331—republished in English in *Sociologia Religiosa,* vol. 1, No. 4 (1958), pp. 3-27.

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10 per cent of those who voted for Mapai in previous elections would vote for another party, thus undermining the basis of the present coalition system? Most well-informed political observers would agree that such a change can hardly be expected. The major reason rests on the assumption that, like many parties in office for a long period, Mapai has become so strongly institutionalized that it has a strong grip on a "hard core" of voters needed to maintain its superior position.

On the one hand, a party which remains in office for a long time often loses some public support because the necessity of taking certain action inevitably alienates some groups. For example, a responsible government frequently has to introduce measures which alienate large contingents of the voters without creating any special support from any group, as for instance, new taxes. Even if a party tries to avoid taking action on controversial issues, as Mapai does with the Israeli constitution and some religious issues, it alienates those groups which expect the party to take action. Thus, on one hand, being in office leads to the accumulation of enemies. On the other hand, holding office may have a positive influence on future elections. The leadership of the state and that of the major party are often fused; people who identify with the state tend also to favor the leading party. The party tends to receive credit for any progress which is achieved during its régime. The opposition is labeled as a group of people who "only talk".

Party patronage is another factor. The amount of patronage available depends to some degree on the moral atmosphere and on the institutionalization of a civil service. But even more important is the amount of control which the political organizations have over economic activities. In Israel, as well as in many other newly developed countries, conditions encourage a widespread political influence on the allocation of manpower, capital, land, and power positions. The sources of foreign currency are of major significance in a small, expanding economy. The scope of government control over these sources is well reflected in the following figures. Compared to 28.4 per cent of income from exports and 4.3 per cent of income from private investment, which are only regulated by the government, about 65 per cent of the foreign currency income is virtually state income and is allocated and controlled by the government or by the Jewish Agency.[10] It is almost inevitable that partisan considerations have some influence when political organizations control the economy, and when this control is extensive,

[10] These figures represent the period of 1949-1956.

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these considerations are very important. In such state allocations and controls, parties in power have an advantage over those in opposition.

The most important economic control which the Israeli parties exert on their members concerns place of employment. In an economy where the closed shop is the rule, parties control labor exchanges and trade unions. Parties also organize services for their members including health plans, housing projects, vacations, and recreation.[11] Thus all parties, especially the stronger ones, can expect to hold the allegiance of a large proportion of their members.

But in a régime where ideology plays an important political rôle, economic control is not sufficient. The parties attempt to secure ideological control by maintaining their own media of communication and by curbing the access of their supporters to communication media of other parties. All Israeli parties publish their own newspapers and exert pressure on their members to subscribe to these newspapers. The larger parties have publishing houses. Until recently, parties were quite influential in the school system. The separate party housing projects, vacation centers and social clubs serve also to increase intra-party communication and to decrease inter-party communication. The members' *Weltanschauung* is constantly reinforced so that they will be ready to resist any "hostile" communication.[12]

In this sphere also the parties in office seem to have some limited advantages over other parties. Israel has no television; the single radio station is controlled by the government. The government has an elaborate information service headed by a Mapai member. This service usually does not communicate political ideology but it functions to increase the loyalty of new and old citizens to the state by emphasizing its achievements and its bright future. This inevitably has some political repercussions.

While the Israeli parties in general and Mapai in particular have considerable economic and ideological control over a good many of their members and supporters, this hold is far from being strong enough to make shifts of voters' loyalties impossible. Less than a third of the voters are party members, and in every election thus

[11] See Gerda Luft, "The Party That Shapes Policy", *The Jerusalem Post*, July 11, 1955, quoted by M. H. Bernstein, *The Politics of Israel* (Princeton, 1957), p. 71.

[12] The manipulation of communication channels as a means of maintaining members' loyalties has been analyzed by Philip Selsnick, in his *Organizational Weapon* (New York, 1952).

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far at least 15 per cent of the voters have changed their party allegiances.[13] On the other hand, this very control gives each party a stable core and gives Mapai a hard core of 30 per cent of the electorate, which is sufficient to maintain its dominant rôle in the coalition system unless some serious crisis should occur.

About half of the voters who will participate in the next parliamentary elections have emigrated to Israel during the last ten years. Could this group cause a considerable change in the outcome of the election? Judging by past elections the answer is clearly in the negative. All attempts to establish new immigrant parties have failed. New immigrants are known to distribute their votes roughly in the same way as the old citizens.

The recent political changes in France illustrate the problem of a third form of institutionalization, namely the investment of the parties in office in the Armed Forces, police and other security agencies. These "instruments of violence" can be neutral in the political game and thus serve equally all parties which may come into power. If this is the case, they support the institutionalization of the democratic system. If they support parties in office, they increase the institutionalization of these parties and undermine the system. If they support moderate or, more likely, extreme opposition parties, they endanger the parties in office and the democratic system at the same time.

Mapai's position from this point of view has undergone a considerable change. In the pre-state period its control over the various underground forces was relatively weak, compared to its control over other national political organizations.

This difference between the power distribution in the civic political bodies and that in the underground forces sometimes caused "lack of subordination" of these armed forces to the civil authorities. When the state of Israel was established action was taken to change this situation. First of all, the Armed Forces have been de-politicized. Units which had political loyalties have been disbanded. Soldiers and officers are not allowed to be politically active. There has not been a case of "lack of subordination" since the establishment of the Israeli Defense Forces. Recently this came to a significant test when these Forces were orderd to withdraw from Sinai amid strong public protest.

[13] But note that most changes are among parties with similar ideologies. Thus while more than 15 per cent shift, only about 6 per cent or less shift from parties left of Mapai to parties right of Mapai or vice versa. Thus Mapai's superior and center position is maintained. See Table 1.

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De-politicizing of the Defense Forces has been considered an insufficient safeguard for the régime in a country where such Forces are so powerful. This may explain why today many of the top positions in the Defense Forces are in the hands of Mapai members or neutrals. Out of the five chiefs of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces during 1948-58, two have been active Mapai members before and after their service, two are known to be supporters of Mapai in their private life, and the fifth has never shown any special political inclinations. The names of generals and colonels are usually not published in Israel, but the government year book gives a list of twelve of the top commanders of the Defense Forces.[14] Most of them are known as members or close adherents of Mapai. The Israeli police commander-in-chief and his deputy are Mapai members; so are many of the higher officers. There is little information on other security agencies, but they seem to be staffed similarly. It is of interest to note that when, in January 1952, a political demonstration by Herut (extreme Right) members broke through the police lines in front of the *Knesset,* an army unit was called to help.[15] This shows that the government, and first of all Mapai, can rely on the loyalty of the army.

II. *Democracy and an Institutionalized Center Party*

The party in office has never been replaced in Israel and it is unlikely to be replaced in the near future. Still the changing power distribution in society corresponds to the changing policy of the government. What are the mechanisms which enable a democracy to function without replacing the party in power?

A. *Changes in the Composition of the Coalition Government*

Mapai, like other parties in democratic countries, is quite sensitive to public opinion. Although its control over some of its supporters is quite extensive, Mapai can never be secure in its control over its followers. While it never lost its core support, its leaders feel that this was achieved only by the party steering a cautious course, based on a combination of responsible leadership with enough "flexibility" (opponents say "opportunism") not to lose the support of the voters.

Mapai has some difficulty in determining what the public wants. There are no by-elections to the Israeli parliament. If a member dies or resigns, his party appoints a new representative. Since local

[14] *The Government Year Book* (Jerusalem, 1958-59), p. 84.

[15] *Ha'aretz,* Hebrew daily, Tel Aviv, Jan. 8, 1952.

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elections usually take place on the same day as parliamentary elections, they cannot indicate public attitudes between elections. Experience has shown that other elections, as for instance to the *Histadrut* conventions, do not reflect clearly the outcome of forthcoming national elections and therefore they are not considered as reliable political indicators.[16] There is no Israeli Gallup Institute or any close equivalent which could serve as a means for assessing the public. Therefore, the main test for the policies of each government coalition comes with the general elections to the *Knesset*. If the electorate then shows dissatisfaction with the government line, Mapai tends to change its policy and its partners in the coalition. Thus, while Mapai stays in office, the government policy may change considerably and in relation to changes in public opinion and pressures.

The first regular Israeli government (March 10, 1949-November 1, 1950) consisted of a coalition of Mapai, Religious United Front, the Progressive Party and Sephardim. The government was under criticism from three major opposition parties: from Mapam (Left-wing party) in regard to the Israeli stand between East and West; from Herut (extreme Right) with respect to the defense policy; and from the General Zionists (Right wing) in the matter of economic policy.

As this was a time of mass immigration and rapid economic expansion, a strong inflation developed.[17] The government introduced a far-reaching system of control which included licensing of imports and exports, complete control over foreign currency, and government allocation of raw materials and of consumer goods. Nearly a thousand different products were rationed. Luxury items were highly taxed. Credit allocation was controlled by the government.

The General Zionists, a party of big business, exporters, importers, citrus plantation owners, and to some degree supported by small business men and artisans, objected to all this. The party advocated a liberalization of economic policy, that is, the curtailment or abolishment of governmental regulations and of various allocations.

[16] For instance, Mapam lost 7.25 per cent of its seats in the *Histadrut* convention between 1949 and 1955 (in 1955 both splinters are counted together) but in elections to the *Knesset* in the same years it received the same per cent of the seats—15.8 per cent.

[17] The amount of money in circulation tripled in three years (end of 1948 to end of 1951). Credit expanded in the same period from 80 million to about 150 million Israeli *lirot*. The consumer's price index jumped from 100 (September 1951) to 178 (December 1952).

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The ration system, which many loathed, was made the symbolic target in the political campaign.

In the elections to the second *Knesset* which followed, the public shifted its support to the General Zionists. While the General Zionists were a small party with 5.8 per cent of the seats in the first *Knesset* (1949), they obtained almost three times as many seats in 1951 (16.7 per cent) to become the second largest party. The other two opposition parties lost considerably (Herut fell from 11.7 per cent to 6.7 per cent and Mapam from 15.8 per cent to 12.4 per cent). Mapai lost only 0.8 per cent of its seats, but the lesson was obvious. Large groups of the public were not satisfied with Mapai's economic policy, and it adjusted to this situation in several ways. First, the party abolished some of the more disagreeable measures of control. Then, in December 1952, the General Zionists were included in the government. Finally, a "New Economic Policy" was introduced which was a compromise between Mapai's policy and the General Zionists' ideas. Mapai economists pointed out that the changes in economic policy were possible now because the economic situation had changed. The change was brought about mainly by the reparation agreement with Germany. But it is clear that the election played its rôle. Although the General Zionists left the government at a later time and the economic situation changed again, Mapai never tried to return to the 1949-51 system of rationing.

A similar change took place after the elections to the third *Knesset*. The primary cause of conflict and adjustment was defense policy this time. During the days of the second *Knesset* (1951-55) the pressure from the Arabic countries increased by means of economic boycott, border incidents, and infiltration activities inside Israel. Israel reacted by retaliatory operations which were focused on the centers from which the Arabic activities were launched. The frequency and scope of these activities varied in relation to the pressure exerted by other nations on the Arabs and on Israel. Public opinion in Israel was split on these retaliatory activities. Herut and Ahdut HaAvoda (Left wing) demanded a more aggressive line and questioned the military and political expediency of limited retaliatory activities. All the other parties were for continuation of the moderate line.

The election to the third *Knesset* showed that the public now was more concerned with the defense issue than with economic problems and that it protested against the continuous insecurity. The public supported the extremists (or activists as they are called

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in Israel): Herut almost doubled its seats (from 6.7 per cent to 12.5 per cent) and became the second largest party in the *Knesset*. The other party which supported the activists' line also improved its position. Mapai lost a considerable number of seats (4.2 per cent) and so did other parties.

Mapai's reaction was as quick and as determined as in the earlier case. Ben Gurion reassumed the Prime Ministership and the Defense Ministry; Sharet—who supported the moderate line—resigned from the government. Since a coalition with Herut is inconceivable for Mapai,[18] a Left-wing coalition was formed on November 3, 1955 which included the Left-wing activists. When Nasser arranged his weapons deal with Russia and nationalized the Suez Canal only one year later, the Israeli government switched from limited retaliatory activity to broader military activity. In October 1956 the government ordered the Israeli Armed Forces into the Sinai peninsula. Thus again the government acted in accord with a new public trend. A new policy was introduced and a new coalition was formed.

Of course a change in public opinion was not the only cause of the change in government policy, but the election results had considerable influence. The objective situation was interpreted differently by moderates and activists. If moderate parties had gained in the elections and the activists had lost, Sharet might have remained in the Cabinet as Prime Minister and/or Foreign Minister and the policy as well as the composition of the Cabinet might have been quite different. It is not accidental that public support turned to the activists; the objective situation produced this support. Thus one can see the elections as one mechanism through which the policy of the government is adjusted to the situation and to the electorate wishes without a change of the party in office.

B. *Changes in the Inner Balance of Mapai*

The study of factions and pressure groups within a party is of special interest from several points of view. First, these groups determine to a considerable degree the party's policy and the composition of party representation in the various political institutions. Second, the larger the party and the more interests and groups there are represented in it, the more some functions of the parliament, such as policy-making and consensus formation, are taken over by party organs. The party's higher bodies have to reach a working consensus among the various groups before party policy

[18] Because of the strong ideological differences between the parties.

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can be determined.[19] Mapai itself comes close to being a federation of groups.[20] The major groups are: an organization of collective settlements *(Kibbutzim)* which supports Mapai (about 97 per cent of the eligible population votes Mapai), an organization of cooperative villages *(Moshavej Ovdim)* (about the same ratio of support), the *Histadrut* group, professionals and intelligentsia, Mapai members in government administration and representatives of new immigrants. All these groups are represented in the Mapai Center (196 members) and many of them in the Mapai secretariat (15 members, in March 1958).

How does the federative structure influence the democratic process? Through it, those who support Mapai have a voice in the decision-making process in non-election years and without changing the party alliance. Thus, before Mapai changed its defense policy, the fight between moderates and activists was taken up in the Mapai Center, with Ben Gurion heading the activists section and Sharet the moderate one. Only after it was decided here by a majority vote that Ben Gurion's policies should be promoted did Sharet resign and Mapai offer the new policy to the whole government.

The functions, prestige, and voting power of collective settlements are declining, while those of the coöperative villages are increasing. For reasons discussed elsewhere, collective settlements still have considerable privileges and power.[21] But in the last years the coöperative villages have struggled for increased representation of their group. To some degree their demands have been met but the collective settlements are still somewhat over-represented. This is likely to diminish in the near future. Thus, changes in the social significance of groups are reflected in changes in their political power through change in their representation in Mapai's policy-making bodies.

[19] In cases where there is only one party as in totalitarian states, the factional struggle is an uninstitutionalized substitute for rivalry among parties. In some states in the United States where there is only one active party, the factional struggle is the most important form of political expression. Unlike the totalitarian countries, it is here institutionalized in democratic party conventions and primaries. See V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949).

[20] Factions have not been tolerated since 1944 when a faction split Mapai and created its own party.

[21] See Amitai Etzioni, "Agrarianism in Israel's Party System", *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* vol. XXIII, No. 3 (August 1957), pp. 363-375.

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Another group struggle which has aroused much public interest in recent years is that between *Histadrut* (trade union) leaders and Mapai economic experts concentrated in the Treasury. The economists press for enlarged investments in order to achieve an increasing degree of economic independence and strength. The trade-union leaders insist that this should be done without a considerable decrease in the standard of living of the workers. Till now the trade-union leaders have had the upper hand. One of the reasons why they are so influential is that they represent a much larger and better-organized group of voters than the economists.

Is group representation really democratic? First of all one should note that it is part of the democratic process in all democratic countries, especially in those where there is a two-party system, because fewer interests are directly represented on the party level, and more are represented on the faction level. It is more important to examine the way in which faction representation is determined. Even where there are officially controlled and supervised primaries, nomination is still open to much abuse. Oligarchic procedures in units which participate in the democratic mechanisms seem to be almost an "iron law". While there are no primaries in Israel, two thirds of the members of Mapai Center are elected by Mapai locals and one third suggested by the Mapai Secretariat and approved by the convention. The latter are in most cases group representatives, often elected leaders of their groups or organizations. New immigrants, intelligentsia, and youth representatives are frequently selected in less formal ways. Thus group representation in Mapai is quite democratic in a sense. It is an important mechanism through which powerful groups and Mapai's policy are maintained in balance.

C. *Structural Weakness of Mapai*

Mapai's political power, which has been stressed above, is an important factor of the whole process of institutionalization. But the picture should be balanced by showing a major weakness of Mapai which is important because it makes Mapai sensitive to group pressures and public opinion. Mapai is often seen as an omnipotent party, as a strong monolithic political body with branches in all the major power centers. This description is misleading in one important respect. It does not take into account the federative nature of Mapai, in which the main power rests in each group and little in Mapai as a party. There is a powerful group of Mapai members in the trade unions, in the coöperative

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movement, in the three major cities, in the Treasury, and so on. But their relations to other Mapai groups vary all the way from close coöperation to open hostility. In most cases the relationships are highly voluntary because each group is very independent. The weakest group is the party bureaucracy which supposedly ties them all together. The party personnel is small in number, low paid, has little prestige and consists mainly of party representatives who failed to maintain a position in other organizations. Many Mapai branch secretaries are just clerks for party activities and mediators among the various local centers of power. The Mapai Center, itself, is a place where the various groups determine their relative power and work out common policies, not a center of a powerful party machine which has strong control over its representatives in various political organizations. This is an important reason why Mapai, with all its weight and power, when it comes to coördinated action on the national scene in opposition to other groups, is internally weak and highly sensitive to pressures of various groups.[22]

III. *A Comparative Note*

Is Israel an exception to the "normal" democratic model or are there other countries which come close to her form of democracy?

The Swedish government in the last twenty-six years (since 1932) has seen a coalition government in which the Social Democratic party is the basic political partner. Since 1949, Germany has been run by a coalition government in which one party, the Christian Democrats, plays the rôle of the decisive partner. The situation formally resembles a two-party system because two parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, obtain the majority of the votes, but many commentators agree that this is misleading since the class and religious structure of Germany does not give the Social Democrats a real chance to obtain much more than 35 per cent of the vote, which means that there is no alternative party to the CDU at the moment. The special importance of Adenauer for the maintenance of the system can be compared to the position which Ben Gurion holds in the Israeli system. While Ben Gurion has the charismatic rôle of the state founder, Adenauer plays a similar rôle as the one who restored the new German Republic to a respectable place among the nations. The coalition partners of the CDU are weaker than the partners of Mapai,

[22] That unorganized voters or weaker groups lose out in this process is obvious, but this is a problem of democracy in general.

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especially since the CDU gained an absolute majority of the seats in the Bonn parliament (1957). On the other hand, nine years in office have been enough for the CDU to become considerably institutionalized. Group struggles within the CDU are an important mechanism of German democracy as well (Catholic labor, big business, Catholic and Protestant clergy, liberals and others).

Another illustration is the French Fourth Republic which in some respects functioned similarly to the Israeli system. The MRP, like Mapai, participated in a large number and great variety of coalitions. The decisive difference between Israel and France is that the MRP was by far weaker than Mapai and therefore the coalition system never achieved the stability which the Israeli system has. No central party became institutionalized and the extreme parties on left and right were considerably stronger. The final blow to the system was given by power organizations which had political orientations differing from those of the elected government of France.

Thus if coalition governments are formed on a continuum according to the strength of the center party, the Israeli and Swedish governments would be in the middle, Germany on one side and the Fourth Republic on the other. There are of course other types of coalition governments without one center party, but a discussion of those would take us far beyond the scope of this paper.

Mapai is often compared to the British Labour party and the Social Democrats in the Weimar Republic. These comparisons have certain merits when one attempts to point out the ideological position of Mapai in an *abstract* continuum of political ideologies. Mapai subscribes to a Left-wing noncommunist ideology. But beyond that, the comparison is of little help. The British Labour party is one in a two-party system; it entered and left office several times in the last three decades, while Mapai became a highly institutionalized party.

The comparison to the Weimar Social Democrats is even less meaningful. The Social Democrats were not able to continue in office because, among other reasons, rightist forces were highly entrenched in the army, the bureaucracies and the judicial system. This is almost opposite to the situation in Israel. The center of the Israeli political spectrum is not liberal, as in so many Western societies, but social-democratic with an approximately even distribution of the more leftish forces on one side and conservative and liberal groups on the other side. More than that, for historical reasons which cannot be discussed here, the left-of-center ideologies

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and groups have stronger political, economic and prestige positions than the right and liberal forces. While socialist parties in Western societies are often parties of reform and change, Mapai is more representative of the Israeli values and social structure than any other party. To be a Social Democrat in Israel—and the same holds for many of the newly developed countries—means to be in conformity with the majority of the politically conscious members of society. It is like being a moderate liberal in the present Congress of the United States. Thus in conducting a comparative analysis we have to take into account not only the substance of political values but also the place of such values in the political spectrum of the society. What is quite revolutionary in one society may be rather on the conformist side in another society. The different place in the political spectrum is of great significance in view of the different political conditions with which revolutionary and reform parties are confronted as compared to those in which conforming and status quo parties are placed, disregarding the actual content of their ideologies.

Mapai can be fruitfully compared to other state founding parties which have become highly institutionalized in young nations, as, for instance, the Congress party in India, the Neo-Destour in Tunisia, the Convention People's party in Ghana, and the A.F.P.F.L. in Burma. Of course, there are considerable differences among these countries and between them and Israel, but they all seem to have in common a leader and a party with the charismatic rôle of gaining independence and establishing the state; left-of-center ideologies; state-regulated economies; a high degree of economic dependence on external sources (perhaps with the exception of Ghana); and control over the labor organizations, excluding the Communists.[23]

A comparative study of democratic societies cannot be carried out here. The main purpose of this paper has been to describe a democracy that functions through mechanisms other than the frequent alternation of parties in office. The concluding paragraphs are meant to suggest that such mechanisms can be found also in countries other than Israel and that a comparative study of these countries might throw light on the nature and organs of modern democracy.

AMITAI ETZIONI

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

[23] See S. M. Lipset, "Socialism—Left and Right—East and West", *Confluence*, vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 1958), pp. 173-192.

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ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY, 1917-1918

THE REELECTION of Woodrow Wilson in 1916 was the result of a widespread belief that a Democratic administration would not involve the United States in the World War; yet only five months after the election the United States was at war with Germany. This sudden development left large numbers in opposition to their country's participation in the war; but the extent of this opposition has not been appreciated. The conventional channels of expression were closed to the opponents of the war. The great majority of newspapers supported the war energetically. Despite the fact that six senators and fifty congressmen voted against the declaration of war, major party opposition was slight. Indeed, opponents of war remained disorganized and almost leaderless: organized opposition was restricted virtually to radical groups. Nevertheless, many Americans, of varied backgrounds and interests, remained firm in the belief that American democracy had nothing at stake in the war.

Probably the main reason that historians have underestimated popular opposition to the war is that the Socialist party was the main vehicle of opposition. The wartime (and, until recently, the pre-war) influence of the party has received scant attention from students of this period.[1] Historians have tended to project the changed character of the Left after 1919 into the pre-war period, and to consider the influence of the Socialists during the war to have been negligible.[2] This is probably a result, in part, of the hostile and disparaging attitude of the wartime press and politicians. Opponents, and particularly radical opponents, of the war became such constant targets of both verbal and physical

[1] H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, in *Opponents of War* (Madison, 1957), deal with the Socialists during the war, but from the point of view of the attacks on their civil liberties.

[2] See David H. Shannon, "The Socialist Party Before the First World War", *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, September 1951, p. 279. Even Shannon, in writing of the difference between pre-war and post-war Socialists, omits the war years. He writes of the influence of the party before 1917, and its decline after 1919.

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abuse that they are more remembered for the violence directed against them than for their activity in behalf of peace. Yet, throughout 1917 and 1918, Socialists campaigned vigorously for an immediate conference to end the war on what came to be accepted as democratic peace terms. In a series of local elections in these years the party made unprecedented gains on the basis of its opposition to the continuation of the war.

The Socialist party was, of course, unable to mobilize all opponents of the war. The party's potential as a center of opposition was limited by its radical nature, as well as by a deficiency of press and organization. Much anti-war sentiment was left to find expression through spontaneous local organization, or through individual actions. This was true also with regard to conscription, which was widely opposed by those who considered it undemocratic and by many who simply did not wish to serve, as well as by those who were opposed to war.

If the motives for opposing the draft varied, so did the forms of opposition. They ranged from widespread attempts at evasion to armed rebellion. The initial form of opposition to the draft was simple failure to register, of which there were occasional reports in the press.[3] Then, with the beginning of the induction process, large numbers of registrants failed to appear for their physical examinations. In Donora, Pennsylvania, 40 per cent of the men who registered gave fictitious addresses, such as vacant lots. In Erie, where one in six was a "slacker", the *Dispatch* proudly reported that Erie men were "showing a greater willingness to serve than in most Pennsylvania cities." One district in Chicago reported that of 345 men called 139 did not appear.[4] In the month of August alone 2,500 slackers were reported in Cleveland. In October 4,000 were reported in Akron.[5] In a two-week period, in Minneapolis, thirty delinquents were picked

[3] The Reading (Pennsylvania) *News-Times* reported, August 2, 1917, that the Department of Justice was receiving from one hundred to two hundred letters a day giving substantially accurate information of men who had not registered. The New Castle (Pennsylvania) *Herald,* September 18, 1917, reported the arrest of three unregistered men. The Youngstown (Ohio) *Vindicator,* October 22, 1917, reported that many men registering to vote were found to be "shy of serial numbers."

[4] Allentown *Democrat,* August 8, 1917; Erie *Dispatch,* August 26, 1917. On November 1, 1917, the *Dispatch* reported: "Slackers Multiply. No Men To Go Friday." Minneapolis *Journal,* August 8, 1917.

[5] Dayton *News,* August 20, 1917; Akron *Beacon-Journal,* October 3, 1917.

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up and inducted and sixteen deserters found as late as June 1918.[6] Even among those who did appear when called for their physical examinations large numbers were reluctant to serve. Seventy per cent of those appearing in New York City, a center of interventionist sentiment, filed exemption claims. In Philadelphia several draft boards exhausted ten times the number of exemption blanks originally provided; the government was unable to keep up with the demand for these forms.[7]

More direct evidence of anti-war sentiment than efforts to avoid personal military service was the generalized attacks on the draft and the Administration's war policies. In some cities draft lists were stolen to delay the induction process. The night before the first scheduled draft in Indianapolis the lists for the entire county were stolen.[8] A few days later a similar incident occurred in New York City.[9] On August 7, the Minneapolis *Journal* reported that antidraft sentiment had "infected large areas of Minnesota," and was "fast spreading". Protest meetings were reported in many places. Merchants and bankers who supported the war were boycotted in Hutchinson, Glencoe and New Ulm.[10] Similarly, in Georgia, as Senator Hardwick later told his colleagues, "there was undoubtedly general and widespread opposition [to] . . . the draft law. Numerous and largely attended mass meetings held in every part of the state protested against it."[11] The outstanding leader of this opposition was Tom Watson, whose energetic activity brought him renewed prominence in Georgia politics. In his newspaper, *The Jeffersonian,* Watson attacked the "dictatorial powers demanded by the President." Nor did he hesitate to attack the Administration's motives in leading America to war. Watson twitted "our sweetly sincere President" for saying "The world must be made safe for democracy." "What he meant", Watson explained, was "that the huge investment, which our blood gorged capitalists had made in French, Italian, Russian, and English *paper* must be made safe.

[6] Minneapolis *Journal,* June 15, 1918.

[7] *New York Times,* August 8, 1917; Philadelphia *Public Ledger,* August 15, 1917.

[8] Reading *News-Times,* August 3, 1917.

[9] *New York Times,* August 6, 1917.

[10] Minneapolis *Journal,* August 6, 7, 22, 1917.

[11] *Congressional Record,* 65th Cong., 2nd Session, May 2, 1918, p. 5941.

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"Where Morgan's money went, your boys' blood must go, ELSE MORGAN WILL LOSE HIS MONEY."[12]

In June, July and August, Watson appealed for funds to challenge the constitutionality of the Conscription Act. Checks in small amounts, totaling about $100,000, poured in from Atlanta, Chattanooga, Danville, Virginia, and numerous towns throughout the South. Every week Watson published a list of contributors several columns long—until, in mid-August, *The Jeffersonian* was banned from the mails.[13]

There were those, too, whose hostility to the war led them to more forceful resistance. In Dallas, Texas, fifty-three members of the Farmers and Laborers Protective Association were indicted for armed resistance to the draft. In Tyler, Texas, six men were arrested with arms in their possession.[14] In North Carolina an armed revolt against the draft was reported among the farmers of Chatham County.[15] Outside of Toledo, Ohio, a troop train was fired upon; three soldiers were wounded. In California, a band of twenty-five men, alleged IWWs, cut off the last two cars of a troop train and fought the soldiers.[16]

The most dramatic, and certainly the most pathetic, anti-war action occurred in eastern Oklahoma, where an armed uprising, known as the Green Corn Rebellion, took place early in August. The rebels were some 800 to 1,000 poor tenant farmers, the vast majority of whom were of old American stock. Peace sentiment among them was particularly strong, as was resentment against President Wilson, to whom they referred as "Big Slick".[17] The Rebellion was organized by the Working Class Union, a syndicalist organization which had its greatest strength among the Socialist farmers of eastern Oklahoma. The farmers, believing that there were groups of men under arms in many states, planned to march on Washington, seize the government and end the "Rich Man's War".[18]

In only six counties of eastern Oklahoma did groups of men

[12] C. Vann Woodward, *Tom Watson* (New York, 1938), pp. 453-55.

[13] *Ibid.* and Philadelphia *Public Ledger,* August 5, 1917.

[14] *New York Times,* August 4, 1917. [15] *Ibid.,* August 4, 5, 1917.

[16] Toledo *News-Bee,* September 16, November 4, 1917.

[17] Charles C. Bush, "The Green Corn Rebellion" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1932), pp. 1, 11, 26.

[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 6, 9, 17. The Socialist party received a third of the vote in this part of Oklahoma.

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actually assemble. A few of these set about cutting telegraph wires and attempting to burn railroad bridges, while the encamped "army" waited with growing restlessness for its four million promised allies to materialize. After two days of waiting, and eating barbecued beef and green corn, realization came: they were alone. Demoralized and without leadership the "army" scattered at the approach of a local posse. By August 16 the last of the known conspirators had been rounded up, and some 450 frightened men rested in Oklahoma jails. The "revolution" was stillborn.[19]

At its Emergency Convention in St. Louis, April 7-9, 1917, the Socialist party branded the declaration of war "a crime against the people of the United States," and pledged "continuous, active opposition to the war" and to conscription.[20] In the months that followed, Socialists tried vigorously to rally the varied anti-war elements under their banner. In many states the party's rôle was extremely limited because of a lack of organization; and in Oklahoma, the state in which the Socialists were strongest, the party dissolved after the Green Corn Rebellion.[21] But in other states Socialists were "in evidence almost everywhere,"[22] speaking against continuation of the war and against conscription. The speakers attracted large crowds, and, along with them, sharp attacks on their right to speak. On July 1, 8,000 Socialists and trade unionists paraded in Boston. They carried banners demanding peace with "No Forcible Annexations" and "No Punitive Indemnities." As they marched, organized groups of soldiers and sailors attacked them. Hundreds of fights broke out, and the Socialist headquarters was ransacked. Ten of the paraders were arrested.[23] A more peaceful gathering was held in Chicago, where 3,000 pacifists were addressed by Congressman William E. Mason and six Socialist speakers. The program adopted by this

[19] Bush, *op. cit.*, p. 50. Oscar Ameringer, in *If You Don't Weaken* (New York, 1940), p. 351, writes that although the rebellion was limited to the eastern counties, opposition to the war "was just as strong in the western half of the state. And there the bitterest opponents were . . . the Democrats who had cast their ballots for the man who 'kept us out of war' . . . only being better situated and educated, they saw the futility of opposing the war by force."

[20] From the St. Louis Manifesto, *International Socialist Review*, May 1917, pp. 670 *et seq.*

[21] Ameringer, *op. cit.*, p. 351. [22] Dayton *News*, August 18, 1917.

[23] Peterson and Fite, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46. *New York Times*, July 2, 1917.

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meeting called for an immediate peace conference based on the Socialist slogan of "No Annexations, No Indemnities."[24] In Evansville, Indiana, Frank Lamonte, Socialist candidate for mayor, had a "thrilling escape" from a group of vigilantes after "flaying" the draft before a large crowd.[25] On New York City street corners countless radicals spoke against the war. So many were jailed on Blackwell's Island that the New York *Call* facetiously suggested that the prisoners might request a local charter.[26]

In Minnesota, Socialists were especially active. They spoke at mass meetings throughout the state, and brought upon themselves the wrath of state officials. On July 25, 5,000 to 10,000 farmers gathered at New Ulm for a meeting presided over by the mayor of the town and the local college president. Conscription was denounced by Thomas Van Lear, Socialist mayor of Minneapolis.[27] Two weeks later he addressed a meeting in Glencoe, "where 6,000 persons gathered for a protest against sending American troops to France." Petitions against sending conscripts overseas were circulated and 4,500 people were reported to have signed. Van Lear "hinted" that the nations fighting Germany were doing so for private gain. He demanded a statement of war aims, declaring that the people had a right to know for what they were fighting. Another speaker declared his opposition to the Kaiser, but added that the war was being fought "for Wall Street interests . . . not for democracy."[28]

The success of these meetings led to the arrest of many Socialist leaders, and inspired "loyalty" meetings throughout Minnesota. Among those arrested was J. O. Bentall, former Socialist candidate for governor. In a letter from jail he described some of the meetings:

> At Hutchinson at least 10,000 came—some 20 or 30 miles—full of enthusiasm and eagerness. I never saw anything like it. In the middle of my speech the postmaster rushed up on the platform and struck me in the face. He was promptly reduced to quiet by some big farmers, and I talked another hour and a half. People are falling over each other to hear about Socialism these days. They are no longer afraid of it, and the farmers are most radical and fearless.

[24] *New York Times,* July 9, 1917.

[25] Dayton *Journal,* August 7, 1917. [26] September 6, 1917.

[27] Peterson and Fite, *op. cit.,* p. 37. Minneapolis *Journal,* August 6, 22, 1917.

[28] Minneapolis *Journal,* August 8, 1917.

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> . . . . Eight thousand attended a meeting at Dale, including two sheriffs, three judges, and several U. S. deputy marshals and a number of plain clothesmen. . . . I never talk against the war, all I do is talk peace.[29]

At the first big "loyalty" meeting in Minneapolis, Governor Burnquist gave his answer to the critics of the war. He warned:

> If anti-American meetings cannot be stopped by local officials, every resource at our command will be used to punish the offenders and prevent such meetings from being held. If, by means of this action on our part, bloodshed and loss of life will result, the responsibility therefor will rest on those who are back of and support, by their presence, these un-American demonstrations.[30]

The Governor's warning did not stop the peace meetings, and so, in early September, he placed a blanket ban on Socialist meetings in most counties of Minnesota.[31]

Governor Burnquist's attitude toward expressions of anti-war sentiment, although extreme, was by no means unique. Most active interventionists, typified by Theodore Roosevelt, saw in every opponent of the war "the Hun within our gates."[32] The press usually took this attitude toward Socialists, as did several of the Socialist leaders who had resigned from the party to support the war effort.[33] But, although pro-German sentiment was not unknown within the party, the great majority of Socialists opposed the war because they viewed it primarily as a struggle among capitalists for control of world markets. Most Socialists were neutral, as their program, adopted in 1915, indicates. Similar in principle to Wilson's Fourteen Points of early 1918, the program called for an immediate conference to end the war on the following terms:

No indemnities.

No transfer of territories except upon the consent and by the vote of their people.

All countries under foreign rule to be given political independence if demanded by their inhabitants.

[29] *International Socialist Review,* September 1917, p. 188.

[30] Minneapolis *Journal,* August 7, 1917.

[31] *International Socialist Review,* October 1917, p. 209; New York *Call,* September 14, 1917.

[32] Peterson and Fite, *op. cit.,* p. 81.

[33] See "Divergent Effects of the War on the Socialist Movement", *Current Opinion,* August 1917, pp. 73-75; "The Socialist as Patriot", *Literary Digest,* June 16, 1917, pp. 1836-37.

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International commission to consider and settle international disputes without resort to arms—in place of present secret diplomacy.

Political and industrial democracy. Universal suffrage, including woman suffrage.[34]

Whether the party was neutral or pro-German made little difference in the wartime atmosphere; the relevant fact was that the party opposed the war. The more active the party became in opposition, the more intense were the various attacks on its representatives and its organs. Increasingly, Socialist meetings were banned or broken up, speakers arrested and put on trains leaving town, or kidnapped and threatened.[35] Of the many blows suffered by the party during this period, perhaps the most serious from a long-range point of view were those struck by the federal government. Almost immediately after the Espionage Act became law in June 1917, Postmaster-General Burleson proceeded to withhold Socialist periodicals from the mails. In June and July he withheld a dozen or more leading Socialist publications with a total circulation of over a million copies.[36] This harassment helped alter the character of the movement during the war. As Eugene Debs wrote, the press was "the very life-breath of [the] party,"[37] especially in the rural states where its strength had always been relatively greatest. Even in the cities, however, many Socialist papers were forced to suspend publication, once denied second-class privileges.[38]

II

In the face of this mounting tempo of attack on their right to speak, the Socialists saw their best opportunity for further discussion of peace in the relative freedom of the coming municipal election campaigns. This was decided, despite the fact that 1917

[34] Adapted from *American Labor Yearbook: 1916* (New York, 1917), p. 126.

[35] New York *Call,* September 5, 6, 14, 1917; *New York Times,* July 5, August 16, 1917; Youngstown *Vindicator,* August 22, 1917. Peterson and Fite, *op. cit.,* chapter v.

[36] See "Divergent Effects of the War on the Socialist Movement", *loc. cit.; International Socialist Review,* August 1917, p. 125; *American Labor Yearbook: 1919-20,* p. 401.

[37] *Social Revolution,* October 1917, p. 3.

[38] For example, *Current Opinion,* November 1917, reported the Hungarian Socialist paper, *E'lore,* and the Russian, *Novy Mir,* both published in New York City, had been "wiped out of existence speedily by federal authorities" (p. 293).

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was an off year, in the hope that the party could gain sufficient votes in these elections to win a more respectful hearing for its program. The Reverend Herbert S. Bigelow, recent convert to socialism, expressed this hope when he asserted that the government would "have to heed the Socialist votes," adding confidently that "if there are as many as we expect, the war will end."[39] In the hope of securing this goal, Socialists conducted active campaigns in Chicago, and in the cities of Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut and Maryland.

Ohio was the scene of greatest Socialist activity in the 1917 elections, and it was in the primary election in Dayton that the first victory was won. Dayton, Democratic in state and national elections, was the home of Ohio's Governor, James Cox. The city's commission government was controlled by the Citizens' Committee, a "nonpartisan" reform group, which, on local issues, differed little from the Socialists, normally a minor force in Dayton's politics.[40] During the primary campaign the Socialists were virtually ignored by the press, which was involved in a battle between the Democrats and the Citizens' Committee; but Socialists from many parts of Ohio campaigned actively in Dayton. They presented the party's demand for a statement of war terms and repeal of the draft at street meetings, and in the pages of the one small Socialist weekly.[41] On primary day, August 14, the Socialists amazed everyone by sweeping nine of Dayton's twelve wards. The Citizens' Committee carried the remaining three, while the Democrats, supported by Governor Cox's *News*, carried none. The Socialists received 11,017 votes, the largest primary total any party had received in Dayton's history. They won an absolute majority and defeated the Citizens' Committee by a record plurality. In doing this the Socialists spent only $395, compared to the $28,058 spent by the other parties.[42]

Overjoyed, Joseph Sharts, local Socialist leader, declared:

> The great victory of the Socialists in Dayton, Ohio, at the primary election in August was won squarely on the anti-war issue, and any attempt to minimize the significance of the victory is an effort to

[39] Akron *Beacon-Journal*, October 4, 1917. Bigelow had been chairman of the Ohio State Constitutional Convention in 1912.

[40] See Raymond Moley, "Representation in Dayton and Ashtabula", *National Municipal Review*, January 1918, pp. 28-29.

[41] New York *Call*, September 2, 1917; *Chicago Tribune*, August 18, 1917.

[42] Dayton *News*, August 15, 25, 1917; *Call*, September 2, 1917.

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> hoodwink the rest of the country. . . . The workers registered their protest against the war and voted for peace.[43]

Governor Cox's paper admitted that the vote was due to the disaffection of Democrats, many of whom were "inimical to the war". The *News* further commented that "a combined fight should be made against the Socialists" in the November election in order to defeat the "cowardly" opponents of the war who, although "afraid to proclaim their convictions to their fellows," were still capable of enjoying the "sensation of the silent stab of the ballot."[44]

As Joseph Sharts hoped, the Dayton primary was "an inspiration to the Socialists the country over."[45] With growing enthusiasm they campaigned in a number of nominally nonpartisan primaries. In September, Pennsylvania Socialists nominated four of eight council candidates elected in Reading; the lone Socialist candidates ran first of eight nominees in Allentown, and second in New Castle; and in Erie the Socialists unexpectedly nominated one of their candidates for council.[46] The same month, the Socialist candidate was among three nominees elected to run for mayor of Toledo.[47] In October, Buffalo Socialists increased their vote over the previous election from 13 per cent to 32 per cent, losing second place to the Republicans by 14,341 to 14,695.[48]

After the news of the large primary vote in Buffalo, the New York *Call* could hardly contain itself. "The world is sick of war; it is sick of bloodshed and destruction", the Call wrote. "THE WORLD WANTS PEACE! THE WORLD WANTS SOCIALISM." In a burst of premature enthusiasm, it added: "The great victories that we are winning and that we are going to win are the most significant political events of the century . . . it is not a political revolution. It is *the* political revolution."[49]

Support for the Socialists appeared to be developing so rapidly at the time that this seemingly incredible view is not entirely inexplicable. Even conservatives believed that the Socialists might

[43] *Call*, September 2, 1917.

[44] Dayton *News*, August 15, 1917. [45] *Call*, September 2, 1917.

[46] Reading *News-Times*, Allentown *Democrat*, New Castle *Herald*, Erie *Dispatch*—all September 20, 1917.

[47] Toledo *News-Bee*, September 12, 1917. The Socialist ran a poor third.

[48] *Call*, October 18, 1917. Also Paul H. Douglas, "The Socialist Vote in the 1917 Municipal Elections", *National Municipal Review*, March 1918, p. 135.

[49] *Call*, October 19, 1917.

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sweep the country in future elections. The strongest statement of this view was made by C. L. Knight's Akron *Beacon-Journal*. On September 7, the *Beacon* wrote:

> There is scarcely a political observer whose opinion is worth much but what will admit that were an election to come now a mighty tide of Socialism would inundate the Middle West and perhaps other —maybe all other sections of the country. . . . The United States has never embarked upon a more unpopular war. However wrong it may be the vast majority of the people have never been convinced that war was necessary either to sustain our honor or to protect our interests and being unconvinced . . . they vote the Socialist ticket as a means of protest.

This estimate of Socialist strength was, of course, far from universal. But it was common enough to cause Democrats and Republicans to unite in an effort to prevent Socialist victories in Chicago, in Dayton, Hamilton and Toledo, Ohio, and in Blairville, New Castle and Reading, Pennsylvania.

By the end of September the election campaigns were in full swing in most cities. Of these campaigns, the one in New York City ranked first, both in national significance and in drama. There a four-cornered race developed, with the incumbent, John Purroy Mitchel, a highly irregular Democrat, running as a Fusion candidate. Mitchel was an outstanding reform mayor, with a national reputation as an energetic, honest man, equally concerned with municipal efficiency and the welfare of his constituents.[50] Against him Tammany, under heavy pressure from William Randolph Hearst, had nominated John F. Hylan, a singularly undistinguished and obscure judge from Brooklyn. The Republican candidate was William M. Bennett. The Socialists nominated Morris Hillquit.

The initiative in the campaign was seized by Mitchel. Disregarding his excellent record on municipal matters, he chose to center his campaign on all-out support of the war, the issue the Socialists most wanted to test, and one which Tammany turned to its advantage by adopting a policy of silence. Nevertheless,

[50] See Burton J. Hendrick, "The Mayor of New York", *The World's Work*, September 1916, pp. 513-21; *World's Work*, February 1917, p. 355; "A Mayor and His Constituents", *Outlook*, April 21, 1915, p. 900, and May 10, 1916, p. 52; "Mayor Mitchel's Administration of New York City", *American Review of Reviews*, April 1916, p. 495; William Hard, "John Mitchel", *Everybody's*, October 1917, pp. 465-78; and *Survey*, November 10, 1917, p. 144.

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"Americanism" *versus* "Kaiserism" was the challenge Mitchel flung at his opponents.

In the early weeks of the campaign Judge Hylan was the main target of Mitchel's attack. Since Hylan was Hearst's candidate, and since Hearst was a well-known Anglophobe who had expressed pro-German sentiments, Hylan became the "Kaiser's candidate". "Hearst, Hylan, and Hohenzollern" was Mitchel's war cry,[51] while campaign posters depicted Mitchel in a doughboy's uniform, rifle in hand, bayoneting the Tammany Tiger. In this posture Mitchel received the support of powerful politicians, of whom Theodore Roosevelt was the loudest and most prominent.[52] There were a few attempts to focus the campaign on local issues, but they were unsuccessful.[53] As the *Nation* observed, Mitchel "not only wrapped himself in the American flag, but declared that a vote for Hylan was a vote for the Kaiser and every vote for Hillquit a vote for treason."[54]

Although press support for Mitchel was almost unanimous, and interest in his campaign nation-wide,[55] it was Hillquit, rather than Mitchel, for whom there were amazing manifestations of popular support. This was much more than "the usual propaganda campaign" which Hillquit had expected.[56] Indeed, the Socialist campaign rapidly assumed the character of a religious revival. For the first major meeting 20,000 people jammed in and around the old Madison Square Garden. At the "magic" words, "We want peace", the crowd rose in their places and "for five minutes the shouting, whistling and stamping of feet beat in waves upon the scarlet-decked platform from which the demand had come."[57]

Morris Hillquit set the tone of the Socialist campaign as he declared:

[51] New York *World*, October 2, 1917, *passim*, September, October and November 1917.

[52] Charles E. Hughes, Alton Parker, Henry Morgenthau and Oscar Straus supported Mitchel actively.

[53] See *World*, October 15, 1917. Governor Whitman, in announcing his support for Mitchel, tried to make Tammany the main issue.

[54] November 8, 1917, p. 500.

[55] See "National Aspects of the Mayoralty Contest in New York City", *Current Opinion*, November 1917, pp. 293 *et seq.*

[56] Morris Hillquit, *Loose Leaves from a Busy Life* (New York, 1934), p. 182.

[57] *Call*, September 24, 1917.

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> We are for peace. We are unalterably opposed to the killing of our manhood and the draining of our resources in a bewildering pursuit of an incomprehensible 'democracy' . . . a pursuit which begins by suppressing the freedom of speech and press and public assemblage, and by stifling legitimate political criticism.[58]

Hillquit campaigned not for a separate peace, but for the immediate calling of an international conference to end the war on the principle of no annexations, no indemnities. But the Socialists refused to support the continuation of the war until such a conference be called. In keeping with the St. Louis Manifesto, which had declared that in support of the war Socialists would "not give a single dollar", Hillquit announced that he would not buy Liberty Bonds. This caused a storm of indignation. Mayor Mitchel declared that "Any man who will not buy a liberty bond when he can afford them is not fit to be a citizen of the United States."[59] Theodore Roosevelt and Charles E. Hughes also attacked Hillquit on this issue; but Hillquit stood his ground, asserting that he would gladly contribute to a fund to end the war: that was the way to aid the soldiers.[60]

In Washington, President Wilson considered an indictment of Hillquit for his "outrageous utterances about the Liberty Loan," but decided that the government would "only be assisting Mr. Hillquit by apparently making him a martyr if . . . [it] should pay any attention to his remarks."[61]

Despite Hillquit's refusal to buy bonds, enthusiasm for him continued to mount. In October, Socialist meetings on the East Side drew great throngs. One night 15,000 admirers "surged through the streets," following Hillquit from hall to hall in spontaneous demonstrations. Hillquit asked the crowd: "War or peace? How will you decide?"[62] In the *Herald's* straw poll "Scores of ballots were returned with the crossmark before Morris Hillquit's name, and the words written, 'They are all crooks but Hillquit.' " A meeting at which Hillquit had been "followed by thousands who cheered until they were hoarse" was a "typical Socialist reception."[63]

The greatest manifestations of support for the Socialists occurred

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] *World,* October 26, 1917.

[60] Robert W. Iversen, "Morris Hillquit, American Social Democrat" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1951), p. 204.

[61] Woodrow Wilson, *Life and Letters,* ed. R. S. Baker, VII (New York, 1939), 333.

[62] *New York Times,* October 19, 1917; *World,* October 19, 1917.

[63] *Herald,* November 1, 1917.

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after Postmaster-General Burleson initiated proceedings to revoke the second-class mailing privilege of the *Call*. Burleson's tactics, which in the long run greatly weakened the party, had the immediate effect of rallying non-Socialist support to Hillquit. Several pro-war liberal leaders supported Hillquit as a protest against "Burlesonism", although most of them also endorsed the Socialist demand for a statement of war terms including no indemnities, no annexations. Among the liberals who supported Hillquit were Amos Pinchot, Dudley Field Malone, J. A. H. Hopkins and Harry Hopkins.[64]

Despite the intense barrage from Mayor Mitchel and the press, Judge Hylan maintained a prudent silence on the war. Tammany saw Mitchel's arrogant superpatriotism alienating him from the voters, and came to view the growing strength of Hillquit as its main concern. The *World* reported, on October 21, that Hillquit had "Gained strength at an almost alarming rate," and that Tammany,

> trying to cut the ground from under the Socialistic program [was] giving paramount importance to the municipal ownership pledge and the other vagrant features of the Socialistic doctrine.
>
> Instructions to the leaders [were] . . . to star municipal ownership and the high cost of living and to *evade any agitation of patriotism or other issues resulting from war conditions.* [Italics added]

The commercial press, with the exception of the Hearst papers, followed Mitchel in attacking nonsupport of the war as alien and non-American. The *Tribune,* for example, on October 28, had "Morris Hillquit of Riga" as its subject in the current number of a series on "Who's Who Against America". Hillquit was described as "a Jew, born at Riga, the Milwaukee of Russia, 48 years ago. Now he is rich and lives on Riverside Drive." The *Herald,* on November 2, ran a cartoon on page 1 showing a hook-nosed man named "Hillkowitz or Hillquitter" waving a flag which said "Peace at any price" at a smiling "Kaiser".[65]

[64] *New York Times,* October 15, 27, 29, 1917; New York *American,* November 5, 1917, advertisement. On Harry Hopkins see Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948), p. 25.

[65] This anti-Semitism appeared to confirm fears previously expressed by conservative Jewish leaders. The pro-Mitchel *American Hebrew* protested: "It is regrettable that the shortsighted policy of making the Jew the scapegoat for all radical movements, having been abandoned by the reactionary Russian press since the outbreak of the Revolution, has been adopted now by some of our New York dailies." Quoted in *World,* November 5, 1917.

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Colonel Roosevelt's attitude toward dissenters was similar. In a speech in support of Mitchel, Roosevelt bellowed: "I don't like the Hun outside our gates, but I tell you, I like the Hun inside them still less. (Applause) And even worse than the Hun is the man who cringes before them! (Traitors! Applause)".[66]

Even the liberal *World* was carried away. It editorialized on Hillquit, Hylan and Mitchel: "Today's election will determine whether New York is a traitor town, or a quasi-Copperhead town or an American town devoted to American ideals and pledged without reservation to the war policies of the United States government."[67]

On election day, Mayor Mitchel's militantly pro-war campaign ended in disaster. Hylan swept in, receiving the greatest plurality in the history of the city, while Mitchel finished just barely ahead of Hillquit. The vote was 313,956 for Hylan, 155,497 for Mitchel, 145,332 for Hillquit, and 55,438 for Bennett. Two thirds of the vote had gone either to the candidate widely accused of disloyalty, or to the one openly opposed to the war. Hillquit's 21.7 per cent represented nearly a fivefold increase over the normal Socialist vote. For the first time the party put candidates on the Board of Aldermen, electing seven. They also elected a municipal court justice and ten assemblymen, an increase of eight.[68]

Hillquit hailed the result as a repudiation of Administration policies.[69] Hylan, however, "proclaimed his loyalty"[70] the day after the election, and newspapers the country over, which during the campaign had attacked Hylan as the Kaiser's candidate, took this belated declaration as proof that Hylan's victory was no reflection of peace sentiment. "New York is not against the war", the *Tribune* wrote. "It is not ready to accept the programme of surrender which Mr. Hillquit so boldly preached."[71] The Des Moines *Register* echoed: "Whatever satisfaction the Kaiser got out of the New York election will be due to the large minority vote cast for the Socialist candidate."[72] It was left to the *Survey* to state the obvious: that although "Hillquit polled much of the

[66] *Herald,* November 1, 1917. [67] *World,* November 6, 1917.

[68] *Call,* November 7, 8, 1917; *Annual Report of the Board of Elections in the City of New York: 1917.* One other Socialist assembly candidate was tied until the soldier vote was counted; an aldermanic candidate lost by 11 votes.

[69] *Literary Digest,* November 17, 1917, p. 12.

[70] *Herald,* November 8, 1917. [71] November 7, 1917.

[72] Quoted in *Literary Digest,* November 17, 1917, p. 12.

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anti-war vote . . . some non-Socialist pacifists voted for Hylan as more practical."[73]

As in New York, so in most other cities, the war was the main issue projected by the Socialists; and where they failed to stress the issue it was raised against them with vigor.[74] In Reading, Pennsylvania, James Maurer, Socialist President of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, told the voters: "On election day you have on one side a party which has plunged you into war . . . on the other hand you have the Socialist party which is opposed to the war and demands an immediate peace. Which are you going to choose?"[75]

In Cleveland, the Socialist candidate for mayor was C. E. Ruthenberg, co-author of the St. Louis Manifesto, who was under indictment for inciting resistance to conscription. Some Socialists believed that "if all the anti-war sentiment in Cleveland were put behind Ruthenberg, he would be the next mayor." But, they conceded, "Unfortunately many . . . will stick by their [traditional] political organizations."[76] Calling Ruthenberg "the Hillquit of Cleveland", the *Plain Dealer* wrote that Cleveland—"200 percent city in patriotism"—would be "shamed before the world", should this "candidate of Prussianism" be given a respectable showing.[77]

In Toledo, where a two-way race developed,[78] Senator LaFollette attacked war profiteers in a speech in support of Haworth, the Socialist candidate for mayor.[79] In turn he was attacked by Charles Edward Russell, one of the pro-war Socialist leaders.

[73] November 10, 1917, p. 144.

[74] Blairsville, Pennsylvania, was an exception. There the main issue seemed to be that Reuben Einstein, the Socialist candidate, was the richest man in town. He was accused of being a parasite, and was chided for his Socialist ideals. Einstein conceded being a parasite, but explained that "The actual difference between me and the other parasites is this: They want to stay on your backs and continue to live off you, while . . . I am willing to get entirely off your backs just as soon as you have enough sense to keep others off. . . . [Until then] I refuse to join your ranks and starve. . . ." Blairsville *Courier*, October 25, 1917, advertisement.

[75] Reading *News-Times*, November 5, 1917.

[76] Letter to New York *Call*, September 8, 1917.

[77] November 3, 1917.

[78] The third nominee died several weeks before the election.

[79] Toledo *News-Bee*, September 24, 1917; New York *Tribune*, November 7, 1917.

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Russell called the Senator "a perjurer and a traitor", and, accusing him of sympathizing with Germany, urged him to "Go live there."[80] The Toledo *News-Bee,* concerned over the possibility of Haworth's election, warned "that to elect a Socialist mayor at this time would be to encourage sedition and treason, to stimulate German intrigue, to aid in dividing our own people when we should stand together as one man."[81]

In Dayton the Citizens' Committee campaign had active support from the Democratic governor. In attacking the Socialists, Governor Cox argued that

> In their declaration against this war they insolently assume that our people are not opposed to war in the abstract, while everybody knows that the war is being fought to prevent wars in the future; that when the Kaiser is destroyed the great menace to peace shall have been destroyed.[82]

The Dayton *Journal,* organ of the Citizens' Committee, was also deeply concerned at the prospect of Socialist victory. It quoted New York Socialists as declaring that a Socialist victory "WILL BE A CLEAR MANDATE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN IMMEDIATE PEACE." This prospect was more than the *Journal* could bear. "When the votes are counted," it declared, "we are going to know, for a truth, whether we really have a nation, or as Colonel Roosevelt expresses it, 'only a polyglot boarding house.' "[83]

In Hamilton, Ohio, too, where the Socialist candidate for mayor faced a single opponent, the *Evening Journal* noted that many intended to vote Socialist "as a means of saying they want the war to stop." But, the *Journal* argued: "Such a vote cannot stop the war. If every man in Hamilton voted the Socialist ticket it would and could have no effect on our nation at war. . . . The only thing a vote for the Socialist ticket can do is say you . . . are in sympathy with the Kaiser."[84]

[80] *News-Bee,* November 6, 1917.

[81] November 3, 1917.

[82] Cleveland *Plain Dealer,* November 4, 1917. The Governor also challenged the Socialists to "produce one Socialist leader that had bought a war bond."

[83] November 1, 1917.

[84] November 5, 1917.

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TABLE 1

THE SOCIALIST VOTE IN 1916 AND 1917 AND PERCENTAGES OF FOREIGN BORN IN 1920[a]

	1917 Per Cent[b]	*1916 Per Cent*	*Elected Socialist Officials, 1917*	*Per Cent Foreign Born*
Ohio[c]				
Byesville	...	...	Mayor and others	7.0
Hamilton	44.1	15.5	1 Councilman	6.7
Dayton	44.0	6.5	None	8.6
Toledo	34.8	5.9	3 Councilmen	15.7
Piqua	33.0	8.1	Mayor, 2 Councilmen	3.9
Sandusky	48.9	4.7	1 City Commissioner	11.7
Massillon	29.6	10.2	1 Councilman	12.5
Springfield	30.0	3.6	?	4.5
Canton	21.0	3.8	?	16.9
Cleveland	22.4	4.5	2 Councilmen, 1 Member School Board	30.1
Lima	19.9	3.7	None	4.6
Akron	16.3	3.8	8 Assessors, 1 Constable	18.2
Cincinnati	11.9	2.9	None	10.7
Pennsylvania[d]				
Garrett	...	33.0	Burgess (Mayor)	?
McKeesport	55.0	7.0	Controller	25.4
Allentown	4151[b]	4.7 (513)	1 Councilman (of 4)	11.7
Slatington	42.3	5.0	?	8.2
Blairsville	45.0	11.3	None	7.3
Reading	32.6	14.3	None	8.9
Erie	3403[b]	6.4 (702)	None	22.5
New Castle	1488[b]	6.0 (307)	None	19.3
Maryland[e]				
Hagerstown	15.0	1.6	None	1.5
New York[f]				
Buffalo	30.2 (Primary)	2.6	None	
Schenectady	23.7	8.0	None	
New York	21.7	4.5	10 Assemblymen, 7 Aldermen, 1 Municipal Court Justice	
Rochester	19.5	3.4	3 Constables, 2 Aldermen, 2 Supervisors	
Gloversville	18.7	?	None	
Syracuse	11.9	3.0	None	
Olean	597[b]	4.1 (138)	?	
Albany	4.0	.8	None	
New Jersey[g]				
Passaic County	14.0	7.5	None	
Hudson County	13.2	3.7	None	
Camden County	8.3	4.8	None	
Newark	12.0	...	None	

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TABLE 1—*Cont.*

	1917 *Per cent*[b]	*1916* *Per Cent*	*Elected Socialist Officials, 1917*	*Per Cent Foreign Born*
Illinois[h]				
Chicago	34.7	3.6 (1915)	None	
Connecticut[i]				
Bridgeport	7.0	3.0	None	

[a] Foreign-born percentages compiled from *U. S. Census, 14th Census (1920)*, vol. III.

[b] In some instances, absolute figures are given for 1917, as it is not possible to convert these into percentages, for various reasons.

[c] Figures for 1916 from *Annual Report of the Secretary of State* of Ohio for 1917, pp. 299 *et seq.*, vote for Governor. Figures for 1917 from Paul H. Douglas, "The Socialist Vote in the 1917 Municipal Elections", *National Municipal Review*, March 1918, pp. 136-37; Hamilton *Evening Journal;* Dayton *News;* Toledo *News-Bee;* Piqua *Leader-Dispatch;* Sandusky *Register;* Massillon *Evening Independent;* Cleveland *Plain Dealer;* Lima *News;* Akron *Beacon-Journal*—all November 7 or 8, 1917.

[d] Figures for 1916 from *Smull's Legislative Handbook and Manual for the State of Pennsylvania: 1917*, pp. 667 *et seq.*, vote for President. For 1917 from New York *Call;* Allentown *Democrat;* Blairsville *Courier;* Reading *News-Times;* Erie *Dispatch;* New Castle *Herald*—all November 7 or 8, 1917.

[e] For 1916, *Maryland Manual: 1915-1916*, p. 249, vote for Governor. For 1917, Hagerstown *Globe*, November 7, 1917.

[f] For 1916, *Manual for the Use of the Legislature of the State of New York: 1917*, pp. 898 *et seq.*, vote for Governor. For 1917, Douglas, *loc. cit.*, pp. 133-35; New York *Call*, October 18, November 7, 8, 1917; New York *Tribune;* Albany *Times-Union;* Rochester *Democrat and Chronicle;* Gloversville *Herald;* Syracuse *Herald*—all November 7, 1917.

[g] Douglas, *loc. cit.*, p. 134; *Manual of the Legislature of New Jersey: 1916, 1917*, vote for Assembly.

[h] For 1915 see Douglas, *loc. cit.*, p. 135. For 1917, *Chicago Daily News Almanac and Yearbook*, p. 624.

[i] For 1916, *Connecticut Register and Manual, 1917*, p. 484, vote for President. For 1917, New York *Call*, November 7, 1917.

On election day Socialist mayors were elected in only five municipalities: two in Indiana, two in Ohio, and one in Pennsylvania. Yet the party recorded sweeping gains in almost every city in which it campaigned. (See Table 1.) The most striking gains were in Ohio, where the Socialists received 30 per cent of the vote, or more, in at least seven cities and one town. All told, they received from 20 to 48 per cent of the vote in at least eleven municipalities in Ohio, eight in Pennsylvania, six in Indiana, four in New York, and they received 34 per cent of the vote in Chicago. A number of Socialists were elected to office in Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania and New York. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

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TABLE 2

The Socialist Vote and the Percentage of Foreign Born in Indiana Cities in 1917[a]

City or Town	*Percentage of Vote*	*Percentage of Foreign Born*
Gas City	40.4 (elected mayor)	4.9
Elwood	38.9 (elected mayor)	4.2
Marion	30.9	2.2
Anderson	29.1	3.2
Elkhart	22.5 (2 councilmen)	6.3
Fort Wayne	19.6 (1 alderman)	7.7
Kokomo	18.3	3.9
Evansville	17.3	3.7
Columbus	13.6	1.5
Bedford	12.1	3.3
Princeton	11.6	1.2
Alexandria	11.3	5.3
Clinton	11.3	21.3
Goshen	10.9	3.1
Logansport	10.3	4.9
Gary	6.2	29.7
South Bend	5.2	18.9
Mishawaka	5.1	15.2
Indianapolis	4.0	8.5
East Chicago	2.8	40.0

[a] Election figures compiled from *Yearbook of the State of Indiana* for the year 1917. Foreign born compiled from *U. S. Bureau of Census, 14th Census, 1920,* vol. III.

[b] Douglas, *loc. cit.,* p. 138.

The Socialist vote in New York City received nation-wide press comment, but in other cities it was minimized. In reporting the results in Chicago, for example, the *New York Times* stated that the " 'anti-war, anti-Wilson, anti-American' judicial ticket of the Socialists" had been snowed under "in a blizzard of ballots."[85] But the Socialist defeat was decisive only because the Democrats and Republicans had united in a single opposition slate. Actually, the 34 per cent which the Socialists received represented almost a tenfold increase over their normal vote. Indeed, the vote was sufficient to induce Roger Sullivan, Chicago Democratic leader, to suggest that it might be "time to amalgamate the Republican and Democratic parties in the nation in a new lineup of conservatives and radicals."[86]

[85] November 8, 1917.

[86] Paul H. Douglas, "The Socialist Vote in the 1917 Municipal Elections", *National Municipal Review,* March 1918, p. 139; *Nation,* November 27, 1917, p. 712; Milwaukee *Leader,* November 8, 1917. Election figures, *Chicago Daily News Almanac and Yearbook: 1918,* p. 624.

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In further depreciation, the press widely attributed the Socialist vote in these elections to the foreign born. The Philadelphia *Public Ledger* declared that the Hillquit vote was "almost entirely due to . . . alien discontent, intensified by conditions peculiar to foreign populations of New York in wartime."[87] The *National Municipal Review* saw the "immense foreign influence" as responsible for the large Socialist vote in New York City, Buffalo, Cleveland and Chicago.[88] In many cities Socialists were the political beneficiaries of large concentrations of immigrant population. This was so in New York City, where Hillquit's strength was concentrated in immigrant Jewish working-class communities.[89] Contrary to popular belief, however, this was not typical. The Socialists also received substantial popular support in many cities where foreign born were few. (Tables 1 and 2.) Indeed, in Indiana cities the results show a negative correlation between the percentage of foreign born and the Socialist vote in 1917. In Ohio there is little or no correlation. For example, Hamilton and Dayton, each of which gave the Socialists 44 per cent of the vote, had foreign-born populations of 6.7 per cent and 8.6 per cent. In Reading, Pennsylvania, as the *News-Times* wrote, the "election dispelled another fallacy. It proved that the German-American citizens were absolutely loyal, for they voted almost as a unit against the Socialist candidates."[90] What is true, however, was that in most cities the Socialists received their heaviest vote in the working-class districts. In those cities with large numbers of working-class immigrants, therefore, the Socialist vote came predominantly from the foreign born. This was so in Chicago, Cleveland, Buffalo, New York City, Rochester and several other cities.

III

After the election the New York *Evening Post* commented that "The Socialists have won admission, as it were, to the family of political parties,"[91] a sentiment confidently echoed by Socialist

[87] November 9, 1917.

[88] January 1918, p. 44.

[89] Harry Best, "The Melting Pot in the United States", *Social Forces*, May 1936, pp. 591 *et seq.* Best uses the heavy Socialist vote among the Jewish immigrants in New York City as proof that these foreigners had not become "Americanized".

[90] November 7, 1917.

[91] Quoted by Douglas, *loc. cit.*

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party leaders.[92] But just before the election the Dayton *News* had indicated more accurately what was in store for the party:

> Ever since the outbreak of the war we have heard sedition preached and it has been allowed to pass in the name of free speech. . . . Now we see riot and disorder encouraged in political campaigns by Socialist candidates, who hope thereby to collect under their banner all who have grievances. . . . Action must take the place of forbearance.[93]

In the months that followed, mass sedition indictments were returned against almost every major Socialist leader. These indictments, added to the previous attacks on the civil liberties of the Socialists, further hampered the party's attempts at organization.

While the attacks on the Socialists sharpened, President Wilson enunciated the principles he was soon to embody in his Fourteen Points, thereby enabling many wearying opponents of war to change gracefully to supporters of the Administration. The *Appeal to Reason,* which had been banned from the mails for most of the late summer and fall of 1917, announced on December 15 that "President Wilson Has Heard the 'Voices of Humanity That Are in the Air' and Declares in Favor of Democratic Settlement of War." Commenting on Wilson's address to Congress in early December—in response to the plea made by Pope Benedict XV, in August—the *Appeal* added: "Until your President delivered his address to Congress last week the democratic slogan of 'No annexations; no contributions; no punitive indemnities,' was practically sounded by the Socialists and liberals alone while the reactionary elements condemned this slogan as being tainted with pro-Germanism."[94]

Two weeks later the *Appeal to Reason* was the *New Appeal,* and an ardent supporter of Wilson.

The war, however, continued to be an issue in elections which took place in the spring and fall of 1918. In these elections, under conditions much more difficult than those of the previous year, nonsupporters of the war received unexpectedly high votes. In Wisconsin, in April, a special election for senator was held. The candidates were Joseph E. Davies, Irvine Lenroot and Victor

[92] See *Literary Digest,* November 17, 1917, p. 12; *Social Revolution,* December 1917, p. 5.

[93] November 3, 1917.

[94] December 15, 1917.

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Berger. Davies received strong support from President Wilson.[95] Lenroot, although one of Wisconsin's two congressmen who voted for the declaration of war (nine voted against it), was attacked for having a record which did not square with the "interests of the nation", and for accepting support from Senator LaFollette. Berger, indicted for sedition in the middle of the campaign, ran on a platform which stated that America had been plunged into war "by the treachery of the ruling class".[96]

The election was won by Lenroot, who polled 163,980 votes, to 148,713 for Davies, and a surprising 110,487 for Berger.[97] The *Milwaukee Journal* commented that, in electing Lenroot, Wisconsin might have "gone as far as she can go. It may be, in other words, that Wisconsin's Americanism is lukewarm. The large vote polled by the anti-war Socialists, and . . . Mr. Lenroot, with his record, may indicate a mild, negative sort of interest in America's cause."[98]

In the Milwaukee mayoralty election, which also took place in April, the Socialist mayor was reëlected with an increased plurality; while in November, for the first time since 1910, the Socialists elected their entire county ticket. They also increased the number of state senators from two to five, and assemblymen from 11 to 18;[99] Victor Berger was elected to Congress from the Fifth District, and in the Fourth District the Socialist candidate polled 42 per cent of the vote.[100]

In Minnesota, in June 1918, Charles A. Lindbergh, Nonpartisan League candidate, ran against Governor Burnquist in the Republican primary. He campaigned jointly with Thomas Van Lear, Socialist mayor of Minneapolis, who was seeking renomination in a nonpartisan primary. A "Loyalty ticket" was put up against them and the Minneapolis *Journal* urged the people of Minnesota to "Let Lindbergh know that he cannot preach sedition and treason, and yet aspire to the chief magistracy of the state." Van Lear was told that "stirring up of class feeling will not avail to return him to the seat he does not deserve, and that his acceptance

[95] *Milwaukee Journal,* April 1, 1918. [96] *Ibid.*

[97] *Ibid.,* April 10, 1918. The Socialists had polled 27,846 votes for president in Wisconsin in 1916.

[98] April 3, 1918.

[99] *Milwaukee Journal,* April 4, 1918; *Milwaukee Leader,* November 6, 1918.

[100] *Milwaukee Journal,* November 6, 1918.

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of the disloyal St. Louis platform was emphatically 'a local issue.' "[101] Repression in the campaign was so intense that Lindbergh was forced to conduct at least one meeting in the state of Iowa.[102] Yet he received 43 per cent of the primary vote, while Van Lear was renominated.[103] In November Van Lear was narrowly defeated, but the number of Socialist aldermen increased from three to seven, while two Socialists were elected to the State Assembly and two to the State Senate.[104]

Finally, in Georgia, Tom Watson began his amazing political comeback by almost defeating Carl Vinson in the primary election in the Tenth Congressional District in 1918. Vinson, a "super patriot", made the war the main issue, charging, among other things, that Watson had never bought a Liberty Bond. Watson admitted the charge. He campaigned for "free speech; re-establishment of the press . . . and . . . stronger individual liberty." The election was so close that Watson contested the result. He lost, but two years later was elected to the Senate by a large plurality.[105]

Although the Socialist party of World War I has been remembered primarily for the persistent attacks upon it, the intensity of these attacks has not been satisfactorily explained. Recently H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite have implied that it was not the activities of the opponents of war that inspired the assaults upon them. On the contrary, "patriotism", they write, was merely a "cloak" which "served as an ideal camouflage for the conservative economic and political interests which sought to crush the radical labor and farmer movements"[106] during the war. There is undoubtedly much truth in this explanation, but it is not complete. The size of the Socialist vote in 1917 suggests that there was genuine reason for viewing the party as a potential menace to the war effort; that the almost universal sanction for the anti-Socialist assaults was based, partially, upon apprehension of increasing Socialist popularity.

The popular response to Socialist and non-Socialist anti-war appeals demonstrates considerable and continuing opposition to

[101] Minneapolis *Journal*, June 15, 1918.

[102] Peterson and Fite, *op. cit.*, pp. 189 *et seq.*

[103] Minneapolis *Journal*, June 19, 23, 1918.

[104] *Ibid.*, November 7, 8, 9, 13, 1918. Van Lear received 27,652 votes to 28,967 for J. E. Myers, the "loyalty" candidate.

[105] Woodward, *op. cit.*, pp. 462, 473.

[106] *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

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America's participation in the World War. The opposition, furthermore, was probably appreciably greater than the Socialist vote, in the states examined here, would indicate. This is so partly because of the severe limitation of the Socialist party as an effective center of opposition to the war. In addition, this study does not indicate the full extent of anti-war sentiment because the states in which the Socialist campaigns were conducted, in 1917, were not those in which opposition was greatest. If congressional votes against the declaration of war are used as a measure, then Wisconsin, Nevada, South Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska, Montana, Minnesota and Washington, in that order, were the main centers of opposition. Of the 42 congressmen from these states who voted on the declaration of war, 24 were opposed; while only 8 of 162 congressmen from Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Connecticut voted "no".[107]

It seems clear, also, that opposition to the war was not restricted to any one section of the population or nation. In Minnesota, Oklahoma and Georgia opposition was primarily rural,[108] while in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Indiana it appears to have been primarily urban. The Socialist vote indicates that in some cities where Socialist votes were numerous, foreign born were few; in the rural areas of Oklahoma and Georgia foreign born were curiosities. What emerges is a pattern of opposition which indicates disagreement with Administration policies among diverse groups in the population—an opposition which cannot be explained in terms of Midwest "isolationism" or of urban alienism, but which indicates that many Americans, of varied interests and origins, felt that American democracy had nothing at stake in the European war.

JAMES WEINSTEIN

NEW YORK, N. Y.

[107] *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, Special Session, April 5, 1917, pp. 412-13.

[108] Lindbergh carried many of the rural counties by better than two to one, while running well behind Burnquist in most cities. (Minneapolis *Journal*, June 23, 1918.) In Oklahoma the opposition was among tenant farmers. In Georgia, Watson's strength was among the "red-neck" farmers.

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AUG 1 0 1959 INDEXED

LABOR'S PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM

A STUDY IN FRUSTRATION*

IT IS sometimes said that our professional diplomats spend too much time with the élite and not enough time with the plain people of the countries to which they are sent. It is sometimes argued, too, that this defect can be remedied by a greater use of nonprofessionals in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. One example of this use was the participation of labor representatives in the execution of the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe. It is the purpose of this article to examine this experience and to see what conclusions can be drawn from it.

In particular, we shall try to answer the following questions:

1. How did the general criterion for the success of the Plan's operation agree with the criterion used by the representatives of American labor?
2. What was the nature of the participation of these representatives in the Marshall Plan administration?
3. How realistic were these representatives in what they expected from the Marshall Plan administration?
4. What are the possibilities and problems of incorporating labor movement personnel into the government's official foreign policy and administration?

I

The United States looked upon the European economic chaos of 1947 as a threat to world stability. The principal object of the Marshall Plan was to assist Europe to rehabilitate its factories and workshops so that its citizens would once again find employment and make their contributions to the channels of trade.

If we confine our evaluation of the Marshall Plan to this most general objective, then the Plan can definitely be termed a success by the year 1955. The United Nations reported that Europe had

* This paper was written while the author was a Research Associate in the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California.

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lifted its over-all production 87 per cent between 1948 and 1951.[1] In that same period the United States had raised its production 38.5 per cent.[2] These figures are impressive even when due allowance is made for the much higher base from which the United States began. In that same period Italy showed an increase in production of 98.4 per cent; France, an increase of 80.3 per cent; and the United Kingdom, a 67.6 per cent increase.[3]

However, when we compare this over-all success with labor's additional objective of protecting living standards while increasing productivity, the record is less good. Countries like Great Britain, Germany and those in the Scandinavian group attained labor's objectives. Italy and France, on the other hand, failed to do so.

The working classes in Great Britain, Germany and Scandinavia were protected by powerful trade-union blocs which participated in the local expenditure of Marshall funds, and thus were able simultaneously to explain to their constituents the necessity for the allocation of large sums to capital accumulation and, through collective bargaining processes, to protect the living standards of the workers. Profits were plowed back into both capital investment and higher wages.

On the other hand, in France and Italy labor was very poorly organized and its participation in the decisions allocating Marshall Plan funds was confined to the ceremonial level and was seldom effective. The majority of the working classes of both of the countries showed their sense of alienation from the national community by voting Communist.

This relationship between the national governments of the European countries and their working classes would ordinarily be none of our business. The traditions of nineteenth-century diplomacy called for exclusive contact between governments. Any interest in the internal affairs of a foreign country by the citizens of the United States must be confined to purely private channels. The development of a Marshall Plan administration was undertaken within this tradition—the contacts between the United States and the Marshall Plan countries were to be exclusively meetings between governments.

We quite honestly insisted that we did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. Yet if we intended to spend

[1] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1956*, New York, Table 37, p. 117. Computed from this table, using 1948 as 100 instead of 1953 as 100.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

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some 17 billions of dollars in the European economy within a five-year period, then per se we were interfering in the most important part of that country's internal affairs—the operation of its internal economy.

If we still insisted that we were not interfering, all that it could mean was that our interference was unconscious and random instead of conscious and directed toward a specific social objective. The Russians were shaping our policy, not by direction, but by indirection. We listened to what they accused us of doing and then insisted we were doing the opposite. The result was that we never thought out at the top policy level a definite set of social objectives. We were too busy pretending that we were not interfering in the internal affairs or economies of our European friends. This contradictory behavior flowed largely from our past inexperience in such activities and is not intended as a hindsight indictment.

This situation was made worse by the campaign of the Communists against the Plan. It was to the interest of the Communists to maintain the economic chaos in which Western Europe found itself. This chaos, they hoped, would result in a breakdown of existing institutions, and Western Europe would fall into the Communist orbit like a ripe apple from a tree. The Communist countries were initially invited to participate in the Marshall Plan. The Czechs, in fact, sent their acceptance of the invitation. They were subsequently forced to withdraw by the Russians who then coined slogans intended to convince the workers of Western Europe that the Marshall Plan was but a cleverly contrived scheme of the American imperialists to gain control of all European economic resources.

So far from this being the case, the United States did a good deal to encourage European decision in the allocation of the funds made available by the Marshall Plan. In particular, there was formed a sixteen-member council of European nations to formulate existing needs and to distribute the funds to meet them. This European participation was partially an answer to the Russian propaganda by showing that the European countries had a voice in shaping their own economic future. But it was more than that, since it involved the United States in European affairs more than would have been the case if the tradition of absolute noninterference had been followed literally. If that had been done, the Americans would merely have given money to individual governments which would then have spent it as they saw best.

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Earlier experience with the extension of aid to a certain small European country, however, was a clear warning against following the tradition of noninterference. The funds made available to the small country in question were used to finance luxury imports for the rich rather than to rehabilitate the production machine. In the end the United States found that it had spent a great deal of money only to earn the obloquy of the workers and peasants of the country who looked upon our aid as representing an alliance between the rich "American capitalists and their European counterparts." This had to be avoided in the case of Marshall Plan aid.

Thus, from the very beginning, American policy was caught in a dilemma. At the same time that we insisted that it was our policy not to interfere in the internal affairs of the beneficiary countries, we developed an elaborate apparatus to oversee the expenditure of these funds. Once we had created this apparatus the ground work was laid for severe disagreements within our official family about how much pressure could be classified as gentle influence and persuasion and how much constituted interference. The extent of pressure or persuasion favored by different groups varied from one country to another and, what was even more important, from one sector of the economy to another within a specific country.

II

Labor felt deeply involved in these decisions and was invited to participate in the Marshall Plan administration from its beginning in 1947. Paul Hoffman, chief of the agency, asked William Green and Philip Murray to nominate candidates for posts. Clinton Golden, a former vice president of the Steelworkers Union, nominated by the CIO, and Bert Jewell, formerly associated with the Railway Workers department of the AFL, were appointed to head the Washington office of labor affairs. Boris Shiskin, formerly research director of the AFL, was appointed to head the Paris office of labor affairs—the coördinating office for all of the national missions abroad. Each mission to an individual country was headed by a mission chief on whose staff was a labor adviser with a staff of his own. It was standard practice for the European Co-operation Administration, the name of the Marshall Plan administration, to rely on organized labor to nominate candidates for these various posts. The posts carried virtually no operating responsibilities; they were strictly advisory, at least officially.

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This unprecedented invitation to participate in the administration of America's foreign aid program aroused high hopes in organized labor. Irving Brown, AFL's roving minister abroad, expressed these hopes by drawing up a list of six objectives, two of which were:

1. "Labor must safeguard collective bargaining, trade union standards and agreements and social legislation and engage in training and retraining programs and, above all, maintain the principles of free labor."

2. "Labor must obtain the wholehearted and enthusiastic support of the workers in this tremendous production effort which will fail unless European labor is aroused to all out enthusiastic support."[4]

The function of the labor adviser was to draw the attention of the missions' officers to the impact of the expenditures of American funds on the fortunes of the workers and their organization. This brought him into conflict with his fellow mission officers, particularly in those countries where a weak and ineffective labor organization was unable to protect its own constituents. This was especially true in Italy and France. The English, Germans and Scandinavians were protected by powerful trade unions and real government participation. The free French and Italian trade unionists were busy attempting to survive. They were beleaguered on one side by old-guard employers whom Marshall Plan credits were restoring to their old affluence and strength, and on the other by the Communist trade unionists who were trading upon the workers' distrust of these same employers. To be sure, all of them paid tribute to the principles of "fair shares for everybody" but they often frustrated every attempt to implement any form of collective bargaining—European or American.

The prejudiced view of the Marshall Plan held by Italian and French workers can be understood from a description of the detailed manner in which a typical factory would be regenerated. For example, take a French textile manufacturer with plenty of worthless francs and a destroyed factory in 1947. There was an official rate for his francs. However, this rate was meaningless because the entire economy of the country was in ruins and there was nothing to back up his francs. The Marshall Plan comes into existence. He applies to the French government for a million

[4] Irving Brown, "The Marshall Plan", *American Federationist*, vol. LVI, No. 1, p. 36.

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dollars' worth of American equipment to rehabilitate his factory. The French government applies to the American mission for an allotment from its allocated funds. He is informed that the application is approved. He then deposits the equivalent of a million dollars in francs with the French government, at the official rate of exchange and shortly finds himself the owner of a brand new factory. What happens? The francs increase in value as the factories of France rise again. The bankrupt textile owner is once again a prosperous factory owner. The workers find employment. America has intervened in the French economy to restore the same set of social relationships that prevailed before the war, unconsciously perhaps, but effectively.

The Americans were aware of what was happening but were in a dilemma. If they insisted that any firm that was the beneficiary of Marshall Plan funds must comply with certain minimum social standards, then they would be accused of interfering in the internal affairs of France by the very people who were the chief beneficiaries of Marshall Plan credits. Only the labor representatives and some few among the professional administrators felt that the risk of being accused of overt interference in France's internal affairs was less than the risk of earning the indifference or contempt of France's working classes. The results of this policy were apparent very shortly.

It was true that industrial production was chalking up new records. In 1951 the United Nations reported that French production had increased 39.4 per cent over its pre-war level and was still rising.[5] During that same period, however, the cost-of-living index had climbed from 4 to 101, or about 25 times.[6] On the other hand, the hourly wage level in France had risen from 10.45 francs in 1938[7] to 103.7 francs in 1951,[8] or 9.9 times. It was understandable that a good part of the production increment should go into capital accumulation, but the French worker found he had still not regained his pre-war standard of living. Moreover, no available statistics showed how much of current profits was

[5] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1956,* Table 37, p. 117—computed from this table using 1938 as 100.

[6] *Ibid.,* Table 160, p. 467.

[7] International Labour Office, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1941,* Montreal, Table XIII, p. 102.

[8] International Labour Office, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1956,* Geneva, Table 16, p. 211.

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going abroad to create emergency nest eggs for wealthy Frenchmen who were considering emigration.

Americans might argue somewhat resentfully that the French working class should have been grateful for the Marshall Plan expenditures. After all, without them the recapitalization of French industry would have proceeded much more slowly or might never have taken place at all, with the result that the French workers would have been completely unemployed. But it was difficult for the workers to be so objective. A "rich uncle" is never liked in the first place, and when his funds are used as inequitably as the figures given above indicate, his gifts are much more likely to generate resentment than gratitude. The question in France, therefore, was, "What could we do as Americans to change the situation?"

We should hesitate before accusing the Marshall Plan administrators of lack of foresight when the Plan was launched in 1947, since it is difficult for us to recapture the feeling of urgency and imminent catastrophe of that time. Yet, while labor was no doubt aware of this urgency, it felt it necessary to ask whether a clearer view of what we were seeking would not have produced more and better social results in countries like Italy and France. Was there no alternative to the restoration of economic affluence and power to the same group of restriction-minded industrialists who climbed to the top of the economic heap with American aid?

III

Early in the Marshall Plan program, the Americans sponsored a drive to increase the productivity of European workers. The techniques of industrial engineering and modern management were presented aggressively to the Europeans. Now such techniques as time study, job evaluation, merit rating, the use of psychological tests for promotion and hiring have been bones of contention between labor and management even in highly organized areas. Their use in areas and countries without unions or with weak unions can become the basis of unbridled exploitation. Unfortunately the Americans in charge of the productivity program continued to advocate these measures with little regard for the collective bargaining environment within which they found themselves. The productivity drive degenerated into a managerial cult in which a fixed remedy was prescribed for each country independent of the peculiar problems it faced.

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Again this meant very little in those countries with a strong labor movement; they could either accept or resist the installation of those measures as suited their needs. On the other hand, in France, except for a small group of labor specialists who saw in the widespread adoption of these methods a place for themselves in the national productivity bureaucracy, the average worker looked upon these techniques as part of a conspiracy to exploit him further.

All attempts to combine the productivity program with a program of better organization of the free trade unions were frustrated. As a result the workingman's plight grew steadily worse. Senators Ellender and Ferguson at the Senate hearing on foreign aid appropriations in 1951 argued that unless the position of the average workingman was improved by 1952 much of our original investment would have gone for naught. Neither Senator was particularly known as a domestic liberal at the time.[9] This feeling culminated in the addition of Section 516 to the Mutual Security Act, the so-called Moody-Benton amendment, which included a general directive for carrying out a program which would encourage the growth of free trade unionism abroad.

The tugs and pulls that were developing between the professional administrators of the program and the labor representatives are best understood by the way this policy was interpreted and implemented or, to speak more accurately, buried.

Section 516 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 directed the Mutual Security Administration to carry out its program to permit free trade unions to play an active rôle in gaining their country's economic and social objective. This amendment passed through Congress almost without debate. Funds were appropriated to enable the productivity program to attain these objectives. William H. Joyce, a top official, announced the new policy.

He wrote: "To make its effort to increase European productivity more effective ECA will modify its general policy of working only with and through the governments of Marshall Plan countries. In the new drive ECA will work directly with trade unions, individual firms, individual managers, trade associations, labor leaders and others."[10] The professional administrators of the agency, however, shared enthusiasm neither for the Moody-Benton amendment nor for the "people to people" approach that Joyce indicated. Their

[9] U. S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, *Hearings on Foreign Aid*, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 19, 243.

[10] *New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 30, 1951, p. 40.

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feeling was that the sole emphasis should be upon building up the government institutions of the country.[11]

The agency decided to draw up a pilot plant program, particularly in France and Italy, to attain the new objectives. The history of this program goes back to early 1950 when Boris Shiskin, then head of the labor office of the Paris headquarters of the European Cooperation Administration, initiated conversations to determine a more realistic basis for expenditures of Marshall Plan funds. The program entered a new stage in September 1950 when an American trade-union team made up of Lucia, Berenger and Gibbons issued their report on the findings of their mission to France. They pointed out that the reactions of the French workers to our aid varied from indifference to active hostility. Following the presentation of this report, Robert Oliver, the newly appointed CIO Labor Consultant to ECA, convened a group of trade unionists to formulate a program for France. This group consisted of Victor Reuther, William Gomberg and Harold Gibbons. Ken Doty, Chief Labor Officer of the French Mission, was called in from Paris to participate in the conference. It was out of this conference that the concept of pilot plants for France and Italy first emerged.

There was no attempt at the time to develop this concept in any detail. The whole theory behind the concept, however, was that of learning by example as well as by precept. This thinking ran along somewhat the following lines. The French business man remains convinced that low profit ratios and high turnover rates are applicable to the United States but not to France. If he is shown by example that these business principles can be applied successfully in an enterprise run in France, then the French business man will at once abandon his outmoded thinking and embrace a high-wage, low-price economy.

Somehow the smug assumption was made that the French business man was ignorant of the economic truths discovered by the Americans. He merely awaited an economic education at the hands of the United States. Any observer, however, would soon discover that the French business man was completely aware of how the Americans function but that he preferred his own way. When talking with a French manufacturer on an informal basis about a specific problem in the way I talked with a knit goods manufacturer, he would say frankly that he could reduce the price of a sweater selling for six dollars by as much as two dollars and

[11] Conversation with Harlan Cleveland at Berkeley, California, July 1957.

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still make a profit. As he put it, however, why should he do this? He felt it would surely mean a great deal more activity for the same or less profit, and it might even reduce over-all profit because the retailer would not change the retail price.

Conversations with one of the prime organizers of the famous annual Royaumont conference on scientific management disclosed that he could make a handsome profit even if he reduced the price of a common household product he was manufacturing. Yet he asked, "Why should I do this? The market for my product is inelastic."

Of course, none of this grass-roots thinking came through in official statements or speeches. All of the official speeches hailed high turnover, low profit and the necessity for high productivity. However, the employers' organizations enjoyed a semi-official status and they effectively perpetuated the policies which their members actually desired. They were able to enforce most of their trade practices because of their ability to restrict the new entrants into any industry and their control over allocations of limited raw materials. Before any new enterprise could be opened, the owner had to secure a *carte commerçant* from the Commerce Ministry. New applications for opening a business were referred by the Commerce Ministry to the appropriate association for recommendations as to whether there was room for the enterprise. In other words, the man's potential competitors were deciding if he should be permitted to enter the market! If the Commerce Ministry finally rejected the application, it was under no obligation to disclose the reason for its action. There was no appeal. In addition, there were numberless other points at which the French business community could exert pressure to keep potential competitors out and mavericks in line.

There were two ways of looking at the concept of a pilot plant, the naïve way and the effective way. The first was that American industrialists and trade unionists would make available to a French employer the best American operating techniques, based on a policy of rapid turnover, low profit ratios, high productivity and high wages. The French employers would be invited to adopt them out of a sense of patriotic duty. The other approach was to search out unorthodox maverick employers who were anxious to expand their enterprise by creating new markets and capturing old ones. They would be the Henry Fords of the French economy. Their influence would be felt in France because their unorthodox business methods would threaten the business security of any enterprise which did

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not follow their practices. It was very unlikely that employers prominently identified with the trade associations possessed this temperament. In fact, it would not have been at all surprising to find that employers for whom we were looking were frowned on by the associations as habitual antisocial outlaws. We were much more likely to find them outside than inside regular channels. To seek, through the regular trade associations, for industries and plants which would offer themselves as pilot plant projects made as much sense as asking those trade associations to commit suicide. The whole purpose of the program was to abolish the very practices which the associations were created to perpetuate.

When, however, one or two industries were found which were sufficiently attracted by the possibility of capital credit to offer themselves as pilot plants, the representatives of the French soon discovered how to negotiate with the American officials so as to avoid the adoption of the labor practices which they regarded as undesirable. If one of our representatives broached the matter of social guarantees, the French representative would first explode with indignation and then announce his lack of further interest in the project. This would frighten the American. He was generally negotiating for a project which he would be called upon to administer. Successfully concluded negotiations for a project meant status, a semipermanent administrative post in Paris with all the accouterments of "making like a diplomat". The collapse of negotiations meant a report to Washington that the plan was impractical at the present time, which might lead to the shutting down of the division headquarters and the official's return to the United States.

The Administration could have avoided this situation merely by providing that project negotiators were ineligible for administrative posts in the operation of the project. Labor consultants who recommended this procedure were ignored. The French negotiators continued to frighten our representatives by threatening not to take our money. In the end, they got the money and in return we were identified with a silly collection of trivia rather than with some real advance in social welfare.

IV

A specific example of what this meant is the fate of the so-called clothing pilot experiment. The industrial office of our French mission requested me to meet with the representatives of the

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clothing association to determine the feasibility of a clothing pilot project in France.

At a luncheon at a well-known restaurant in the Bois de Boulogne all went well between the many courses and the wines, white and red, under which an American had to fight to stay awake, until a discussion began about the social guarantees which would be written into an agreement between the free French unions and the employers' associations. The atmosphere became increasingly tense until one of the employer representatives protested that they no more needed a written agreement than did a certain firm in the United States that was notoriously antiunion in an industry 90 per cent unionized. The social thinking of the employer and the practices he was anxious to import from the United States were quite apparent. The luncheon ended on a note somewhat less polite than that on which it had begun.

Independent of the antiunion feelings that were shown at the luncheon, other considerations made it apparent that the undertaking of a pilot plant operation in the clothing industry at the time was ill advised. The clothing trade newspaper had reported earlier that the French trade association had petitioned the government for a cessation of all clothing imports into France because of the spreading unemployment in the industry. At the luncheon to which I referred earlier, the officers of the association denied that any petition had been submitted to the government and said that unemployment in this industry presented no problem at all or, at most, a very small one.

Perhaps this represented the differences in the concept of unemployment in American and French economic thinking, or in the American and French languages. A group of American engineers under Sam Yulke had been retained to look into the feasibility of a pilot plant in the clothing industry. Hyman Bookbinder, the labor expert on the Yulke team, disclosed that virtually every factory which he visited in the tailored clothing industry was on short-time, that is, the workers were working 32 hours or less instead of full-time and their incomes were consequently curtailed. Without exception, every local union leader and every *Comité d'Entreprise* which was interviewed expressed great concern about the *chômage*.

Was it wise under these circumstances to choose an industry where curtailed employment had already made the workers fearful of any production program? The answer, of course, could have been given in the old platitude, "Well, if production goes up, prices will come down, the market for clothing will expand, and thus

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unemployment will disappear." Unfortunately, this represents an oversimplification of the real problem. There was no guarantee or indication that the labor cost in the production of clothing would have any significant effect on the over-all sales volume of men's apparel. Direct labor, it was disclosed, accounted for less than 20 per cent of the wholesale price and about 12 per cent of the retail price. Even an optimistic 25 per cent reduction in labor cost, if it were transferred completely to the wholesale price, and from there to the retail price, would result in a cost reduction of only 3 per cent at the retail price level—factors, incidentally, over which the United States and the French unions exerted no control whatsoever.

When these facts were reported to the industrial officer of the mission, he became extremely angry and accused the labor representatives of tactlessly destroying his efforts to persuade French manufacturers to undertake the pilot plant project. His own vested interest in a project for its own sake had blinded him completely to the fact that it would be better to be identified with no project at all than with one that was sure to fail. A laconic comment of René Richard, a leading advocate of productivity in French trade-union circles, discloses the subsequent fate of the project. He said: "It is still too early to give facts and figures for this experiment. . . . Its importance is unfortunately limited owing to the small number of trade union members in the industry." The agreement had called for consultation with the national labor bodies. Unfortunately no effective control could be exercised. Some of the American experts assigned to the project eventually resigned in disgust.

The fate of a similar undertaking in the foundry industry was also commented upon by Richard. Here, too, there were often cases of total or partial unemployment and the effects of these cases were felt in the industry in the closing months of 1952. He goes on to ask: "Can workers really be called upon to husband every minute of their time if ignorance of the market prevents the undertaking from guaranteeing them a job?"[12]

The *Centre Intersyndicale D'Etudes et de Recherche de Productivité* was created by the French government to assist the French unions to participate in the productivity program. With the help of the Americans, Richard played a leading part in its creation. Yet he found himself embarrassed when members of his own organi-

[12] René Richard, "Productivity and Trade Unions in France", *International Labour Review*, vol. LXVIII, No. 3, Sept. 1953, p. 282.

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zation, the *Force Ouvrière,* voted to disaffiliate from the *Centre* in November 1952, not because they were opposed to the concept of increased productivity, but because they were angry with the way these projects had been organized and executed. Similarly the Christian unions came very close to disaffiliating after a violent debate that ended on May 24, 1953 with a vote of 1601 to 983 to continue affiliation.

The essential differences between the work performed by a trade-union technician attached to the ECA in countries like Britain and Scandinavia, on the one hand, and Italy and France, on the other, become apparent at once. In the former countries, the technician was able to sit down with his counterparts who likewise represented a powerful force in the community, and discuss actual technical problems. In the latter countries, he found it necessary to abandon his purely technical rôle and enter into the field of agency policy. A low-pressure area was left by the absence of any powerful trade group in France and Italy. Under the circumstances he feared that his techniques would be used to increase worker exploitation rather than to contribute to an increase in the standard of living or to the strengthening of the weak trade unions in these countries. While the professional civil servants in the agency were sympathetic to raising the standard of living, they seldom understood the critical importance of shoring up the local trade-union movement. It was over this issue that most conflicts developed between the civil servants and the labor consultants.

These conflicts in policy implementation between the professional administrators and the labor representatives were largely confined to the top European bureau offices and the consultants working on their staffs on a temporary basis. Very often, however, the officers of the local labor mission did find themselves in an impossible position. They owed their nomination to the American labor organization, but they were dependent upon the professional administrator for continued employment and advancement. If they chose to leave the agency, they ran a great economic risk. Their union posts were no longer available to them. Many of them were men in their forties with families completely dependent upon them and they could not afford prolonged unemployment.

V

It is possible to draw at least three different conclusions from labor's experience with the productivity program of the Marshall Plan.

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The first is that given by David Heaps in an article published in 1955. He expresses very well the feeling of frustration induced in him and in so many of his colleagues by the difficulty of combining the rôle of an independent trade unionist seeking a colleague-to-colleague relation with European fellow trade unionists with that of a subordinate official in a government administration, confined to protocol relations with foreign nationals. His conclusion is that the labor movement has no place in the official apparatus. "A realistic overseas labor program", he says, "will operate effectively . . . only if the American trade union movement is a detached advisor and critic of foreign operations; it cannot hope to fill this role as long as it maintains a vested interest in the program."[13]

To the present writer, this argument for staying out of the administration of the Marshall Plan makes no more sense than the analogous arguments of the Marxist Socialists before 1914 against participation in capitalist coalition governments. They preserved their orthodoxy, but they got nothing done for the people.

Nor can we accept a second conclusion that may be drawn from Mr. Heaps's article. This is that labor, if it goes beyond the rôle of "detached advisor and critic", should confine its participation to membership in a top policy board. It has been shown above that this *pro forma* participation leads to nothing but the expression of the appropriate platitudes for public consumption. Policy decisions become meaningless if the executors of those decisions do not agree with them.

A third conclusion, therefore, and the one with which the present writer agrees, is that labor behaved in a correct and responsible manner when it accepted the invitation to participate in solving the problems of transforming the Marshall Plan policy, with which it agreed so fully, into an operating reality. It should do so again in the future if similar situations arise.

But the Marshall Plan experience shows that this participation can be improved in more ways than one. In the first place, trade unions ought not to be allowed to use overseas agencies as patronage outlets, especially as dumping grounds for cast-off officers who have already seen their best days. In the second place, trade-union representatives in government agencies must be guaranteed freedom to follow their consciences. In the case of the Marshall Plan administration, this freedom was enjoyed by only a small number

[13] David Heaps, "Union Participation in Foreign Aid Programs", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. IX, No. 1, Oct. 1955.

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of labor representatives who were on temporary assignment as consultants. But many or most of the posts held by trade unionists were on a political basis in the sense that their occupants had no security of employment back home if they resigned. Yet many of these administrative officers in the labor division came from the staffs of trade unions. The union movement is large enough and stable enough to be able to provide job security for a representative of labor's ideals whose conscience compels him to resign an overseas post with a government agency. The future for labor and the country demands the extension of this security so that men can serve both their nation and their social conscience.

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THE EMPIRICAL PROLETARIANS: A NOTE ON BRITISH COMMUNISM

"THAT lot run a revolution? They couldn't run a whelk-stall." Such was the verdict of the late George Lansbury upon the Communist Party of Great Britain.[1] Although the C.P.G.B. has failed as a revolutionary political party, its influence in British society has been more than that of a small propaganda sect. The extreme Left of the Labour party has sometimes found the ideas and activities of British communism more attractive than the offerings of its own leadership. In the period from the Spanish Civil War and the Left Book Club to the collapse of Nazi Germany, King Street was a considerable force among the literati, the scientists and the teachers of Great Britain. Even today after the witch hunt of Lysenko, the denouement of Stalinist despotism, and the martyrdom of Hungary, virtuosi such as Maurice Dobb, George Thomson, Arnold Kettle and Alan Bush remain to bolster the prestige of a seriously weakened organization. Indian communism owes much to the C.P.G.B., as do the other communist movements within Empire and Commonwealth. Nor can its determined work in the ranks of organized labor be overlooked, for example in such key organizations of the British industrial complex as the National Union of Mineworkers, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and the Electrical Trades Union. In short, British communism has proved to have more than a mere nuisance value.

Students of comparative politics, however, might consider the C.P.G.B. for another reason. In this world of tension between East and West popular treatments of communism sometimes create the misleading and dangerous impression that a national Communist party is little more than the party of Stalin and Khrushchev writ small. But national communism can seldom be explained simply in terms of a common global organizational and ideological pattern. Such a pattern certainly exists, but in attempting to understand local Communist party behavior, variation from the

[1] As reported by his son-in-law, Raymond Postgate, *The Life of George Lansbury* (London, 1951), p. 238.

The following essay is an expanded version of a section of a study, *Communism and British Intellectuals,* to be published shortly in Great Britain and the United States. Research for the study was made possible by a grant to the author from the Rockefeller Foundation.

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"norm" may be more important than conformity. National Communist parties have roots in different national cultures as well as in Moscow. There is no clearer example of this than the C.P.G.B. Among the Communist parties of the major industrial Powers it is unique in respect to history, size, general outlook, leadership and attitude toward the intellectual. An examination of this distinctive configuration may aid in determining why it acts as it does, and why it has been no more successful than it has.[2]

Unlike Continental and American communism the British party did not result from a major split in the ranks of the Social Democrats. The nucleus of British communism was the very small British Socialist party, affiliated to the Labour party, that was heir to H. M. Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation. Joining the British Socialist party to form the Communist Party of Great Britain was a variety of radical elements: the Left-wing of the Socialist Labour party, composed of syndicalists who had seceded from the Social Democratic Federation in 1903; the Workers Socialist Federation, later the British Communist party, led by Sylvia Pankhurst; the South Wales Socialist Society; the Com-

[2] No fully sanctioned official history has ever been published by the party. The first scholarly study of the C.P.G.B. has only just appeared: Henry Pelling, *The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile* (London, 1958).

In addition to party publications, the author has relied upon the following: Tom Bell, *The British Communist Party: A Short History* (London, 1937); R. Page Arnot, *Twenty Years: The Policy of the Communist Party of Great Britain from Its Foundation July 31st, 1920* (London, 1940); William Gallacher, *The Case for Communism* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1949); E. J. Hobsbawn, "The British Communist Party", *Political Quarterly*, vol. XXV (January-March 1954), pp. 30-43; J. T. Murphy, "The Shop Stewards and Workers Committee Movement", and "Their Ideas", in Arthur Gleason, ed., *What the Workers Want: A Study of British Labor* (New York, 1920), pp. 184-211; Nesta H. Webster, *The Socialist Network* (London, 1926); Henry Gibbs, *The Spectre of Communism* (London, 1936); G. D. H. Cole, *A History of the Labour Party from 1914* (London, 1948); Egon Wertheimer, *Portrait of the Labour Party*, trans. from the German (London and New York, 1929); Stephen Richards Graubard, *British Labour and the Russian Revolution 1917-1924* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 115-139; Franz Borkenau, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), and *European Communism* (London, 1953).

Also of great value are the autobiographies of men who have been prominently involved in the British communist movement: Tom Bell, *Pioneering Days* (London, 1936); William Gallacher, *The Rolling of the Thunder* (London, 1947), and *"Rise Like Lions"* (London, 1951); J. T. Murphy, *New Horizons* (London, 1941); Harry Pollitt, *Serving My Time: An Apprenticeship to Politics* (London, 1940).

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munist Labour party of Willie Gallacher and Dave Ramsay; intellectuals from the National Guilds League; dissenters from the Independent Labour party; and the members of several sects like the Socialist Prohibition Fellowship.

A unity conference held in April 1919 in London was attended by delegates from the British Socialist party, the Socalist Labour party, the Workers Socialist Federation, and the South Wales Socialist Society. Two main issues of disagreement, the questions of affiliation to the Labour party and of parliamentary action, proved to be the chief obstacle to immediate and complete unification. Although the British Socialist party and the Socialist Labour party favored parliamentary action, they differed upon the matter of affiliation. The Socialist Labour party opposed it. Little sympathy for either affiliation or parliamentary action was shown by the other two groups. A compromise was ultimately reached between the British Socialist party and the Socialist Labour party, but the followers of Sylvia Pankhurst withdrew to become the Communist party (British Section of the Third International), and to enter the Communist party of Great Britain some time after it had been established. Since the work of the Socialist Labour party delegates was repudiated by their Executive Committee, they decided to continue on their own with the work of unification. So they organized the Communist Unity Group from all members of the Socialist Labour party who approved the decisions of the London conference. This faction met in April 1920 and issued a unity manifesto.

The Communist party of Great Britain was constituted at the Foundation Conference in London, July 31 and August 1, 1920. Delegates, totaling 152, represented fifty-six branches of the British Socialist party, twenty-two branches of the Communist Unity Group and twenty-four miscellaneous organizations.[3] They gave their approval to a Provisional Executive Committee consisting of four members of the British Socialist party and four members of the Communist Unity Group, previously designated by the two groups; and six members (four B.S.P., one Guildsman, one Socialist Prohibition Fellowship) elected by the delegates. Arthur Macmanus of the S.L.P. became the Chairman and Albert Inkpin of the B.S.P., Secretary.[4] At the Second Conference in Leeds,

[3] Bell, *Pioneering Days*, p. 186.

[4] Proceedings of the convention together with names of the delegates and the officers are contained in *Communist Unity Convention, London, July 31st and August 1st, 1920: Official Report* (London, 1920).

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January 29 and 30, 1921, the new C.P.G.B. was strengthened by the Communist Labour party under Gallacher and Ramsay; the British Communist party of Sylvia Pankhurst; and a few individual members of the Independent Labour party. Finally at the Third Party Conference in April 1921 in Manchester, more I.L.P. members entered the ranks, and the process of formation was completed with the proclamation of the Party Rules.[5]

British communism has to a great extent been shaped by its development in the shadow of what has become the largest and most powerful Social Democratic party in the world. By 1920 the Labour party had over four million members, and never in its subsequent history did the membership drop below two million. Gaining 4.2 million votes in the election of 1922, Labour went on to poll 8.3 million votes in 1935. Numerically, the German Social Democratic party was stronger than the Labour party at a much earlier date. However, its post-war growth, not as great as that of the Labour party, was abruptly terminated by Hitler.[6] The existence of the gargantuan Labour party has undoubtedly retarded the growth of the C.P.G.B., whose diminutive size has probably been vital in determining certain other facets of its character.

The C.P.G.B. has always been smaller than any Communist party of a major industrial nation. Although membership of 10,000 was officially claimed at the time of its foundation, the actual figure seems to have been nearer 2,500.[7] The high during

[5] Information on the Leeds conference can be found in the *Communist*, March 26, 1921, p. 1; April 2, 1921, p. 1; and Bell, *The British Communist Party*, pp. 60-62.

[6] The comparative strength of the European Communists and Socialists in 1929 is illustrated by the following statistics in B. Vassilyev, "The Forces of the Comintern and Its Allies", *International Press Correspondence* (March 29, 1929), p. 334, as quoted in Theodore Draper, *The Roots of American Communism* (New York, 1957), p. 448, f.n. 3.

	Communists	*Socialists*
Germany	124,729	867,671
Czechoslovakia	150,000	194,960
France	52,376	99,106
Great Britain	9,000*	3,338,256 (Labour party)
Austria	6,270	683,786
Belgium	500	597,971 (Labour party)

* This figure is an obvious exaggeration.

[7] See Bell, *Pioneering Days*, pp. 194-195. Rigorous analysis of the membership of a national Communist party is virtually impossible because of the

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the twenties was reached in 1926, the year of the General Strike, when, within a few months, the membership doubled to about 10,730. However, after the strike, the membership rapidly dwindled until it revived in the early thirties. The growth of the C.P.G.B. in the nineteen thirties was much less dramatic than that of the French and American Communist parties, as the following figures indicate:

Communist Party	*1930*	*1935*	*1938*
Great Britain	1,376	6,500	15,570
France	38,240	71,000	350,000
United States	8,000	30,000	75,000 to 100,000

At the beginning of 1943 a membership peak of approximately 60,000 was achieved by the C.P.G.B. Subsequently there was a decline to about 33,000 in 1955, falling after the Hungarian uprising to 24,670 in 1958. If a conclusion can be drawn, it is that in all probability the British masses are politically more conservative than their foreign counterparts. Those who are radically inclined can always turn to the Labour party. As a consequence the C.P.G.B. has been compelled to grope its way forward, cautiously and empirically, carefully attempting to adjust its policy to the "objective economic situation".

In respect to the composition of its membership, the C.P.G.B. has not deviated greatly from the general pattern set by its fraternal parties. There have been fewer middle-class members. But like all Communist parties, the C.P.G.B. has been a refuge for "floaters", for the unemployed and disillusioned, who, once finding jobs and relative security, quickly take their leave. The resulting turnover

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lack of reliable statistics available to the public. No continuous monthly reports are published. A heterogeneous variety of sources must be combed for the few existing figures. Precise dates are seldom revealed in these sources. Often no effort is made to distinguish between dues-paying members and those who are delinquent in this regard, or who have dropped out of the party altogether.

Membership statistics given below are based on a careful examination of the following sources: *Workers' Weekly; Workers' Life; Daily Worker; Communist Review; Discussion; Party Organiser; Communist International; International Press Correspondence; World News and Views;* official reports of the C.P.G.B.; abridged reports of the Comintern Congresses; O. Piatnitsky, *Urgent Questions of the Day,* "XIth Plenum Series" (London, 1931), pp. 36-39; *The Communist International: Between the Fifth and the Sixth World Congresses 1924-8* (London, 1928), p. 30.

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rate, at times well over 40 per cent, has facilitated the oligarchic control of the party by a hard core of true believers.[8]

Another feature of British communism has always slightly astonished, if not exasperated, foreign Communists. Arthur Koestler recalls that, after a lecture tour of England in the days of the Left Book Club, he reached the "tentative conclusion" that English Communists were nearer the Pickwick Club than the Comintern.[9] British Communists have always seemed comparatively moderate in their outlook, not overly engrossed with theoretical questions, and less hesitant to associate with non-Communists. Membership in the C.P.G.B. does not usually carry the penalty of social ostracism. Leaving the party, therefore, tends to be less traumatic. Party-life is generally not as demanding as it is elsewhere. In short, the C.P.G.B. has never become a closed society with distinctive mores, isolated from the rest of society. The penchant for the middle road, for the compromise and tolerance so much a part of British politics, has left its imprint upon British communism.[10]

Hatred evidently has not been as influential in Great Britain as it has elsewhere in shaping the relations of Communist and non-Communist. In trade unions there seems to be somewhat greater fraternization. No real stigma is attached to a Labour M.P. who associates with Communists or writes for their publications. Among Communist and non-Communist intellectuals, the bonds of family, school, university, profession and club may to some extent bridge the gap caused by ideological differences. Perhaps the best-known

[8] The high turnover of Communist membership is discussed in Piatnitsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38. Data on the composition and turnover of the C.P.G.B. membership are given in the following: *International Press Correspondence,* vol. 5 (Feb. 5, 1925), p. 138; Idris Cox, "Carrying Out the C.C. Resolution", *Communist Review,* vol. IV (Aug. 1932), p. 384, and "The Twelfth Party Congress and the Principles of Bolshevik Organization", *Communist Review,* vol. IV (Dec. 1932), p. 577; J. Tsirul, "The Communist Party of Great Britain at the Cross-roads (Organizational Tasks of the Party)", *Communist International,* vol. IX (March 15, 1932), p. 169; Harry Pollitt, *The Road to Victory* (London, 1932), p. 50; Peter Kerrigan, "The Vanguard Party", *Communist Review* (March 1946), p. 23.

[9] Arthur Koestler, *The Invisible Writing: An Autobiography* (London, 1954), p. 382. An anecdote given by Ignazio Silone about the behavior of a British Communist in Moscow furnishes a similar impression; see Richard Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed* (new ed., New York, Bantam Books, 1954), pp. 104-105.

[10] See Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton, 1954), pp. 122, 128-130, 152, 157, 160, 380-381, 384.

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family connection of the political Left is the Dutt-Lansbury-Postgate-Cole relation. Clemens Palme Dutt, outstanding Communist intellectual (brother of the long-time Communist leader, Rajani Palme Dutt), and Raymond Postgate, a former Communist, married daughters of George Lansbury, the now deceased Labour party leader. Postgate's sister, Margaret, was the wife of the late Professor G. D. H. Cole of Oxford. At one time or another British Communists have borne the respected family names of Cockburn, Haldane, Spender, Romilly, Toynbee and Philipps. If loyalty to Eton and Balliol means little to the Communist, it may certainly temper the feelings of his former non-Communist classmates toward him. Beatrice Webb described the tolerant state of affairs in the entry of her diary for September 4, 1920.[11] She mentions the visit of foreign socialist leaders who were invited over for a week by the Fabian Society. At the same time they had an unexpected "lightning" visit from the two Bolsheviks, Krassin and Kamenev. This free mixing of Communists and Fabians perplexed the foreign socialists. They saw it

> as an amazing example of an almost anarchic tolerance on the part of the Fabians of hostile schools of Socialist thought. It was strange enough, they explained, to see Guild Socialists and members of the new English Communist Party on terms of intimate comradeship with Fabians, but to invite the official representatives of Lenin, who had expressly denounced all Fabians as traitors, and the Webbs as particularly pernicious ones, was really carrying the principle of tolerance too far!

It is generally agreed that the C.P.G.B. has been directed by leaders of higher than average ability. The early S.L.P. leaders, Arthur Macmanus and especially J. T. Murphy, were exceptional products of the British labor movement, but perhaps too independent in outlook to have remained entirely happy in the party as it was bureaucratized. Pollitt, Gallacher and Campbell usually receive a good word, even from former Communists, and Dutt's intellectual powers are seldom denied. As early as 1929 the German Social Democratic journalist, Egon Wertheimer, admiringly called Harry Pollitt "a highly gifted man who towers head and shoulders above the average trade-union leader".[12] Rank-and-file members have apparently had greater respect for their leaders than

[11] Margaret Cole, ed., *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1912-1924,* Introduction by Lord Beveridge (London, 1952), p. 190.

[12] Wertheimer, *op. cit.,* pp. 36-37.

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has been the case in other Communist parties.[13] Perhaps the ability of the leadership and the satisfaction of the membership help to explain the relative absence of violence and the smoothness of transition in the British party hierarchy when a sudden change of international Communist tactics has occurred. The minimum of conflict within the party may also owe something to the fact that its leadership has always been predominately working-class. This would diminish the rivalry between intellectuals and workers at the top, prevalent in some of the Communist parties, particularly at the time of Stalin's struggle for power.

The continuity of the British Communist leadership is noteworthy, although not a single member of the Provisional Executive Committee elected at the Foundation Conference has survived as a leading member of the party. But by October 1922, Pollitt, Dutt and Gallacher were members of the Central Committee, and by August 1923 the Political Bureau consisted of Pollitt, Dutt, Gallacher, J. R. Campbell (substitute), Arthur Horner, Wal Hannington, Tom Bell, Macmanus and J. T. Walton Newbold (substitute), with William Rust of the Young Communist League an ex officio member.[14] In 1945 the names of Pollitt, Dutt, Gallacher, Campbell, Horner, Hannington and Rust still appeared in the list of the newly elected Executive Committee of thirty members, and Pollitt, Dutt, Campbell and Rust were also members of the all-powerful Political Committee. Delegates to the Sixth Congress of the Party (1924), in choosing a new Central Committee gave Pollitt, Dutt and Gallacher the greatest number of popular votes, 71, 71 and 65 respectively.[15] Today if their power is not what it was, they are still nominally leaders of the party: Gallacher as President, Pollitt as Chairman, and Dutt as Vice-Chairman. Such a record of survival is unparalleled among any of the world's leading Communists.

The partnership in power of Harry Pollitt and Rajani Palme Dutt is one of the fascinating episodes of British labor history. Dutt, graduate of Perse and Balliol, was an austere Eurasian theo-

[13] Partial confirmation of this is offered in the poll of former Communists described in Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 146. Praise of the leadership was found to be by far the highest among the English respondents with 64 per cent. The others were France, 54 per cent; United States, 28 per cent; Italy, 26 per cent.

[14] *Workers' Weekly*, Sept. 1, 1923, p. 4; Nov. 2, 1923, p. 2.

[15] *Workers' Weekly*, May 23, 1924, p. 4.

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retician, completely dedicated to the revolutionary cause. Pollitt was an affable boilermaker from Lancashire, skillful labor organizer, and a truly great orator. It was a wedding in the twenties of thought and action in the true Leninist style. The Fourth Congress of the C.P.G.B. was convened in March 1922, and appointed an Organisation Commission to determine how the organizational theses of the Comintern could best be applied in Great Britain. A commission of three members who were not of the party leadership was selected: Pollitt, Harry Inkpin (the brother of the Party Secretary, Albert Inkpin), and Dutt as Chairman. Thus began the friendship between Pollitt and Dutt.

The report, largely the work of Dutt, was presented in October 1922 to the Fifth Congress.[16] The Commission recommended a unified hierarchical organization ruled at the top by a strong central executive. Thereby it was hoped that the old federated propaganda sect would be transformed into an efficient instrument of revolution. The Congress approved the recommendations of the Commission and new statutes were passed to implement them.[17] Pollitt and Dutt were elected to the new seven-man Executive Committee and were later placed in charge of the reorganization program.[18] Six months elapsed before the measures of bureaucratization began to be effected, and another year passed before their full impact was felt by the party membership.[19] One change was immediately noticeable. Dutt, who became editor of the new *Workers' Weekly* in February 1923, completely departed from the tradition of the previous weekly newspaper, the *Communist*. He eliminated the book reviews, the theoretical articles of the intellectuals, the cartoons and the satire. His "puritanism" had changed a sophisticated and interesting propaganda sheet, created by Francis Meynell and Raymond Postgate, into a mediocre broadside.

The demands for discipline and conformity and an ever greater subservience to Moscow met great resistance within the party. The

[16] *Report on Organisation Presented by the Party Commission to the Annual Conference of the Communist Party of Great Britain, October 7, 1922* (London, 1922).

[17] *Statutes and Rules: As Adopted by the Battersea Conference, Oct. 7-9, 1922* (London, 1922).

[18] This occurred as a result of a conference in Moscow at the beginning of 1923. See Murphy, *New Horizons*, pp. 195-196.

[19] See *Handbook for Party Members*, No. 1, "Organisation" (London, 1923), p. 3.

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few intellectuals left the party.[20] Some of the former S.L.P. leaders, who agreed in principle with the reorganization plan but who were cautious about its hasty application, were by-passed by the Pollitt-Dutt juggernaut. J. T. Murphy protested against the "organisational fetishism" of the Organisation Commission's report, and decried its rôle as a sort of "Communist Holy Bible". He deplored the fact that the "voice of criticism" within the party was being destroyed.[21] Under the heading of "The Need for Politics", his article continued:

> We impose ceaseless work without giving opportunities for tapping the well springs of aspiration and enthusiasm which come from the deep and better understanding of Communism. We absorb the will to revolution in the overwhelming demands for mundane activities and smother the desire for a thorough understanding of our struggle and our aims. We can no longer afford this. . . . Organisation should be a weapon of politics, and not politics an afterthought of organisation.[22]

The London organizer of the party, E. W. Cant, wrote to the *Communist Review* that "we have become so involved in organisational machinery that the essential spirit and life of the Party is being sapped . . . members are regarding themselves as mere Robots, creatures to obey the orders of the powers above, and not to think for themselves."[23] Despite these pleas charisma fell before the bureaucratization initiated by Pollitt and Dutt. "Undying loyalty" to the party apparatus became the test of the true Communist.[24]

Pollitt and Dutt, supported by only a minority in the party, vigorously championed the 1928 change in the Comintern line. This called for unceasing struggle instead of collaboration with the Social Democrats, who were now branded "social-fascists". Moscow rewarded Pollitt for his loyalty in August 1929 with the General Secretaryship of the C.P.G.B. Before the end of the year the

[20] The impression that Bolshevization made upon a prominent Communist intellectual is found in Raymond Postgate, *How to Make a Revolution* (London, 1934), pp. 173-197.

[21] J. T. Murphy, "The Party Conference", *Communist Review*, vol. IV (Jan. 1924), pp. 410-411.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 412. Harry Pollitt replied to Murphy in "The Party Conference, Looking Backward and Forward", *Communist Review*, vol. IV (Feb. 1924), pp. 447-452.

[23] Letter by E. W. Cant in the *Communist Review*, vol. IV (March 1924), p. 502.

[24] *Communist Party Training*, Preface by T. B. (London, 1927), p. 95.

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majority faction of the Executive Committee which had opposed the new line succumbed, losing its seats on the Executive. Pollitt's last rival from among the old leaders, J. T. Murphy, always a vociferous minority of one, was expelled from the party in the spring of 1931, nominally because he refused to repudiate his theory that an increase in international trade relations between Britain and the U.S.S.R. would substantially reduce the possibility of war between them.

The long tenure of Pollitt and Dutt has been due to a combination of factors: their own talents; their early realization that organization was the key to party control, and their success in using it; their loyalty to the Kremlin and the blessing which it conferred upon them; their ability to command and to retain the respect of the ranks; and the presence of only a few intellectuals in the seat of power to complicate matters. Furthermore, the Lilliputian dimensions of the C.P.G.B. and the high turnover rate of the members meant that there were fewer competitors than would have been the case in a large mass party.

The C.P.G.B. like the Labour party has been fundamentally a working-class movement. The groups which coalesced in the C.P.G.B. were organizations of workers advocating the ideas of syndicalism and industrial unionism. With the exception of Sylvia Pankhurst, no intellectuals had conspicuously participated in the arrangements leading to the Foundation Conference. J. T. Murphy, who attended the Second Congress of the Comintern in July 1920, was struck by the fact that only one member of the British delegation of eight was an intellectual—Sylvia Pankhurst, and she arrived when the Congress was all but over. This was in distinct contrast to the other delegations, including the Russian, heavily weighted with intellectuals.[25] Few intellectuals were elected to the early Executive Committees of the C.P.G.B. Only three of the fourteen members of the Provisional Executive Committee established at the Foundation Conference of 1920 could possibly be called intellectuals: C. L'Estrange Malone, Dora B. Montefiore and William Mellor. At no time during the nineteen twenties were more than two or three intellectuals on Executive Committees averaging eighteen to twenty members. The total came to seven: Malone, Montefiore, Mellor, Walton Newbold, R. P. Dutt, Page

[25] Murphy, *New Horizons*, p. 139. The British delegates were Murphy, Pankhurst, Gallacher, Willie MacLaine, Tom Quelch, Jack Tanner, Dave Ramsay, Helen Crawfurd.

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Arnot and Andrew Rothstein. Three very shortly left the party (Malone, Mellor, Walton Newbold); Dora Montefiore died; and of the remaining three, only Dutt remains an important leader.

The supremacy of working-class leaders in the C.P.G.B. at its very beginning is another deviation from what appears to be the Communist pattern. The Council of People's Commissars of 1917, the first Soviet government, consisted of fifteen members, eleven intellectuals and four workers.[26] In 1920 the Bolshevik Politbureau (Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Krestinsky, Zinoviev) included only one nonintellectual.[27] As Stalin became prominent this state of affairs was soon altered. Trotsky has recollected that in his last days of power he was the only Politbureau member who was able to speak French fluently.[28] By 1931 no intellectuals remained in the Politbureau.[29]

Stalin's attack upon intellectuals in the Soviet Union had repercussions throughout the international communist movement. He supported working-class leaders such as Thorez in France and Thalmann in Germany in their struggle with the intellectuals for control of the national Communist parties. The heaviest toll was perhaps in Germany where Paul Levy, Max Hoelz and Heinz Neumann eventually either committed suicide or died under dubious circumstances. In the American Communist party, despite the great influence of the I.W.W., intellectuals like Jay Lovestone and his "City College clique" were managing the party, only to be ousted in 1929 by the Stalinists, Foster and Browder. The change was reflected in the composition of the Central Committees. The French Communist party is fairly typical.[30] At the Congress of Tours in 1920 only four of the thirty-two members of the newly elected Central Committee were workers. In 1929 the number of workers had increased to forty-eight, or 70 per cent of a Central Committee of sixty-nine. A study of the Central Committees of

[26] Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (London, 1949), pp. 176-177.

[27] See list of Politbureau members in Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 264.

[28] Leon Trotsky, *Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence*, edited and translated by Charles Malamuth (New York and London, 1946), p. 395.

[29] Fainsod, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

[30] See Chernomordik, "The Question of Communist Cadres", *Communist International*, vol. XI (Dec. 5, 1934), p. 930.

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nineteen national parties revealed that by 1934 average working-class representation was 64.5 per cent.[31]

The percentage in the British party has *always* been considerably higher. Since the nineteen twenties the Executive Committees of the C.P.G.B. have at any one time included only about half a dozen intellectuals out of a total of thirty or more members. Party intellectuals are found more frequently in the Central Committees of the French and Italian parties.[32] A recent examination of the biographical data available for 109 Central Committee members of the Communist parties of France, Italy and the United States shows that thirty-one members were either students or from the professions.[33]

Since the twenties Dutt has been joined on the Executive by two intellectuals, the party careerists, Emile Burns and James Klugmann.[34] Other intellectuals, distinguished in their fields, have been elected to the Executive, no doubt as a gesture to the intellectuals inside the party, and for the prestige that their names would bring outside the party. They include Professor J. B. S. Haldane, former Weldon Professor of Biometry in London University, and world-renowned geneticist; Professor George Thomson, a classicist from Birmingham University; Arnold Kettle, literary historian and critic of Leeds University; Ivor Montagu, film director and producer; G. C. T. Giles, Headmaster of Acton County School for Boys and a former president of the National Union of Teachers; Allen Hutt, typographer, historian and journalist.

What is the explanation for this scarcity of intellectuals among the leaders of the C.P.G.B.—a scarcity which clearly distinguishes it from the other European Communist parties? To begin with, a cultural factor is involved: the intellectual has never possessed the prestige among British workers that he has had among workers elsewhere, in France and Italy, for example. Second, the C.P.G.B., as part of the British labor movement, reflects its most obvious characteristic, the overwhelming working-class composition of both its membership and leadership. Third, the British working class has always contained a relatively high number of very literate and articulate self-educated men who could provide competent political

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 929.

[32] See Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach and Aldo Garosci, *Communism in Western Europe* (Ithaca, 1951), pp. 21-22, 105, 110, 193-196.

[33] Almond, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.

[34] At the lower levels of the party apparatus the number of intellectuals in positions of leadership is proportionately as small.

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leadership. Fourth, a large body of alienated, discontented *déclassé* intellectuals has never existed in Great Britain. For the most part intellectuals have been solidly middle class, forming a pillar of the *status quo*. Fifth, the British colonies and Commonwealth have no doubt provided a convenient outlet for the energies of the disgruntled activistic intellectual. Finally, because of the small size of the C.P.G.B. and its failure as a parliamentary party, young intellectuals interested in making a career out of Left-wing politics have preferred to enter the large and powerful Labour party. Moreover, at Oxford, responsible for the education of more Members of Parliament than any other university, the influence for the last thirty years of Professor G. D. H. Cole has been very great. A staunch Socialist activist with little sympathy for British communism, and a popular teacher, Professor Cole has had no comparable rival from the ranks of communism as mentor of the Left-wing intellectual.

The absence of intellectuals from the leadership of the C.P.G.B. is perhaps only one manifestation of a basic "anti-intellectualism" that has always marked the party. The increasing hostility to the intellectual has been a concomitant of the growth of both the international socialist and the communist movements. The British labor movement and the C.P.G.B. in the past seem to have exceeded the norm in this respect. George Orwell in 1937 bitterly condemned British socialism for "bourgeois baiting", prophesying that if the trend continued, the valuable and enthusiastic support of many members of the middle classes would be lost.[35] The letter to *Plebs* by J. Lewis in February 1922 is fairly typical of the tendency:

> I'm not in love with these intellectuals! As a matter of fact they are not a bit plebian in spirit and would be regarded by an average crowd of workers as a lot of conceited asses, I'm afraid. . . . It's awfully difficult, when you move in a rather small advanced intellectual circle, to realise how tiny your world is and how little it influences the world of workers.[36]

To this the Communist intellectual, Maurice Dobb, replied by reminding the readers of *Plebs* who belittled intellectuals and their theories not to forget

[35] George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* (London, 1937), pp. 260-261. In reply, Harry Pollitt called Orwell "a disillusioned little middle-class boy". *Daily Worker*, March 17, 1937, p. 7.

[36] J. Lewis, "Is the Plebs on the Wrong Track?", *Plebs*, vol. XIV (Feb. 1922), p. 52.

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> that if Marx had not spent time on "highly speculative stuff" and "in doing the thinking" in the British Museum there would probably be no I.W.-C.E. [International Working-Class Education] movement today. Those who do the "thinking" are as much doing "spade work" as those who impart what has been already thrashed out.[37]

Working-class members of the C.P.G.B. have not hesitated to criticize the intellectuals. Pollitt, Gallacher, Murphy and Bell all remark upon the unreliability and opportunism of the Communist intellectuals in the twenties. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that communism is above all a proletarian movement and that the C.P.G.B. is a proletarian party.[38] No less a person than Dutt was castigated for not adopting "the approach of a Marxist, but that of an intellectual, who has lost touch with realities," and as an individual who "knows only resolutions, theses, ballot results . . . newspaper cuttings, etc."[39] One of the few intellectuals of the nineteen twenties who took advantage of the hostility of the proletarians, turning it to his own benefit, was William Mellor with his North Country accent and evangelical oratory. The working-class audience would roar hilariously when he shouted that it was untrue that the only good Communist was one who had holes in his trousers.[40]

But this almost cathartic abuse of the intellectual did not cease with the passing of the twenties. Postman Bob Darke writes that his party cell in Hackney in 1931 was a "little society of cafe revolutionaries." He remarks that he witnessed the growth of the Hackney Communist party "from a loose-gathering of two dozen intellectual wastrels into a storm-troop of men and women drawn from all branches of working-class life."[41] Nor has this attitude disappeared today. At the afternoon session of March 30, 1956 of the Twenty-Fourth National Congress of the C.P.G.B., Edward Jackson, whose bold attack upon the Executive Committee was

[37] Maurice Dobb, letter to the Editor, *Plebs*, vol. XIV (March 1922), p. 89.

[38] See Murphy, *New Horizons*, p. 89; Pollitt, *Serving My Time*, p. 125; Gallacher, *The Rolling of the Thunder*, p. 201; Bell, *Pioneering Days*, p. 191, and "The Editorial View", *Communist Review*, vol. V (Nov. 1924), p. 314.

[39] J. T. Murphy, "A Reply to R. P. Dutt", *Communist International*, New Series, No. 10 (July 1925), p. 100; E. W. Cant, letter to *Workers' Life*, Nov. 29, 1929, p. 6.

[40] As related to the author by a friend of Mellor.

[41] C. H. (Bob) Darke, *The Communist Technique in Britain* (London, 1953), pp. 35-36. Also see pp. 12, 18-19, 28.

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not reported in the *Daily Worker,* referred to the danger of intellectuals "wrecking" the party.[42] Sectarianism, he charged, was not at the root of the party's difficulties. The trouble was the infiltration of the party by middle-class members, and the Executive Committee's fear of offending them. Resurrecting the old scapegoat, Harry Pollitt, at the closed session of the Congress on April 1, 1956, is reported to have blamed the intellectuals for the discontent in the party over Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin.[43] Since Pollitt's speech, a new wave of anti-intellectualism seems to have swept the party as a result of the revolt of the intellectuals over Hungary.

A rather ironical accompaniment to the general anti-intellectualism of the C.P.G.B. has been the continuing concern of the leadership with the "theoretical backwardness" of the membership. Rebellious intellectuals have charged both leaders and members with this deficiency.[44] Speaking for the Executive Committee in 1932, Allen Hutt condemned what he called "our traditional and shameful theoretical level" and the "contempt for theory" in the party.[45] At later dates this criticism was repeated by both Dutt and Pollitt.[46] These accusations are reminiscent of the charges of empiricism and aversion to theory so often directed at the British and the British labor movement by the early Communist fathers including Marx and Engels. Lenin, no doubt, would have diagnosed the malady of the British working class as extreme "trade union consciousness" leading to "economism". Trotsky summarized the difficulty in his interesting and neglected volume, *Where Is Britain Going?:*

> The traditional way of thought of the British, that is first of all of the British bourgeoisie, is impressed with the stamp of empiricism, and that mental tradition has passed over to the upper circles of the working class. Empiricism became a tradition and a standard,

[42] The author attended this Congress and heard Jackson's attack.

[43] Letter by A.R.L. in *Daily Worker,* April 25, 1956, p. 2.

[44] For example see Freda Utley, "Economism Today: The 'Iskra Period' and Ourselves", *Communist Review,* vol. II (May 1930), pp. 196-207.

[45] Allen Hutt, "The Revolutionary Role of the Theoretical Struggle", *Communist Review,* vol. IV (Feb. 1932), pp. 78-79.

[46] R. Palme Dutt, "Intellectuals and Communism", *Communist Review,* vol. IV (Sept. 1932), pp. 421-430; Harry Pollitt in *For Peace and Plenty! Report of the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Held in the Town Hall, Birmingham, Sept. 16 to 19, 1938* (London, 1938), p. 76.

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in other words, it united with a contemptuous attitude towards the "abstract" way of thought of the continent.[47]

Here then may be a clue. Perhaps both the small successes and the great failures of the C.P.G.B. can be explained by the fact that it forms the meeting ground for two opposing political traditions, rationalism and empiricism. The C.P.G.B. has always suffered from a schizophrenic personality, and its failure has been the failure of not being able to reconcile these contradictory tendencies. The huge Labour party knows no such schizophrenia and is strong just because it does not. For, as Trotsky pointed out, Labour represents "a kind of amalgam of Conservatism and Liberalism" with its "religion of gradualness", strong Christian motivation, and respect for middle-class manners and mores.[48] Communism, however, is a complex and logically coherent rationalistic theory. Extreme systemization of ideas is joined with an extreme systemization of activity. The rigidity of rationalistic thought and of bureaucratic regimentation does not find a favorable habitat in a nation whose philosophy stems from Locke, Hume and Mill; whose government follows no written constitution; whose institutions have grown like Topsy; and whose citizens look upon individual liberties as their most cherished possession. George Lansbury's comment of thirty years ago is apposite: "The British Workers are not doctrinaires: Their minds are too practical. Consequently they will only tolerate a much looser and less rigid form of organisation and propaganda than is laid down in the theses and formulas of the Communist Party."[49] Communism by its very nature cannot flourish in a land of empirical proletarians, especially when the Communists are of the same kind.

NEAL WOOD

COLUMBIA COLLEGE

[47] Leon Trotsky, *Where Is Britain Going?*, introduction by H. N. Brailsford (London, 1926), p. 48.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[49] *Lansbury's Labour Weekly*, vol. III (April 2, 1927), p. 3.

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The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. By WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS. Cleveland and New York, World Publishing Company, 1959.—219 pp. $4.75.

What's Wrong with U. S. Foreign Policy. By CYRUS L. SULZBERGER. New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1959.—255 pp. $4.50.

Professor William Appleman Williams is a political scientist, currently teaching at the University of Wisconsin. Cyrus L. Sulzberger is chief foreign correspondent of the *New York Times,* with headquarters in Paris.

Each of these men has written a highly competent critique of United States foreign policy. Each has written a book which deserves the widest possible reading by those, alas, all too few American citizens who are deeply concerned over the future of their country and the future of mankind.

Both authors recognize the failure of American post-war foreign policy. Apart from this it would be difficult to find two works which, without detracting from each other, present a greater contrast.

As indicated by their respective titles, Mr. Williams' work—*The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*—is essentially pessimistic; while Mr. Sulzberger's *What's Wrong with American Foreign Policy?* optimistically assumes that what is wrong can be cured.

Mr. Williams' work is a scholarly study of the evolution of what he calls American "imperial anti-colonialism" from the Open Door Policy first developed with respect to China more than half a century ago. The emphasis in this work lies upon economic determinism to an extent which this reviewer would be inclined to question. Nevertheless, Mr. Williams offers keen and original insight into some of those little realized factors which condition a nation's behavior, often in a direction quite at variance with its avowed intentions.

Mr. Sulzberger writes primarily as a reporter and as one who is concerned with events and the repercussions to events which he himself has shrewdly observed in almost every part of this troubled world. His emphasis lies upon the political and psychological factors, rather than upon the economic conditioning of policy. Where Mr. Williams voices his criticism for the most part with impersonal, scholarly restraint, Mr. Sulzberger does not hesitate to express his views with a reporter's blunt and sometimes angry forth-

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rightness. As one who has for many years been voicing criticism very similar to that of Mr. Sulzberger, this reviewer regrets that this book was not written and published at an earlier date.

Both authors document their assertions with admirable skill. But, here again, Mr. Williams' documentation is that of the scholar, carefully searching the literature, while Mr. Sulzberger's consists of what he himself has seen and heard at first hand.

Taken together, these two books provide the best possible antidote to the complacency nourished in the American people by a government which has seemed almost wholly unaware of the bankruptcy of its foreign policy. To say this is not to imply that each book by itself is not a solid work, as indeed it is.

An element which neither author has perhaps taken into enough consideration is the extent to which American foreign policy is conditioned by the arrested development of the American society—that is to say, by the impact of the corporation-dominated machine age upon democratic citizenship, by the failure of religion to sustain a sense of moral responsibility, and by an educational system designed to meet not the requirements of world citizenship but the needs of a parochial, self-contained, nineteenth-century American society.

Foreign policy is, after all, not merely the product of economic factors and diplomatic successes or failures. It is conditioned as well by the domestic thought and behavior patterns of a people. This reviewer would suggest that the failure of American post-war foreign policy is to a large extent due to such essentially domestic matters as the contrasting American attitudes toward private extravagance and public parsimony, to failure to develop a constructive use of increasing leisure and, above all, to the lamentable state of race relations in the American society.

If anything can justly be said in criticism of these two excellent and timely books, it is only that both authors seem to this reviewer to treat foreign policy a little bit too much as an aspect of national behavior separate and separable from the whole of a nation's social development.

JAMES P. WARBURG

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Foreign Policy: The Next Phase. By THOMAS K. FINLETTER. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1958, for the Council on Foreign Relations.—ix, 208 pp. $3.50.

In this work, Thomas K. Finletter has made a broad-ranging, cogent and forceful contribution to the continuing debate over how the United States should seek to meet the challenge of communist

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imperialism and the possible danger of nuclear war. Arguing that throughout the post-war period we have generally followed tradition in our foreign policies in spite of the break with isolationism, he insists that we must now embark upon a bold offensive —the next phase—that has as its fundamental objective the complete elimination of war. There can be no real peace in a balance of terror, according to his analysis of the present world situation, and nothing less than an all-out drive on war as an institution holds out any real hope for the future of mankind.

"What is needed as a start", Mr. Finletter writes, "is a subjective decision of the United States Government to make the attack on war the central theme of all its foreign policy, and to do so with a sense of confidence that the policy may succeed."

If this is Mr. Finletter's final conclusion—and it is perhaps hardly fair to him to state it so baldly—his book does not deal only with such broad generalizations. It is thoroughly realistic in its discussions of the immediate problems which this country faces throughout the world. It takes them up briefly but succinctly, analyzing them carefully and then going on in each instance to give the author's own proposed approach to their solution. Only after establishing the background does he state his conviction upon the imperative necessity for synchronizing within the framework of current military and political policies a concerted and continuous drive for really effective disarmament as the only certain guarantee for future peace.

In his preliminary chapters Mr. Finletter emphasizes first and foremost the need for developing our strategic atomic air power as a "clearly superior deterrent force," calls for the strengthening of NATO as the core of the Western defense against communism, and argues eloquently for a new approach to the problems of Asia (including the Middle East) which would accept the implications of the anti-colonial revolution and provide far more extensive economic aid to the underdeveloped countries than is now being given. He would also have the United States act more courageously in dealing with the countries of Asia, taking the pragmatic position that where our policies have been founded on principle, they have been more successful than when we have bowed to expediency.

It sometimes may appear that this brief book—an elaboration of a series of lectures given at the Council on Foreign Relations at the close of 1957—attempts to cover too much ground. There are places—as in the discussion of the Middle East—where it is already dated in the light of a constantly shifting political background. It is easy to disagree with some of the specific proposals that are made for meeting immediate issues. Nevertheless *Foreign Policy:*

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The Next Phase remains an immensely stimulating, provocative discussion of our present policies and is forthright and bold in its suggestions as to how they might be strengthened. And to this reviewer, its conclusion that a more affirmative, positive attack must be made upon the institution of war itself is unanswerable if the world is ever to escape from the menacing shadow of a totally devastating nuclear war.

FOSTER RHEA DULLES

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy. By WALTER MILLIS, with HARVEY C. MANSFIELD and HAROLD STEIN. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958.—xi, 436 pp. $4.00.

In this book, two political scientists and a distinguished journalist-historian examine the influence of the military in America during the last thirty years. The political scientists, oddly enough, deal with the first fifteen years, while the historian treats more recent events.

In the 136 pages which the former modestly characterize as an introduction, the point is made that neither civilian nor military dominated Roosevelt's administrations. Before the war, military men were, to say the least, unequipped for policy making, while civilians, like Secretary Hull, were unwilling to invade even quasi-military spheres. By default as much as by design, defense and foreign policies came to be made in the executive offices of the President. Though war gave the chiefs of staff more self-confidence, the center of power remained in the White House. The point, though it is not made explicitly, is that the United States experienced no General Staff dictatorship such as that in Germany during the First World War.

Mr. Millis' two-thirds of the book is given much less to analysis, much more to narrative, and, not surprisingly, to very good narrative indeed. He focuses, it is true, on the question of whether civilians or military men dominated. But his view, like that of his two collaborators, is that the question is usually unanswerable, if not meaningless. On organizational issues, such as unification, the factions were military against military. On the budget, circumstances tipped the scales. Outlays were governed up to 1950 by civilian concepts of what the country could afford. From 1950 to 1952, the services were able to charge what the traffic would bear. After 1953 the bookkeepers regained control, but among them were a soldier-president, an assortment of service secretaries, and at least one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On other policy issues,

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such as the building of the H-bomb and the rearming of Germany, competing factions were individual or departmental, not civilian or military. Though the Truman-MacArthur conflict is described in detail, Mr. Millis dismisses it categorically as "mainly a personal and political one, having little relevance to the fundamental relationship of civil to military power in the state." Using loose though exceedingly literal definitions of "civilian" and "military", Mr. Millis and his collaborators conclude that civil-military relations are virtually unanalyzable.

It may seem heretical for a historian-reviewer to take exception to this result because it yields a book that is only a history. But the authors do open their preface with Santayana's "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it", yet they offer little to help in securing our parole. It is at least conceivable that their results might have been more constructive, had they applied themselves more rigorously to the problems of definition so searchingly raised two years ago in Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State.* They might have differentiated less between uniforms and flannel suits and more between casts of mind, say between ends-alone and means-ends systems of logic. But this is gratuitous as well as unprofessional criticism. *Arms and the State* is a sound, full, detached and readable history of recent American defense policy.

ERNEST R. MAY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The Eve of War, 1939. Edited by ARNOLD TOYNBEE and VERONICA M. TOYNBEE.—xvi, 744 pp. 90*s.*; $14.40.

The Initial Triumph of the Axis. Edited by ARNOLD TOYNBEE and VERONICA M. TOYNBEE.—xvii, 742 pp. 84*s.*; $13.45.

Both are volumes of the *Survey of International Affairs,* and are issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by the Oxford University Press, London, New York and Toronto, 1958.

The publication of these two volumes completes the Royal Institute of International Affairs' "War-time Series (1939-46)", which now covers the period from Hitler's entrance into Prague in March 1939 until the beginning of Four Power control over Germany after the war and which, in its treatment of affairs of the Middle East, comes down to 1950. The publication of these last two of the eleven volumes which comprise this series was delayed deliberately in order to give the contributors time to use as many as

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possible of the relevant documents in the official British and German Foreign Office papers, now in course of publication. The decision to wait was a wise one and, because of it, it is doubtful that anyone will be able soon to claim that these comprehensive, well-organized and clearly written volumes are "out of date".

The Eve of War, 1939 starts with an introduction by Arnold Toynbee which describes the opportunities that were open to Hitler in the spring of 1939 and the confused reactions in the Western capitals to the destruction of Czechoslovakia, and is particularly critical of the "inner cabinet" in Great Britain (Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon and Hoare) for their inability to adjust their thinking to the requirements of a jungle world that did not recognize the values in which they themselves believed. The consequences of their determined effort to act as if the jungle were a mirage are outlined in Veronica Toynbee's account of their attempt to organize resistance to further Axis aggression, and in a long section on Russia, by Ashton-Gwatkin and others, which points out the mistakes of Anglo-French tactics in their negotiations with the Soviet Union and particularly in the abortive staff talks of August 1939, while admitting that successful negotiation with Moscow at that late date was hardly to be expected. British and French failures are further elaborated in P. E. Baker's section on the last ten days of peace in Europe and, especially, in a careful analysis by Viscount Chilston of the reasons for the poor progress in rearmament and for the technological shortcomings of the British and French defense effort in 1939.

This volume is not, however, devoted exclusively, or even primarily, to the inadequacies of Western diplomacy. A brilliant section by Katharine Duff describes the vacillation between native caution, desire for personal prestige, and fear of being absent from the division of the spoils that marked Mussolini's conduct as he moved, despite the warnings of Attolico, his ambassador in Berlin, toward the fateful Pact of Steel. Finally, a chapter on Germany, by M. Taylor and others, makes it clear that, even in the days of his great diplomatic triumphs, Hitler was hardly more a "realist" than his adversaries, if realism is defined as reasoned action on the basis of careful evaluation of all of the elements involved in a political situation. Hitler's attitude was often marked by an essential frivolity which was to destroy him in the end; and it cannot be denied that his decision to go to war in 1939 was prompted as much by emotional as by political considerations.

The Initial Triumph of the Axis covers the period between the outbreak of the war and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The sections on military operations in the East and in the West are well done, as are those that deal with the

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problems of the neutral states after the beginning of hostilities. Perhaps the most striking parts of this volume, however, are Philip Lane's and Alfred Cobban's chapters on the fall of France, with their caustic treatment of the French Right and their convincing portraits of such notables as Weygand, Daladier and, especially, Reynaud, Katharine Duff's account of the steps leading to Italian intervention in the war, Elizabeth Wiskemann's description of the German diplomatic offensive in southeastern Europe and the Axis conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, Arnold Toynbee's eloquent chapter on the British home front, which includes a deserved tribute to Ernest Bevin and an appreciation of Churchill that escapes the fulsomeness that characterizes much of the writing about the wartime Prime Minister, and, finally, a very comprehensive treatment of Soviet-German relations from 1939 to 1941 that shows the solid advantages gained by Germany from the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the way in which Hitler exploited Soviet weakness so as to improve them.

In both volumes the sections on the United States are by Constance Howard and those on the Far East by F. C. Jones. Miss Howard handles the difficult job of writing about the fight between the isolationists and the interventionists without being unfair to either side; and Mr. Jones, in his chapters on Japan, deals with the thorny questions as to whether President Roosevelt should have met personally with Prince Konoye and whether the United States government's note of 26 November 1941 was an "ultimatum" with admirable detachment.

GORDON A. CRAIG

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

The Bolivian National Revolution. By ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1958.—xviii, 302 pp. $7.50.

Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge. By JOHN D. MARTZ. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1959.—ix, 356 pp. $7.50.

These two timely books constitute a welcome addition to the slowly growing body of serious studies of Latin American politics. A recognized authority on communism and labor movements in the countries south of the Rio Grande, Dr. Alexander is eminently qualified to assess the significant experiment which has been taking place in Bolivia during the past seven years. Mr. Martz, a relative newcomer to this field, took up the challenge of producing a coherent picture of contemporary Central American politics directly after graduation from college in 1955. Although this re-

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viewer has several reservations concerning the resulting work, it still reflects credit upon its young author. Both books will probably be widely used for some years to come.

Dr. Alexander readily admits that his study is not impartial (p. vii); his sympathy for the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR) is evident throughout. The Bolivian National Revolution is still a controversial subject, and many observers will disagree with Alexander's reasoned optimism. Firmly convinced that this experiment must succeed, and perhaps feeling the need to defend it against the violent attacks of Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez's *A People Crucified: The Tragedy of Bolivia,* he may occasionally tend to "accentuate the positive". Under the circumstances his book is more objective than this reviewer had expected. Having visited Bolivia almost annually since 1952, Dr. Alexander relies heavily upon personal observations and interviews. His conclusion is that "the social revolution which has been going on in that country since 1952 is a genuine attempt to carry out changes in the nation's society and economy which are long overdue, and . . . to lay a solid foundation for the development of real political democracy" (p. ix).

Alexander argues convincingly that the "Bolivian National Revolution . . . is the most profound movement for social change which has swept any Latin American country since the Mexican Revolution of 1910" (pp. xiii and 271). Success "will depend in large part upon whether the measures of economic development can come to fruition before the full impact of the economic and social changes sponsored by the new regime begin to be felt" (p. xvi). As an "attempt to meet American problems in an American way", the Bolivian experiment affords a pattern for limiting Communist influence in Latin America. Its failure would be a blow to the United States, which has a tremendous amount of prestige and good will at stake, not to mention an $80,000,000 financial investment (pp. 278-80).

Following two chapters devoted to historical background and a brief account of the MNR in power, Alexander treats in depth the major aspects of the revolution: agrarian reform, the incorporation of the Indian majority into the national life, nationalization of the tin mines, the rôle of organized labor, the reshaping of the armed forces, the search for economic independence, the crisis in industry, inflation and resistance to the stabilization program, opposition to the revolution, United Nations technical assistance, and United States aid programs. In assessing the significance of the Bolivian Revolution, Alexander compares it with the Mexican Revolution (pp. 271-74) and evaluates its impact upon Bolivia's neighbors (pp. 274-78).

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John D. Martz, recently returned from two years in Central America, has produced an interesting and often provocative study of contemporary politics in these six small republics. However, his lack of a thorough grounding in the history, political dynamics, and sociology of the area and surprising failure to make use of several important recent studies on the region have deprived the key "crisis" and "challenge" sections of needed perspective and scope.

Viewing the post-war period as "years of transition and disappointment" (p. viii), Martz pictures Central America as a "subcontinent in crisis" plagued by communism, rampant nationalism, illiteracy, abject poverty, rigid class stratification, political unrest, economic infirmity, and dictatorship. Moreover, further deterioration threatens. In a brief discussion of geographic, historical, political and economic characteristics of the area, he refutes the existence of "traditional liberal political ideals" in Latin America and suggests that "dictatorship—if competently administered and genuinely concerned with national progress—has an important role to play" (pp. 17-19).

With the pessimistic observation that "The critical moments are arriving—the tide of Central American history is sweeping toward desolation, if not complete destruction," Martz turns to the heart of his book, a long chapter on each of the six countries. Marred only by a number of minor, if annoying, factual errors, these chapters present a lucid, though overly pessimistic, picture of recent political developments. Informed readers may well take exception to many of his interpretations, such as his extreme criticism of former President Figueres of Costa Rica or heavy emphasis upon communism in Panama, but he has generally marshaled his facts well and presented them logically.

Martz concludes his book with a discussion of the "challenge to the United States" which is largely a catalogue of the criticisms made against United States policy in Central America. He singles out several examples of actions by the United States which have "widened the gap between the republics of the isthmus and the giant of the north" (p. 336) and stresses the need for "bold provocative, imaginative thinking" to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. His own offerings along this line are less systematic than those of Thomas W. Palmer, Jr., whose excellent *Search for a Latin American Policy* apparently was not known to Martz even though it was published in 1957.

RONALD M. SCHNEIDER

ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

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Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors. By John J. Johnson. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958.—x, 272 pp. $5.00.

Latin American historiography has been uniquely enriched with this perceptive analysis of the emerging middle sectors of Latin American society. It is likely that Professor Johnson's thesis will mobilize both sympathetic and critical specialists to organize their vast empirical knowledge of the area in affirming or denying his thesis that the middle sectors, with their special interests and ideology, have become the new élite.

The book traces the rise of urban middle sectors to relative positions of prominence in five countries—Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil—which together account for two thirds of the Latin American population. The author admits that the middle sectors are not a compact social layer—they lack a common background, and their economic interests are quite disparate. Nor are they large numerically—representing no more than 35 per cent of the population in the smaller states which are considered and 15 per cent in Brazil and Mexico. But they have found common ground for joint political action, as the result of their urban living, their better than average education, their belief in industrialization, their faith in statism, their espousal of nationalism, and their substitution of the issue-oriented political party for the family as the focus of political thinking. Withal, "the growing role of the industrial and commercial leaders as decision makers on the national level is a major theme of this study."

Charting the rise and fall of dominant groups in politics for each of the five countries since 1920 has placed heavy demands upon the author. His extensive and lively annotated bibliography attests to the breadth and depth of his research; the resulting synthesis is skillful, and his final judgments well balanced. The vigor of the middle sectors is successively less in each of the countries reviewed, and in Brazil the author suggests that the military rather than the middle sectors will determine the course of political events in the foreseeable future.

Johnson is nevertheless optimistic about the developing Latin American political stability resulting from the increasing influence of the middle sectors. The bursting population which must be fed and educated, and the revolution of rising expectations, in which the disenchanted masses, armed with a vote, respond to panaceas, not policies, and demogoguery, not reason, can be satisfied by middlesector leaders who will not be victimized by their own propaganda, and who are inclined to make haste slowly. Traditional values and behavior patterns which emphasize person over party,

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principle over interest, and which infest government bureaucracy with corruption and nepotism will be supplanted by new attitudes which will not undermine the effectveness of extensive governmental operations in the field of economic development and social reform.

The author's faith in the growing political stability of Latin America rests upon the all-important contribution of the middle-sector élite to the decision-making process. It would be disheartening to recall how the German middle class capitulated to the aristocracy under Bismark and to Nazism under Hitler, and how the French *bourgeoisie* in times of crisis has been attracted to the extreme Right and extreme Left. Investigations of the decision-making process by political scientists suggest the importance of other factors, in addition to the class structure, in determining the course of political events. The disparity of decision-making situations, the rôle and personality of the decision maker, and the nature of the communications network may reflect to a lesser rather than a greater degree the underlying and in Latin America the undenotable class structure. Johnson's pioneer volume will challenge scholars to intensify and refine the thesis he has so imaginatively applied to a neglected area.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Birth of a Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia. By PHILIP MASON. Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations by Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1958.—xi, 366 pp. 30*s*; $4.80.

This book would be welcome at any time for its understanding of the basic problems of a multi-racial society but it is particularly valuable at this moment when the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is facing the implications of these problems to such an acute degree. Professor Mason's work does not include an analysis of the current situation in Southern Rhodesia but it provides the perspective within which this situation should be viewed. It is as true today as in the earlier period with which he is most concerned, that the widely differing assumptions and objectives of the members of a multi-racial entity bedevil attempts to create a cohesive society.

The book is divided into three main sections: the preconquest period; the time of conquest and settlement; and the succeeding period in which the official doctrine of assimilation of masters and conquered clashes with the natural tendencies toward separation of peoples of different backgrounds and standards. The first period is described with zest and in terms which any nonspecialist can understand. It provides a lively, if simplified, picture of tribal life

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and stresses the earlier achievements of the local tribes of which the most dramatic example is Zimbabwe which, it is now generally accepted, was built by Africans between the sixth and thirteenth centuries. In the second section the theme is the relation between Lobengula, king of the Matabele, and the Europeans who enter his territory toward the end of the nineteenth century for the purposes of trade but who ultimately destroy him in a struggle which has many of the elements of a classical drama. The last part introduces the inevitable complications in the relations between the defeated Africans, the European settlers confidently claiming the rights of Englishmen to trial by jury and representative institutions, and the imperial government with its interest in trusteeship and ultimate partnership of the races. All the way through, the dilemma implicit in the birth of this multi-racial country continues, and indeed increases.

The strongest points of the book are its brilliant title, its superb writing and its presentation of the story of Southern Rhodesia from the point of view of all the groups on the spot, of the Africans as well as of the missionaries, the pioneers and the later settlers. This approach lends a roundness of view to the widely varied material which Professor Mason has found in the archives, and drawn from anthropological, archeological and historical writings. He has also made good use of his own background of experience in India and of comparisons with the Southern states of America and medieval Europe.

The Birth of a Dilemma differs to both its advantage and disadvantage from history of the academic school. The objective is always to transmit understanding of people and of situations. There is a drive and a wholeness to this approach which, particularly in the first sections, are sufficiently important to justify the omission of the more detailed, scholarly analysis which any particular discipline would have made of parts of the material. Toward the end, however, the sameness of the treatment of material palls somewhat, thereby weakening the momentum at the point where the work is approaching its climax. This fact suggests that, attractive and useful as is this book, the other studies which we are promised from the Institute of Race Relations might be still more fruitful if the broad, coördinative and largely descriptive approach which seems characteristic of the newly isolated field of "race relations" were interrelated from time to time with the sharper precision of disciplinary analysis and conclusions.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

SMITH COLLEGE

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French West Africa. By VIRGINIA THOMPSON and RICHARD ADLOFF. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958.—626 pp. $8.50.

Recent events in French Africa have projected that area into the main stream of contemporary political concerns. The colonial world has been shattered in West Africa. A small country like Guinea, voting against continued association with France in DeGaulle's remarkable referendum, has suddenly joined the roster of independent nations, and her moving toward a tentative association with Ghana brings the former British and French African territories into new juxtaposition. M. Houphouet from Ivory Coast discovers the meaning of Nkrumah's "African personality", while M. Diallo of Guinea asks Prime Minister Awolowo of Western Nigeria his views about federalism in West Africa.

Federalism, association, confederation, unitarism, Balkanization, separatism, all have entered the vocabulary of West Africans as they realize that the restraints on redrafting the political map are imposed by themselves. Now is the moment of real exploration as Africans seek out and discover one another. Along with such discovery is an attempt to create common destiny and a shared history. Indeed an over-arching ethic and philosophy is being created by some, notably the *Présence Africaine* group.

For the student the array of problems and events visible in French Africa is bewildering in the extreme. Not only has progress been marked by a changing column of political leaders. As well, the alphabetical geometry of political parties with propensities to fission and association helps to add to the confusion.

The need to understand the events going on and the difficulty of comprehending their complexity make the present volume extremely valuable. True, it is out of date, as is everything written before the DeGaulle referendum, but it is the best political history of French West Africa currently available. It covers the post-war period very adequately up to the *loi cadre* of 1956 which itself marked a radical departure from previous French overseas policy by granting a great degree of autonomy to the French African territories. The authors have given a very useful survey of events and brought together material on economic, social and cultural matters. As a survey with a primary focus on politics and administration, it succeeds admirably in its purpose.

There are important gaps. A survey can hardly be expected to show the real complexities of political organization and the ranges of interest, accommodation and conflict between personalities of which politics is at bottom composed. Perhaps a beginning historical chapter pointing out the "spirit" and the often conflicting

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patterns of French pre-war colonialism would have helped to put post-war events in a better perspective. It could have brought out the military bias in initial occupation and the consequences of, and reasons for, the highly centralized system emanating from Paris. These had the effect of focusing French African nationalism at the Paris end and made Paris rather than the territories the first center of nationalism. Indeed the centralized system helps explain why African parliamentary parties in the French National Assembly were important, and not mere appendages of the metropolitan parties with which they affiliated.

The chapter on the rôle of overseas deputies seems to me particularly inadequate. Analysis of the intricate pattern of bargaining and the strategies employed could have revealed the ambivalent attitudes of Africans dealing with the French in a French parliament. Both cynicism and respect for France came out of these relationships. The cynicism was twofold. Parliamentary life was regarded as a game, but a game played in deadly earnest. As well it expressed a certain contempt, a means of using France and twisting her tail through her own institutions. Furthermore, achievements at the center were reflected quickly throughout French Africa precisely because of the centralized administrative pattern.

The very important problem of chieftaincy has been treated in a hit-or-miss fashion. Little is said of the rôle of chiefs vis-à-vis administration, the sources of support for chieftaincy, the relationships between chieftaincy and political parties, and the status of chiefs in various territories. For example the position of Houphouet, who is a chief and is supported strongly by rural and traditional groups, is in great contrast to that of Sekou Toure, although the latter is himself the grandson of one of the historic chiefs in French Africa, Samori, who for years successfully bedeviled the French by his exploits. But the differences in outlook between the two men are enormous and help to explain why the Ivory Coast remains in the French community and Guinea does not.

Finally, the rôle of the trade unions, a crucial feature of the political life of French West Africa, has barely been treated. It was the introduction of trade unionism that in many crucial respects marks the beginning of French African politics after the Popular Front government made it possible for Frenchmen to organize Africans in metropolitan unions which extended themselves to Africa. Not only did this provide a basis for organization prior to political parties but, as well, it introduced African workers and employees to ideas of syndicalism, socialism, communism, and radical Catholicism. A whole generation of ideologically sophisticated second level political leadership has been affected by the spread of

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these ideas, particularly in the towns. Furthermore, in the post-war period alliances between trade unions and political leaders helped to increase the power of the political parties with union branches and party cells working in collaboration where necessary, especially in the Ivory Coast, Guinea and the Sudan.

These are among some of the important matters which are given weak or inadequate treatment. There are others, of course, but the main virtue of this volume is the comprehensibility of its survey, the information which it supplies, and the history which it relates. As an introduction to a very complicated area the book serves its purpose well. A very useful bibliography on French Africa is provided. An important gap in available African materials is now well on its way to being filled.

DAVID E. APTER

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Essays on Japanese Economy. By SHIGETO TSURU. Economic Research Series, No. 2. The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Tokyo, Kinokuniya Bookstore Co., Ltd., 1958.—v, 241 pp.

Japan's Economic Recovery. By G. C. ALLEN. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1958.—xi, 215 pp. $4.75.

Japan's Postwar Economy. By JEROME B. COHEN. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1958.—xvii, 262 pp. $6.50.

Japan, the most advanced economy in Asia, has recovered from the devastation and disorganization of defeat. These three small but important volumes deal with this "amazing", "phenomenal" recovery, each from a different vantage point and in a different way. Any one of these books will tell the newcomer a good deal about the process. The student of Japan will want to study all three, because they supplement each other significantly.

The authors, a Japanese, a Briton and an American, are all well known for earlier works of major importance dealing with the Japanese economy. Tsuru, who was trained at Harvard, is not only a leading Japanese economist, but one of the few best able to communicate in English. Allen, the leading British writer on Japan's economy, shows again the command of Japanese industrial, financial and related phenomena so skillfully demonstrated in earlier works, notably his *Short Economic History of Modern Japan.*

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Cohen, probably the best-known American writer on Japan's contemporary economic affairs, is the author of the standard work on *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction.*

Cohen's is the most comprehensive of the three volumes being considered here. It presents a broad picture of Japan's economy in the post-war period, but with a tremendous amount of statistical and other detail. It is remarkable that so much material, including numerous quotations, can be presented so briefly, clearly and readably, with emphasis all the while on the basic trends or issues. Allen's book covers much of the same ground as Cohen's, but without so many statistics, with more attention to the various industrial sectors, and with somewhat more historical perspective. Allen's view of the Occupation is different from that of either the American protagonist or the Japanese subject. Tsuru's book does not attempt to survey the economy comprehensively but is a series of essays, all published previously. The first six deal with the post-war period and were written between 1949 and 1957. They present a significant Japanese view, as of the date of writing in each case, on Japan's economic structure, growth, planning, population, international finance, and other subjects.

The views expressed by these authors diverge somewhat at times. These differences are discussed in reviews in other journals (Allen vs. Cohen in *Far Eastern Survey,* New York, December 1958, pp. 191-92; Allen vs. Tsuru in *The Economic Weekly,* Bombay, December 6, 1958, pp. 1529-30). There are also some points with which the careful student will find fault. But on the major features of Japan's economic recovery since World War II, there is sufficient agreement to warrant concentrating attention here on the recovery process itself.

Both Cohen and Allen devote chapters to summarizing the course of recovery and then proceed in subsequent chapters to analyze individual sectors and problems. Allen identifies five distinct periods (p. 22). From the time of surrender in 1945 through February 1949, "inflation and economic confusion" prevailed. At the time of surrender Japan's economy lay in ruins. Devastation and disorganization were added to her normal deficiencies in food and raw materials. Neither the volume of materials made available through United States aid and very restricted trade nor the Occupation policies of demilitarization, deconcentration and "purging" of many leaders left room for rapid recovery. The numbness of the Japanese in defeat, their general acquiescence in Occupation rule, and their preoccupation with daily living precluded much initiative on their part. It was only in 1949, when the Occupation imposed a stern economic stabilization policy and Joseph Dodge was sent from the United States to enforce the measures involved,

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that rapid inflation was checked and a basis laid for the dramatic recovery that followed.

This recovery received its greatest stimulus in June 1950 with the outbreak of war in Korea and a sudden very large demand on the Japanese economy for supplies and services to troops in Japan, supplies for Korea, and exports to markets in the Far East and elsewhere. This war prosperity gave way to a domestic consumption boom which continued until November 1953, by which time renewed inflation had reached such a point that the new sovereign Japanese government decided upon a severe policy of deflation. Again financial measures were successful in checking inflation, and even brought slightly lower prices. Allen's fifth period covers the rapid growth that followed from January 1955 until March 1957, when once again severe financial restrictions became necessary, this time because of such a severe balance-of-payments deficit that international reserves were running out rapidly.

A general indication of the scale of recovery can be found in some of Cohen's statistics. Industrial production, based on 1934-36 as 100, reached 150 in 1941 and 179 in 1944, fell to 31 in 1946, had recovered only to 71 in 1949, but reached 219 in 1956 (p. 47). Real income per capita, again with the 1934-36 base as 100, was only 80 in 1950 but passed the pre-war level with 104 in 1953 and reached 117 in 1956 (p. 45).

The factors at work to bring about this recovery are discussed by both Cohen and Allen. Cohen mentions (pp. 18-23) the funds and sponsorship of the United States, world recovery and trade liberalization, the Korean War, financial policy, the nature of the Japanese market, a redistribution of national product in Japan, the high rate of investment, and the "attitude and knowhow of the Japanese people." The story is a complicated one, but in retrospect it is not difficult to accept Cohen's explanation of these factors or Allen's generally consistent interpretation.

Why, then, was Japan's recovery "amazing" (Cohen's word, in the title of his chapter ii)? In part the answer lies in world trends and events. Does another part of the answer lie, perhaps, in our failure to evaluate Japan accurately? Have we of the West underestimated the strengths and abilities of the Japanese people, their capacity to endure, to save, to adapt and to grow? Westerners underestimated Japan at least militarily in the years before the Pearl Harbor attack and the subsequent quick conquests in the Pacific and Asia. It seems that then we overestimated Japan's power until some time after surrender. But are we again underestimating Japan's power now? If so, we are encouraged by pessimism on the part of the Japanese themselves. Tsuru shows

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his own caution, even if not pessimism, in his essay on employment. He is not ready to rely on the probability of sufficient export success to support full employment and suggests a possible need for the alternative of an emergency public works program in the critical years up to 1970.

Most observers, whether Japanese or foreign, tend toward gloom when they look at Japan's large population, narrow space, limited farmland and meager resources of industrial materials. Perhaps it is time to change the approach and to think in terms of future expansion through trade. Japan has the crucially important human resources including leadership. Raw materials can be imported. Capital can be created by saving and skillful financial management. What Japan needs is opportunities to trade. Tsuru says, "Exports in sufficient volume will be both a necessary and a sufficient condition for full employment prosperity" (pp. 93-94). Whether Japan in the years ahead continues to amaze us will depend in part on how much the Japanese succeed in selling in the United States and other countries that have adequate purchasing power and foreign exchange.

WARREN S. HUNSBERGER
UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Party Committees and National Politics. By HUGH A. BONE. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1958.—xv, 256 pp. $4.50.

Adequate descriptive material on the structure and operations of the party committees at the national level has been seriously lacking in the literature of American politics. Until recently only spasmodically active and still incompletely institutionalized, they have not had the attention that their positions warrant. This deficiency is at least partially corrected in these useful and informative essays by Hugh A. Bone. Roughly half the book is devoted to the national committees proper, primarily in the years of the first Eisenhower Administration. In four chapters Bone discusses their origins, structure, staffing, and activities, including fund-raising, patronage, and public relations. In the second portion of the book he devotes a chapter to the campaign committees in the Senate and the House, and one to the Senate Policy Committees which was recently reprinted in the *Congressional Record* under the approving sponsorship of Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin. These two chapters are considerably revised versions of journal articles. He concludes with a reflective summary which he entitles "The National Committees—Power and Prospect".

Despite the last chapter, the book is far more a collection of essays than an integrated treatise. In one sense this cannot be

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regarded as a criticism, for the author's objectives were limited. He modestly disclaims any attempt at a definitive treatment, and his careful, responsible scholarship restrains him from overgeneralizing his evidence. In another sense, however, the unsynthesized character of the book seems at least partially avoidable. One of the purposes Bone set himself was "to point out the limitations under which these committees operate and to place them in relationship to one another and the party," yet he has not presented a consistent conception of the parties that would explain these relationships and accommodate these limitations. He is not an unreconstructed advocate of "responsible parties"; many of his judgments on features of the system that most violate the reformers' model—for example, on the functions of the Policy Committees—are balanced and discerning. He accepts in his concluding paragraphs the probable persistence of "the proliferated national party structure," but he is resigned to it rather than at home with it. On an adjoining page he declares that "The national agencies . . . have not provided an effective instrument for developing the parties' programmatic needs," and at various points throughout the book he indicates that he is judging the national parties against the ideal of an integrated, hierarchic structure.

The interpreter's rôle thus seems to have been restricted by the reformer's. Had this not been the case, one wonders whether he would have been content to ascribe the origins of the Democratic Advisory Council to "a feeling of frustration of the national committee," whether he would have assigned the refusal of the Congressional leaders to join this body to "jealousy over prerogative," "fear of interference," and hostility to a " 'liberal' civil rights program," and whether he would have been satisfied with the judgments implied in the statement that "the national committees are still far from institutionalized and independent of the president."

These limitations of conception are regrettable, but they do not destroy the very considerable value of the descriptive material and many of the interpretations in the various essays. They will be gratefully welcomed by all who are concerned with our political system.

DAVID B. TRUMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Advent of the British Labour Party. By PHILIP P. POIRIER. New York, Columbia University Press, 1958.—vi, 288 pp. $4.50.

The aim of Professor Poirier's able work is "to account for the emergence of the Labour party as a major political force" between 1900—when the Labour Representation Committee was formed—and 1906—when this Committee proved a success.

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For years before 1900 English trade unions had become concerned with political action. By the turn of the century they were prepared to try independent labor politics. Meanwhile, England had seen the formation of the Social Democratic Federation, the Fabian Society, and the Independent Labour party. Each of these socialist organizations was to contribute to the future Labour party. The S.D.F. by its ineptitude taught other Socialists "what not to do." The Fabian Society, Professor Poirier thinks, "remained peripheral and advisory and was at no time decisive." (Professor Poirier is extraordinarily severe on the Fabians; this reviewer thinks too severe. Although the Fabians' activity in socialist labor politics between 1900 and 1906 was not decisive, to call it peripheral in the 1889-1893 period is a mistake.) By far the most important socialist group was the Independent Labour party, for it became "the core of inspiration and leadership" in the Labour Representation Committee.

Composed of trade-union and socialist organizations, the L.R.C. was designed to sponsor independent labor candidates. No sooner was it formed than it had a General Election to contest. In the "Khaki Election" of 1900 the L.R.C. managed to get Keir Hardie and Richard Bell voted into Parliament. The two men had strong Liberal backing. At this point, the still weak L.R.C. might have been absorbed into the Liberal party.

But in 1901 five Law Lords ruled, in the Taff Vale case, that a trade union was liable for damages or injury caused by its agents, meaning that henceforth no union had protection for its funds. Then in *Quinn v. Leathem* the justices declared that boycotting by a union was illegal. Overnight the unions found their economic weapons blunted. They turned to the ballot box, giving their support to the Labour Representation Committee, so that by 1903 no large union, except the Miners, remained outside.

Professor Poirier insists it was not the judges alone who saved the L.R.C. Credit must go to the "organizing and tactical skill of the L.R.C. secretary [Ramsay MacDonald] and his I.L.P. supporters," as they were responsible for marshaling the discontent that stemmed from the judges' verdicts.

In the next two years the L.R.C. obtained three victories in parliamentary by-elections. It built up such strength that Liberals feared the Labour vote would split theirs and put Tories into office. The Liberal Chief Whip, Herbert Gladstone, in 1903 consulted with Ramsay MacDonald, and in secret they agreed to divide the constituencies between Labour and Liberal candidates. Although MacDonald told the public that there had been no agreement, memoranda in the Gladstone Papers prove the contrary. As a result of the MacDonald-Gladstone entente, in

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1906 the L.R.C. won twenty-nine seats. The Labour party now became a fact. Professor Poirier tells the story well, and it is a revealing one.

His book contains a number of minor errors. But they are small blemishes in an otherwise good book.

M. S. WILKINS

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile. By HENRY PELLING. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1958.—viii, 204 pp. $3.75.

Labour and Politics, 1900-1906: A History of the Labour Representation Committee. By FRANK BEALEY and HENRY PELLING. London, Macmillan & Co, Ltd; New York, St Martin's Press, 1958.—xi, 314 pp. $7.00.

Besides having an author in common, these two books are alike in making an important scholarly contribution to an understanding of recent British political history. As a leading member of the new generation of scholars examining the British labor movement, Pelling's reputation was previously established by his excellent *Origins of the Labour Party, 1880-1900.* Here, in this latest volume on Labour's early years, Pelling and Bealey together show the same painstaking research and critical detachment that distinguished the earlier work. Neither author, even if sympathetic to the aspirations of the Labour party, displays any of the unsophisticated identification with the "cause", either of the Labour party or one of its factions, which has so often marred work in this field. Bealey and Pelling are professional historians, and this is reflected, especially in *Labour and Politics,* in their careful use of previously untapped sources.

The British Communist Party is mainly a straightforward account, enlivened by eight photographs, of that "band of British citizens" who sacrificed themselves "so completely over a period of almost forty years to the service of a dictatorship in another country". The writing is succinct. Yet the story of the British Communists is told in about as complete a form as is possible when research is necessarily confined largely to published sources, communist and noncommunist. By its nature, the work cannot be an examination of conspiratorial tactics. Nor is Pelling concerned to emphasize ideology. He describes the experiences of the British Communist party in its origins among Left-wing socialists, its subjection and rigidities under Lenin and especially Stalin, its attraction for intellectuals in the 1930's, its near control of the trade-

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union movement at the end of World War II, and finally its long post-war decline (but without any final disappearance). The more open party politics of the early years make the story especially enlightening in the 1920's, but even the last years are made illuminating by Pelling's emphasis on the evident trauma of Communist intellectuals, survivors though they were of many past swerves in the party line, when they were finally faced with the exposure of Stalin's crimes by the Russians themselves and with the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolt.

Never a mass party, on the scale of its continental affiliates, British Communists claimed only 56,000 members at their 1942 peak. Their failure to grow Pelling attributes to the fact that "the British people have never been in revolutionary mood." Yet he has provided enough material in this volume to establish that, even without a large mass base, the British Communists have been both persistent and important within the unions, where, incidentally, substantial Communist influence remains in some important organizations.

The co-authored work, *Labour and Politics, 1900-1906,* contains a wealth of important and suggestive information on the crucial period in which a separate labor party achieved substantial parliamentary representation. Most heavily stressed is the secret agreement between Ramsay MacDonald for the Labour party and Herbert Gladstone for the Liberal party. It was this agreement which successfully prevented Labour and Liberal candidates from opposing each other in selected constituencies, and its negotiation and effective operation in 1906 are examined fully and shrewdly. The association of Labour with the Liberal tradition in other respects is brought out so as to underline a main theme of the authors: that the advent of the new party by no means created an entirely new type of British political behavior. Thus, in the Bealey-Pelling analysis the seats won by Labour in 1906 did not result from a new social reform urge, or indeed from any social reform urge, but rather from the electorate's reaction to the new type of conservatism of the turn of the century. Labour, in the authors' view, simply shared, with the Liberals, in the benefits of this electoral reaction. The analysis here is connected with data, presented in the book's first chapter, on certain regional and religious bases of British politics in the early twentieth century.

Further illustrating the nature of the authors' contribution is the discussion of the Taff Vale case and its effects. The actual details of this case, so seldom presented in the numerous works mentioning the magic term, are here told clearly and interestingly. In doing so, Bealey and Pelling not only give a richer than usual interpretation of the rôle of this single court decision in causing trade union-

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ists to throw in their lot (and their funds) with a separate Labour party, but they also provide vital material for understanding industrial relations in Britain during the first decade of the century.

LEON D. EPSTEIN

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Nineteen Thirty-One: Political Crisis. By R. BASSETT. London, Macmillan & Co, Ltd; New York, St Martin's Press, 1958.—xvi, 464 pp. $9.50.

The fall of the second Labour Government in Britain, and its replacement by a coalition which, though it did not include the bulk of the Labour party, called itself "National", constitute an episode at once complex, controversial and dramatic. The Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, has been charged with desertion and betrayal of his Labour colleagues, and with serving as dupe for the Conservatives, enabling them to convert a national emergency into a thinly disguised partisan triumph in the 1931 elections. It has even been suggested that MacDonald arranged the whole drama in order to be rid of his Labour associates, and to enjoy instead the more congenial company of Tory gentlemen.

Mr. Bassett has subjected these events to a most painstaking analysis. He exposes literally dozens of errors in the principal accounts hitherto available of the crisis. Some of these errors are important. For instance, many accounts have been based on the misapprehension that a majority of MacDonald's colleagues in the Labour Cabinet opposed the program of economies later carried out by the National Government, whereas Mr. Bassett shows that the lineup was eleven to nine in favor even of the most controversial of these, the cut in basic rate of unemployment benefit. Again, writers often overlook the fact that the Labour party expelled MacDonald, and that this action helped to embitter the atmosphere and to bring on the general election, so fatal to Labour. Mr. Bassett demolishes the "plot theory"; MacDonald was no Machiavelli, but a troubled, often uncertain, man, who worked hard to keep the Labour Government in being, until he became convinced that it would never take the steps he considered necessary to save the situation. That anyone should seriously have believed otherwise is, of course, a tribute to the passions which the crushing defeat of 1931 engendered within the Labour party.

It must be admitted that this book shows the defects of its virtues. Mr. Bassett carries his pursuit of all other writers on the subject to inordinate lengths, as if determined to leave no hair unsplit. There are pages of debate over whether the Opposition

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leaders, in consultation with MacDonald and Snowden, *demanded* certain economies, or merely indicated that they considered them the necessary precondition of interparty coöperation to end the crisis. And when the reader has concluded that all the authorities and possible viewpoints have been covered, along come a half-dozen appendices devoted to the same tasks, and sometimes covering the same ground. On the other hand, Mr. Bassett's decision to eschew any discussion with participants in the events of 1931 is open to question. Granting that memories are fallible, and almost always weaker than opinions, why does the author then issue a plea that people with further facts to disclose shall do so in the public print? Is a fact disclosed unilaterally any more trustworthy than one unearthed in an interview, where the interviewer can at least attempt a bit of discreet cross-examination?

Finally, Mr. Bassett has gone rather far in his revisionism. He does not explain satisfactorily, to this reviewer at least, MacDonald's apparent halfheartedness in seeking support from Labour people, after the break. That the Prime Minister had made plans to go to Lossiemouth hardly excuses his failure to confront the Parliamentary Labour party at its meeting of August 28. Again, Mr. Bassett treats one-sidedly the question of pressure from the bankers, both British and American, upon the Cabinet; there are real issues here, which cannot be brushed aside as mere products of fevered socialist imaginations. Nevertheless, although *Nineteen Thirty-One* is often a rather trying book, it is also an important one, which is sure to influence any future studies of the period.

RICHARD W. LYMAN

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography. Vol. I: *1874-1923.* By R. MACGREGOR DAWSON. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1958.—xiii, 521 pp. $7.50.

This is the first volume of the official biography of Mackenzie King who was for some twenty-two years prime minister of Canada. It is based on a mass of private papers much more voluminous than that ever accumulated by any other Canadian public man and upon a remarkable private diary which King kept for most of his life. Just as this first volume was coming from the press Professor Dawson died, and the two succeeding volumes that he had planned will be written by other hands.

King was born in 1874 and became leader of the Liberal party in 1919. More than half of this volume is devoted to the years before 1919. Considering what normal and commonplace per-

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sonalities most Canadians seem to possess, the author has here a strange story to tell. On his mother's side, King was the grandson of William Lyon Mackenzie, the Upper Canadian rebel of 1837; and he was brought up by his mother and father to become a political leader who would rehabilitate the Mackenzie tradition. As Dawson puts it, there was a score to be settled. "The community which had done so little for William Lyon Mackenzie who had done so much for it would be able to make belated amends by acknowledging the worth of his grandson and namesake." Young King wholeheartedly accepted this assignment of destiny. He appears to have faltered only once, when he thought of marrying a girl in Chicago whom his parents considered an unsuitable helpmeet for a man with his future. They rebuked him severely. He sighed as a lover and obeyed as a grandson. From that moment he moved ever upward toward the prime minister's office, to the accompaniment of constant pious reflections in his diary on the unseen divine hand which was guiding his career.

With the help of the diary and of family letters Professor Dawson presents a personality that is fascinating in its contradictions. On the one side King is a genuine idealist, the author of *Industry and Humanity,* a sympathizer with the underdog, critical of big business, steeping himself as a graduate student at Chicago and Harvard in the most up-to-date progressive thinking on labor and social questions, initiating the Department of Labor in the federal government, showing a genius as a conciliator in labor disputes, believing it to be his function to educate the Canadian public in a new understanding of twentieth-century industrial society. On the other side he is an almost pathological egoist, who invariably blends motives of private ambition with those of public service, who cultivates the society of important people and coolly accepts large gifts of money from rich friends to assist him in his career, and who apparently never feels so close to God as at those critical moments when he has just accomplished the next step in his persistent upward climb. No doubt all successful men of affairs, in church and state as well as in business, are characterized by an inordinate desire for power. But most of them did not grow up in a family like the King family or keep a diary like Mackenzie King's.

If the revelations of the diary are apt to leave an unpleasant sense of distaste in the minds of most readers, the author makes clear also that young King impressed many shrewd judges very favorably. He was a protégé of two hard-headed Canadian public men, Sir William Mulock and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, though Laurier found him too aggressive in his personal ambitions. In 1906, when the University of Toronto was looking for a president, Mulock suggested King's name. Harvard tried twice to get him to accept a

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full professorship. At the end of 1918 he had a choice of three careers outside of academic life. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., wanted him to continue his very useful association with the Rockefellers as an industrial adviser. Andrew Carnegie wanted him to take over the direction of the Carnegie foundations. He chose the third road open to him, a career in Canadian politics.

The second part of the Dawson volume is a study of King as a Canadian party leader. Sometimes in the earlier parts of the book one gets the feeling that the biographer is finding the narcissism of his subject a little hard to bear. But when we reach the post-war political scene biographer and subject are in complete agreement. As his previous writings on Canadian government had shown, Dawson believed in the North American two-party system in which the primary task of the statesman is to keep in healthy operation a nation-wide political party, uniting as many of the major interest-groups in the country as possible and keeping them going along together by emphasizing what they have in common rather than what divides them. This was exactly how King conceived his function as political leader. Dawson gives a masterly analysis of how he brought together again the warring factions of the Liberal party which had been so badly split by the 1917 conscription crisis ("After the violent eruption in 1917 the lava cooled slowly."), how he compromised between Montreal big business and the low-tariff agrarians, how he handled the Progressive revolt in Ontario and on the Prairies. In developing King's conception of what a national party should be, he brings out the contrast between the King kind of leadership, which was so well adapted to Canadian conditions, and the leadership offered by his rival, Mr. Arthur Meighen of the Conservatives. He is preparing the way so that we shall understand why King defeated Meighen so decisively in the great central crisis of his career in 1926.

This section of the book also deals with King's policy on imperial relations. While the author does not say so, the narrative makes clear that in this field King's line of action was much more clear-cut than in domestic politics. Long before the Canadian people were quite clear where they were going, King had set his course toward the loose association of independent nation-states with no central imperial government, the association which we now call the Commonwealth.

A prominent Canadian journalist referred to this volume when it first appeared as "an innocent Canadian version of Machiavelli's Prince". The book is by an author who was much too sophisticated and about a man who was much too complicated for the adjective "innocent" to have any relevance. But the journalist was right in being reminded of The Prince. For here is a study of how

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one attains to political power in a modern democracy like Canada. No doubt the next two volumes, when they appear, will be studies of how a modern statesman maintains himself in power. When we Canadians have digested these three volumes we shall be politically a much more mature people. And, while Americans cannot be expected to have our fascinated interest in the King personality, the Dawson volume should interest them as a study of the functioning of an effective national political party in a country whose major political parties are in most essentials very similar to those of the United States.

FRANK H. UNDERHILL

OTTAWA, CANADA

The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, February to October 1917. By OLIVER H. RADKEY. New York, Columbia University Press, 1958.—xiv, 521 pp. $8.50.

This monograph is devoted to the policy of the Socialist Revolutionaries between the February Revolution and the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917. It is to be followed by another study of the later history of this ill-fated party. Professor Radkey is concerned to discover why it was that a party which enjoyed so much popular support should have been so easily swept out of the way by a determined minority. The main reasons, he concludes, were lack of competent leadership and failure to unite—and few would disagree with this. What is less convincing is his hypothesis that "it should have been possible to steer a middle course between surrender to German imperialism and continued inactivity on the peace front, which was equivalent to surrender to the Bolsheviks" (p. 481). What "middle course" is possible between defeatism and defense, when a country is involved in a war, except in the make-believe world of socialist theory? The Bolsheviks, with their all-out defeatist propaganda, were at any rate consistent. The socialists, or the majority of them, who hovered between peace propaganda and support of the war effort, even if they did not intend it merely contributed to the general demoralization from which the Bolsheviks reaped their harvest.

Professor Radkey has used both published and unpublished sources and has talked at length with surviving leaders of the party. It is unlikely that anyone will seek to go over the ground again. For this reason it is right to point to two sources which he has not used, or which were not yet available to him, in the hope that someone in the future may use them to complete the story. The papers of the late V. Zenzinov are now available to scholars. (Zen-

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zinov was one of the most moderate and balanced leaders in a party in which such qualities were rare.) The files of the German Foreign Ministry for the period of the war are also relevant. They should throw light on the question of German attempts to subsidize the Socialist Revolutionaries, with which Professor Radkey hardly deals. Even a cursory examination of the documents shows that the Germans had at least one agent inside the Socialist Revolutionary party, Zivin, though how much money, if any, reached the party and what, if anything, the party leaders knew of these contacts remain to be investigated.

These are minor omissions in a study which impresses by its scholarship, its fairness and its thoroughness. Professor Radkey's judgment is perhaps less certain when once he strays outside the strict boundaries of his subject. For example, he shows little understanding of the problem as seen by the Kadets—to prevent a German victory over Britain and France, since this would stifle the new-born Russian democracy. His sneers at Buchanan (p. 302) are quite unjustified. And the theory that Natanson and Kamkov were more defeatist than Chernov because they were Jews (p. 116) shows complete failure to understand the psychology of the Jewish revolutionary. (Was Lenin, the arch-defeatist, a Jew? And why were nearly half of the Socialist Revolutionary volunteers in the French army Jews?) Such instances lead one to suspect that Professor Radkey has looked at events for so long through the eyes of Chernov as to allow his own judgment to become warped.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Legal Personality and Political Pluralism. Edited by LEICESTER C. WEBB. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press on behalf of the Australian National University; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1959.—xvi, 200 pp. 30*s.*; $5.50.

Taken individually, the essays which make up this book are, with one exception, lucid, cogent and well put together. They raise important issues and deal with them effectively. The reader who is more a philosopher than a lawyer will probably most enjoy the first essay, by David Derham, on "Theories of Legal Personality". It owes a great deal to Professor H. A. L. Hart's article on "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" (1954, 70 *L.Q.R.* 37). It is a precise, careful and subtle argument, though Professor Derham rather misses the point when he insists that the corporation, as a mere subject of rights, is no more an artificial or fictitious person than the human being, as a mere subject of rights. The

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artifice or fiction does not consist in the law's treating the corporation as a subject of rights; it consists in its treating the corporation (within certain limits) as if it were the same kind of subject of rights as a human being. If, when the courts treat a corporation as a person, they meant no more by a person than a "subject of rights", the conclusions they wish to reach would not follow; they follow only if the corporation is treated as if it had some of the natural attributes of man. Professor Derham does not deny this; he merely assumes (mistakenly) that this is not what people have in mind when they say that corporations are artificial as distinct from natural persons. Again, Professor Derham, following Professor Hart, criticizes what he calls the Symbolist or "Bracket" Theory of legal personality (which insists that only human beings have rights, and that the corporation is merely a device enabling very complicated jural relations between human beings to be dealt with more simply than they would otherwise be), for not giving an adequate account of how the notion of corporation functions in legal argument. He creates the impression that the account is inadequate because the theory insists that only human beings have rights. With all respect to Derham and Hart, I suggest that the Symbolists insist on what we all know to be true, that only human beings can make claims and carry out obligations. To insist on this is not to be committed to giving an inadequate account of how a concept functions in argument. If their account is inadequate, it is not so for this reason.

The other essays are more historical and less controversial. S. J. Stoljar's is particularly good on "The Corporate Theories of Frederick William Maitland", and Ross M. Martin's on "Legal Personality and the Trade Union". The essay most difficult to follow is Douglas Pike's on "Churches and the Modern State". He uses words loosely and leaves out steps in his argument, so that it is uncertain what he is trying to prove. Professor Geoffrey Sawer is also sometimes, though less often, obscure. We are told that "much of the law's abstraction is like that of a statistical average, not like that of a system of symbolic logic." This may be true and important; it is impossible to tell, for the sense of it is never explained.

These essays are likely to interest the academic lawyer more than the political theorist. They deal much more fully with the notion of personality as applied to corporations in legal argument than with political pluralism, though they do go some way toward showing what political conclusions were drawn (albeit by false reasoning) from this or that conception of legal personality. Actually, neither the liberal nor the authoritarian stands to gain or lose anything from its being shown that one conception has

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more to be said for it than another. This is an argument to be settled by jurists, and no important political consequences follow logically from it, no matter how it is settled. Maitland and Figgis did not see this. If they had seen it, these essays might not have been written. Who can deny that error sometimes produces good things?

JOHN PLAMENATZ

NUFFIELD COLLEGE
OXFORD

Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory. By JEROME HALL. NEW YORK, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958.—300 pp. $6.00.

In this volume, Professor Hall, who, over the years, has made many distinguished contributions to jurisprudence and criminal law, has brought together fifteen essays. Three of these have not been published before ("Legal Theory and Jurisprudence", "Culture, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence", "Causation"). These are, however, of greater interest to the student of analytical jurisprudence than to the political scientist.

This collection of essays suffers from the usual difficulty of volumes that bring together a variety of writings, written over a number of years, on many different occasions, about different subjects, and without a unifying theme. Moreover, two or three of the shorter pieces are too slight in volume and substance to have deserved inclusion in this volume, together with some major and penetrating studies. The second essay on "Integrative Jurisprudence"—which was published in a previous collection of essays on *Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies* in 1947—is presumably reprinted because it comes nearest to giving Professor Hall's own legal philosophy. As this writer understands it, "integrative jurisprudence" means the viewing of the legal system, and of legal problems, not through a separation into questions of value and questions of fact, but as a synthesis of "relevant ideas, facts, and evaluations, in compliance with the criteria of adequacy" (p. 37).

> There is the given legal system with its host of specific rules, expressed and potential, and the given jurisprudential thought with its basic conceptions, all stated in traditional terms, representing traditional thinking, modified in the past two centuries by legal positivism. There is, also, the organization of prevailing ideas that comprise the non-legal disciplines and sciences, which are more or less simply taken over in jurisprudence. And there are the accepted ideas of common sense, and these, too, form an important part of

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present legal philosophies. Finally, in common with the above bodies of knowledge, prevailing legal philosophies rely, also, on certain ultimate ideas which are the product of speculative philosophy—such as external world, fact, cause, space, time, quantity, quality, purpose, and other "categories" (pp. 43-44).

To this writer, it seems that "integrative jurisprudence" is a kind of legal *Gestalt* philosophy, drawing its inspiration from the phenomenology of Max Scheler, and indebted also to Gény's conception of the four different categories of *donnée,* formulated in his *Science et technique en droit privé positif* (1914-1924)—even though neither of these writers is mentioned by Professor Hall. However, the emphasis on the integration of the various aspects of a given legal problem is a most welcome antidote to the artificial separation of legal approaches into value philosophies, behaviorism and analytical positivism. In particular, the aridity of the contemporary Oxford approach to philosophy and jurisprudence—on which Professor Hall expresses some pertinent criticisms in various parts of his book—is a sad commentary on the poverty of legal philosophy in our time.

For readers of this review, by far the most important piece in this volume is a penetrating and provocative study on "Plato's Legal Philosophy". Professor Hall views Plato's contribution to legal philosophy as a whole, by seeking to find a connecting link and a continuous evolution of thought from *The Republic* through the *Statesman* to the *Laws.* Professor Hall's main thesis is that the majority of interpreters have overemphasized or distorted Plato's alleged contempt for law, as against the wisdom of the philosopher-king in the republic, and that *The Republic* and the *Laws* are not in contradiction with each other, because the former is concerned with an ideal state, a model state to be aspired to, whereas the latter deals with an actual realizable state, which incorporates some, but by no means all, of the ideals that would characterize the perfect state. The author argues that Plato's unconcern with laws and legislation in the former work was not due to contempt for legal order, but that this was outside the scope of inquiry. By contrast, the *Laws* is a detailed body of laws and regulations, including what Professor Hall describes as "virtually . . . a treatise on administration", and certainly going to the opposite extreme of *The Republic.* In the relation of *The Republic* to the *Laws,* Professor Hall sees an anticipation of natural law philosophy. To him, what Plato sought to express in *The Republic* is the ideal order, giving guidance to the positive laws and orders which must aspire to the ideal, but do not attain it.

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Professor Hall's thesis, suggestive and supported by many references not only to the above-mentioned works, but to other dialogues, will undoubtedly receive the serious attention of classical and legal scholars. It is also likely to be challenged. For, while it may well be true that the subject of inquiry for Plato was not the same, Professor Hall's own references confirm that the "ideal law" was, in *The Republic,* not one to be derived from a set of objective rules, but one that resided in the wisdom and insight of the perfect "philosopher-king". However, it must suffice here to draw attention to Professor Hall's important contribution, and to leave a more learned discussion to others.

Readers of this review are also likely to be interested in the concluding essay on "Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility", which is a critique of the many attacks that have for years been directed against the so-called McNaghten rules that made *knowledge* of the nature and quality of the act which the accused was doing, and his intellectual capacity to distinguish right from wrong, the test of insanity. While modern psychiatry has undermined this exclusive reliance on intellectual reasoning capacity, as distinct from the power of self-control, it has proved extremely difficult to find an alternative test. Professor Hall is not alone in criticizing the so-called Durham test, adopted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeal in 1954, according to which "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect". Perhaps it does not matter too much whether we preserve the McNaghten test or not, as long as we are aware that the answer to the question, whether the accused knew that he was doing wrong, is interpreted in the light of modern psychiatry, and with the help of experts. For, as many judges and legal practitioners confirm, the test is broad enough to permit great flexibility. Professor Hall, himself, suggests a slightly modified version of the McNaghten rule, into which it is not possible to go in detail.

WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Americans: The Colonial Experience. By DANIEL J. BOORSTIN. New York, Random House, 1958.—xii, 434 pp. $6.00.

This is a book with a thesis. The thesis is that the way of life, the "frame of mind", of the Americans was generated in the course of the "American experience"—in the day-by-day wrestling of the colonial Anglo-Americans with reality. The two major corollaries of the thesis are (a) that this American experience had a leveling effect—the creation of the "undifferentiated man"—and (b) that

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this undifferentiated man was less intellectual than his European counterpart: he learned "naturally", from experience, not books; he tested the validity of everything, whether action or idea, by his experience with it, not on the basis of prior knowledge or theory.

The thesis, of course, is not new. It is, in fact, a restatement of the frontier thesis, which has been formulated and applied to various aspects of historic American civilization by many historians, from Frederick Jackson Turner on. But it is probably basically sound.

The restatement is entertainingly given, but it is exceedingly fragmentary, sketchy and superficial. Thus, in four "Books", thirteen "Parts" and fifty-six chapters, the author discusses certain features of life in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Georgia and Virginia. The people of these four colonies, apparently, are the "Americans". But the author is not primarily interested in *what happened*, even in these four; he is interested, rather, in finding the derivations, in the experience of his "Americans", of the American "frame of mind". In the instances where he comes down to cases, as in the discussion of Cotton Mather's work in medicine or in the discussion of law, the narrative is informative and sound. Unfortunately, the book seems to be predominantly a series of clever comments *about* people, or events, or moods, or "experience", rather than a narrative of what the events and experience were.

After characterizing his four colonial societies (the Puritans were "practical" and "conservative"; the Quakers were "pacifists", men deliberately in quest of "martyrdom"; the settlers of Georgia were "victims of philanthropy" in an "unheroic age"; the Virginians were "transplanters"), the author is concerned with such things as education, law, medicine, popular science, language, "culture without a capital", the press. He is not interested in the history of religion, as such, economic life and ideas, society and social thought, or political institutions and political ideas.

The "Parts" of the book devoted to those fragments of the intellectual life of his four colonies to which the author gives his attention are pithy and provocative. But in no single one of these little essays is there a history, but only sketchy descriptions of, and flashes of insight into, selected facets of these aspects of the colonial intellectual experience.

The most striking characteristic of the book is its aphoristic composition. It is literally studded with striking and facile generalizations which are all too often inaccurate or misleading, practically never supported by factual evidence, and usually more ingenious and witty than historically dependable. Such, for example, is the statement that "the Puritans . . . were concerned less

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with the ends of society than with its organization and less with making the community good than with making it effective" (p. 29); or that "Never was a reward sought more eagerly than the Quakers sought out their crown of thorns" (p. 36). There are many other such pithy generalizations; some of them, indeed, carry a certain conviction. But what sort of acceptable historical evidence can be adduced to justify any single one of these statements?

The author sits in judgment upon his characters; at times his judgment is favorable, at other times he does not hesitate to condemn. The Trustees of Georgia, for example, were guilty of a "basic error" (p. 81); their plan for the administration of the land was "ill-conceived" and "disastrous" (p. 89); and they themselves were "blind and incorrigible" (p. 93). Indeed, the general mood of this book appears to be dominated by a concern for the present, not the colonial past. It would almost seem that the author is trying to explain—or excuse—the peculiarities and the idiosyncrasies (real or imagined) of twentieth-century America by a highly fanciful literary and quasi-historical description of certain selected facets of the colonial experience.

This is not history, in the generally accepted sense of the word. It may be a new type of "new" history. To one reviewer, at least, it appears to be a highly imaginative contribution to American nationalistic myth-making.

Max Savelle

University of Washington

A Yankee's Odyssey: The Life of Joel Barlow. By James Wood-ress. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1958.—347 pp. $5.95.

The life of Joel Barlow touched the outside world at more points than that of any other public man of his time in America, not even excepting Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin. His New England Puritan heritage was tempered with a cosmopolitanism that was indeed rare among his fellow Yankees and that ranged in its contacts from Washington at the Battle of Long Island in 1776 to Napoleon on his tragic Russian campaign in 1812.

For most of the nineteenth century Barlow's name as a political philosopher suffered in the United States from the prejudice generated against him for his rôle in the ferment of radical doctrines that swirled around the French Revolution, prejudices that were originally set by Federalist leaders during the two and a half decades that followed the adoption of the Constitution. But during the last thirty years since V. L. Parrington's accolade in his *Main Currents of American Thought,* Barlow's fame has been reassessed

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by a number of scholars with a more nearly due proportion of sympathy toward the revolutionary aspects of his career abroad and his later solid contribution to the support of Jefferson's and Madison's concept of America. In addition, several of these writers have shifted the stress upon Barlow as a literary artist from his generally heavy-handed poetry to the ringing high-hearted prose of his political writings. The best of them, *Advice to the Privileged Orders,* written in answer to Burke's *Reflections,* has recently achieved the distinction of a paperback edition. His prose, most of which was written during the seventeen years in France and England, bristles with his democratic convictions and is entirely free of the cumbersome paraphernalia of expression which make most of his poetry so labored and artificial. As a prose writer he is like his friend Paine in the impetuosity of his onslaught upon tyranny of whatever sort, in his pamphleteering ability, and in his saturation with the gospels of reason, optimism and universal benevolence.

Now comes James Woodress with his *A Yankee's Odyssey,* largely the outcome of a year's tenure of a Guggenheim Fellowship and the first full-dress biography since 1886, in which he has garnered the more pertinent parts of recent scholarly studies on Barlow, drawn afresh and multitudinously upon the widely scattered manuscript sources, and set him in a new perspective for posterity as "a minor poet and a major prose writer." As the title suggests, Woodress centers his book in the years spent abroad, during which Barlow saw the birth of the French Revolution in all its horrors and all its ecstasies, was converted to its principles by intimate contact with many of the Girondist leaders, and moved among its friends in England. In these days his soul was forged and his most lasting achievements as a political thinker wrought. However, Woodress finds radical elements in Barlow's political ideas even before his coming to France in 1788. He shows how in the years following the French Revolution Barlow became "a self-appointed representative of the Jeffersonian minority" in trying to use his private good offices for Franco-American peace. For all his final frustration as special minister to Napoleon, Woodress credits him with keeping the United States from going to war with France in 1812.

Perhaps the most serious count in the criticism of Barlow is that he compounded political liberalism and patriotism with mammon. Woodress is almost driven openly to admit that in this respect Barlow falls short of heroic stature. Though he was not tainted by the skulduggery of some of his business associates, he found no difficulty in reconciling his liberal political views with turning over a quick dollar in Terror-ridden France. "The prophet Joel", as

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Burke contemptuously called him, certainly did not balk at carrying a full scrip.

There are several omissions from the record. The relations with Godwin at the very time he was writing *Political Justice* are not explored. Though the intimate personal and scientific connections between Robert Fulton and Barlow during the period of Fulton's submarine experiments abroad are detailed, nothing is said about their sharing ideas concerning the relation between science and free government, which was to be the subject of their projected epic poem *The Canal*, only fragments of which were written. Nor is there anything recorded about Barlow's toning down or omitting certain violent passages in *Advice to the Privileged Orders* and others of his radical publications when he was preparing them for a new edition of his *Political Writings*.

But these criticisms are incidental. The staple of the book is certainly satisfying, indeed appealing to both the general and the scholarly reader. Mr. Woodress has done the crowning work in the rehabilitation of Joel Barlow and thus provided him a permanent niche in the American pantheon. Beyond this assessment prejudice and obloquy cannot follow him. And through it all the biographer has kept his admiration sane.

M. RAY ADAMS

FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE

Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge. By H. C. PORTER. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1958.—xi, 462 pp. $10.00.

The Reformation in England followed a peculiarly tortuous course, baffling in its sudden reversals, its contradictions, inconsistencies and abiding ambiguities. For this the diverse policies of the last four Tudor sovereigns were largely responsible. The story would have been simpler had all the children of Henry VIII been Protestant—or, for that matter, Henry himself. It would also have been much simpler had all English Protestants drawn their theological doctrines from the same source. It is significant that the adjectival qualification applied to the Reformation in England is not derived from the name of any theologian, but from that of the state. It is Anglican, not Lutheran, Zwinglian, Calvinist, or even Erasmian, but combined within its formal uniformity elements of all four, refracted through the thought and emotion of men who, despite a corresponding diversity, were all, like Elizabeth herself, "mere English". The successive phases of formal organization and official creed through which the Church of England passed in the sixteenth century may be designated by the names of the Tudor

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sovereigns, but the various strands of theological doctrine cannot be so clearly distinguished, since they did not follow one another in chronological order, but rather ran concurrently with greater or lesser force.

Dr. Porter's book is concerned primarily with doctrine, set against the immediate background of Cambridge personalities and politics. The more distant background of national politics is barely sketched in, being taken largely for granted. The result is a don's-eye view of the Reformation—and a very illuminating view it is. The focus is narrow, but the resulting picture is correspondingly precise. All the varying shades of opinion for a hundred years are presented through the men who embodied them, the rank and file as well as the leaders being listed with their names and titles. The story thus acquires a concrete reality lacking in many more abstract histories of dogma. In concentrating attention upon a single academic community, Dr. Porter necessarily ignores certain large aspects of the English Reformation, but he defends his procedure with the comment: "Anglicanism, it has been said, was a religion for dons. Was Puritanism any the less so?" (p. xi). And of the two ancient universities, Cambridge furnished the more fertile breeding ground for Protestant, and especially for Puritan, thought and leadership. The chapters devoted to a blow-by-blow account of academic disputes and the shifting "balance of power within the academic community" (p. xi)—the ever recurrent troubles at St. John's, for example, with its "proud tradition of faction" (p. 135)—will be of special interest to Cambridge men. "Certainly the vicissitudes of the story can best be appreciated (and most fully enjoyed) by those who have experience of the senior and junior combination room, and can savour their peculiar blend of the sublime and the ridiculous" (p. ix). The thoughtful analysis of varying shades of Protestant doctrine, especially in the last third of the book devoted to the theological controversies of the 1590's, on the other hand, will be of interest to any student of the English Reformation.

Dr. Porter is at his best in his discussion of the Elizabethan period, which occupies three quarters of his book. The opening chapters on Erasmus and the early reformers are thinner and seem less sure-footed. There is evidence throughout that his own predilections are on the side of the moderate and humanist tradition of Anglicanism, but his treatment of the Calvinist Puritans is both sympathetic and founded upon an exhaustive study of their works. In the end, however, he makes it clear that their interpretation of the mysteries of grace and predestination was not, as they claimed, "the truth of religion publicly and generally received" (p. 413). It was by moderates like Lancelot Andrewes, John Whitgift and

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John Overall that "the candle of the Lord had been kept alight in the Cambridge of Elizabeth: and by God's grace, in England, it was never to be put out" (p. 429).

WALLACE K. FERGUSON
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO

Business and Politics under James I: Lionel Cranfield as Merchant and Minister. By R. H. TAWNEY. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1958.—xii, 325 pp. $7.50.

In this latest work Professor Tawney gives a thoughtful and penetrating study of the career of Lionel Cranfield, Baron Cranfield and Earl of Middlesex, the ablest if not the least selfish administrator in the service of James I. Though it is presumptuous of any reviewer to suggest comparisons with Professor Tawney's earlier writings, this is perhaps one of the more valuable of his numerous contributions to historical scholarship.

The political career of Lionel Cranfield, who rose, by shrewdness, application to business, and a measure of good fortune, from apprentice to city merchant and thence to Lord Treasurer and chief financial adviser to James I, is a striking illustration of that social and economic mobility which carried many a man of wit to high place in Tudor and Stuart England. What made Cranfield more extraordinary than others, however, was not his ability nor the wealth and status he later acquired but the administrative skill and integrity he evinced as a servant of the king. For Lionel Cranfield, unlike many of the ablest of his contemporaries—even including that most intellectual of statesmen, Francis Bacon—saw what was needed to make the machinery of the Jacobean state function properly and fell into disgrace by stubbornly attempting to make it do so. Had he, by some miracle, succeeded in reaching his goal of financial solvency, who can say how different the history of England or the English-speaking world might have been?

Professor Tawney has given us a record of Cranfield's failure set forth in the form of an economic and administrative biography: the story of a successful merchant and government servant rather than of a man of flesh and blood. Nevertheless, Cranfield does not emerge a colorless abstraction. As a merchant, his activities are described within the context not simply of English but of European commercial life. As a minister, we see him not just as a transplanted business man working blindly to set the finances of the state aright in minuscule but as a minor tragic figure caught in a broad mesh of difficulties seemingly beyond the power of any man to resolve.

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In depicting Cranfield's struggle Professor Tawney recalls to mind a commonplace but sometimes forgotten fact about the first two Stuarts and their finances. While they were in a sense victims of circumstances—of the fact that there was no adequate machinery for raising regular revenues or funding the state's indebtedness and of rising costs coupled with increasing demands for state services—they were still, in large measure, responsible for the monetary difficulties that beset them. In this study the author reinforces the long-held opinion that the first Elizabeth, confronted with the same problems, had the wisdom, probably strengthened by propensity, to be parsimonious. With her successor it was far otherwise. "His insolvency was not gradual, or intermittent, or for manageable sums. It was immediate, continuous, and gross." To James's credit, however, he at least had the temporary perspicacity to accept and maintain Cranfield as a servant of the crown for eleven years, from 1613 to 1624. During that time the latter brought the shrewdness and experience of the commercial world to bear on the king's accounts. In the jungle of Jacobean court life, though he had some friends and supporters, he was largely apolitical; and therein lay his and the crown's misfortune. For Cranfield the first duty was reform; the ultimate goal was solvency. Such devotion to the larger purposes of state, while admirable, has never freed the state's servants from contumely even in an age when the position of the civil employee is hedged about by law. Under James I the most dedicated of servants had no protection beyond the king's will—or whim. The knave or the fool—a Rochester or a Buckingham—who had the king's ear or some claim on his overly emotional affections finally determined who should have power and office even when, as in Cranfield's case, James could ill afford the loss of one so able and devoted. In the end it was a *mésalliance* made up of Cranfield's erstwhile friend and patron, Buckingham, the young Prince Charles, and Parliament, many of whose members hated him for his virtues, that finally brought him down. They did so, Professor Tawney suggests, precisely because Cranfield fought to keep the self-willed and the selfish from plundering the dwindling resources of the crown.

In so concluding it would seem, by implication, that Professor Tawney has somewhat shifted the ground of his earlier conclusions on the causes of the English civil wars. Here he says nothing of what has been a favorite theme of his, namely, that the great overturn was caused by the rising gentry who used revolution as a quick and easy means of foreclosing their debtors. Can we infer from this that he has rejoined the ranks of earlier historians like Firth and Gardiner who saw the civil wars as something more

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complex than a class struggle? Certainly, he leaves the impression that he has moved a step or two in their direction. The crown's troubles, he implies in his concluding chapter, arose out of the failure of James and Charles to preserve the dignity and the social impartiality—*pro salute rei publicae*—which most Englishmen regarded as the true attributes of monarchy. When these were lost, men feared that the state would despoil them of property and liberty. The theme is not new, but it is good to have someone of Professor Tawney's stature tell us the story in this way once again.

SIDNEY A. BURRELL

BARNARD COLLEGE

The Faction of Cousins: A Political Account of the Grenvilles, 1733-1763. By LEWIS M. WIGGIN. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1958.—xv, 351 pp. $5.00.

Lord Chatham and America. By O. A. SHERRARD. London, The Bodley Head; Fair Lawn, N. J., Essential Books, 1958.—395 pp. 30*s.*; $5.40.

The Master of Peterhouse, it would seem, is not alone in challenging Sir Lewis Namier and his disciples; Dr. Wiggin and Mr. Sherrard (whose work will be discussed in turn) keep him company. Sir Lewis has made us familiar with a general view of English politics in the eighteenth century which underlines their local and personal nature: men entered parliament, not to formulate policy on general political questions, but to stand well with their family and locality; and although, once in parliament, general questions came to matter to some of them, such questions never mattered much to many of them nor to the electors and the constituencies. Dr. Wiggin set himself the task of examining how valid is that emphasis which Sir Lewis gives to the importance of family in aristocratic politics; and he concludes that Sir Lewis and his followers have got the story wrong, if not altogether, at least in some degree. He reaches this conclusion by a detailed study of the first generation of a great political family, the Grenvilles of Stowe and Wotton in Buckinghamshire.

The Grenvilles make a very good subject for the historian of eighteenth-century England, and Dr. Wiggin is to be congratulated on choosing them. They stood at the center of English politics from the 1730's onward. Frequently they were men of strong passions, whose actions were at least interesting, often enough fascinating—and, most important for the historian, lavishly documented. Dr. Wiggin has studied all the documents, printed and unprinted, from the Stowe collection at the Huntington Library

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in California to the several Grenville collections in the United Kingdom; and it is plain that he has labored lovingly at his studies. That their results give too little satisfaction is therefore an opinion which the reviewer must record regretfully.

Inasmuch as Dr. Wiggin chose to study the structure of an aristocratic family, one would have thought that the unraveling of Grenville family settlements was a preliminary task of major importance. Nothing shows better the pattern of family relationships than the practice of family settlement. Unfortunately Dr. Wiggin has pretty much ignored the Grenville settlements. It is true that the documents themselves (that is, the family deeds) intimidate by their very appearance; and the overblown, technical legal language in which they are drawn up presents formidable problems of interpretation. Still the hang of the subject may be got with some effort. The precise nature of the financial control exercised by the head of the family, the degree to which he was bound by settlement, the finances of younger sons—these are matters well worth knowing in the history of any aristocratic family.

Addressing himself to such matters would have served Dr. Wiggin better than crossing swords with Sir Lewis Namier and his disciples—especially as Dr. Wiggin does so on grounds which his adversaries would scarcely choose to defend. It would seem that he attributes to them the following thesis: that aristocratic family organization in the eighteenth century was tightly bound and firmly subordinated to the head of the family, and that it provided in its time the counterpart of the modern political party. It is very doubtful, however, that such a thesis is to be found anywhere in Sir Lewis' writings. And the sixth chapter, for example, of John Brooke's *The Chatham Administration*—a recent and distinguished work by one of Sir Lewis' younger disciples—would scarcely bear Dr. Wiggin out. The truth of the matter is that the Namier school finds in the aristocratic family, not the only and all-sufficient source of coherence in aristocratic society and politics, but simply one among several major sources. Dr. Wiggin's study of the Grenvilles does not run contrary to this general view of eighteenth-century politics and society.

One cannot be sure, however, that justice is being done to Dr. Wiggin's argument; for his book is lamentably turbid, and sometimes descends to the level of gross illiteracy. It is most distressing to think that, in spite of the many hands through which the book must have passed before it was incorporated in the Yale Historical Publications—those of doctoral supervisors, editors, expert readers, and so on—Dr. Wiggin seems never to have obtained the critical guidance which he plainly needed.

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Mr. Sherrard, in his third and final volume of the life of Chatham—*Lord Chatham and America*—demonstrates that he knows rather better than Dr. Wiggin what he is trying to say and how to say it. Like Dr. Wiggin, although less assiduously, he seeks out Sir Lewis Namier to prove him wrong. Where Sir Lewis in his *England in the Age of the American Revolution* laid much of the political chaos of the 1760's at Pitt's door, Mr. Sherrard will not have it so. Pitt is his hero, and can do no wrong. If fault there was, it lay with the smaller men with whom Pitt failed to get along; all would have been well if they had had the good sense to recognize greatness and to follow it. No one doubts that Pitt was a great man, perhaps the greatest statesman of his century; but one may well insist that some responsibility for the political mismanagement of the 1760's ought to be borne by him—although perhaps not as much of it as Sir Lewis would have us believe.

It is regrettable that Mr. Sherrard (like Dr. Wiggin) was not able to consult John Brooke's *The Chatham Administration,* which would have saved him from a number of factual mistakes concerning the politics of the 1760's. It is equally regrettable, although perhaps less avoidable, that being too much concerned to justify Pitt to posterity he does not add to our understanding of the man. We are still, at the end of Mr. Sherrard's work, where Lord Shelburne left us, with his description of Pitt's personality: the baffling aloofness occasionally lit up by a brilliant imagination, vivid rhetoric, and a touch of madness. As Pitt was not much given to self-revelation, it may not be altogether Mr. Sherrard's fault that his hero is never stripped of his official mask.

DAVID SPRING

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Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815. By HANS ROSENBERG. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958.—xiii, 247 pp. $5.00.

The transmutation of the diminutive and impoverished Electorate of Brandenburg-Prussia of 1640 into one of the Great Powers of Europe by 1815 is the story of a memorable achievement, although it was attained at the high cost of human bondage and misery. This remarkable achievement has always attracted the curiosity and interest of the ablest of French and German historians. In all this vast literature, however, there is one almost unaccountable lacuna, the paucity of studies on Prussia's social history, despite the notoriety of the Junker aristocracy in the nineteenth century. Apart from Hans Rosenberg's articles on the early Junker class, one can count the really significant works on Prussian social evolution on a single hand.

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In this admirable little volume Hans Rosenberg offers professional readers an important addition to his earlier studies on Prussian social history. His book, therefore, is neither a systematic nor a historical inquiry into the functioning of bureaucracy, aristocracy and autocracy as the misleading and slightly sensationalist title might suggest. It is not even a study in Prussian institutional history which has been rigorously excluded, a fact which makes the book difficult reading. If this reviewer has grasped the author's purpose, his central theme is rather the impact of Prussian royal absolutism on social evolution, more especially on the emergence of Prussia's two governing élites, the bureaucracy and the Junker landed aristocracy. Of these two strands that run through the volume, the bureaucracy occupies the major portion of the author's attention.

Beginning with the transition from the *Ständestaat* to the absolute monarchy, the author, following the pattern derived from France, seeks to show how the *officier*, who had purchased his charge and enriched himself by means of perquisites, was supplanted by the *commissaire*, the bureaucrat proper, who was salaried, instructed, controlled and accountable. He continues this theme down to the Stein-Hardenberg reform era of 1815, when it became obvious that the Prussian kings no longer possessed the energy and intelligence to rule as autocrats. This ushered in the classic period of "bureaucratic absolutism" when the Prussian bureaucracy had succeeded in emancipating itself alike from the direct scrutiny of the Prussian crown and from any form of constitutional control. Hohenzollern absolutism, however, had been possible since 1660 only because of a compromise which left the Junker squires in complete political, economic and juridical control of their servile peasants. Even after 1815 "bureaucratic absolutism" was based on a working alliance with the Junker squires, an alliance which perpetuated the political hegemony of these two governing élites down to 1848. Thus allied, these élites defeated both the autocracy of the crown and all liberal movements that aimed at setting up constitutional controls. So runs the argument of this volume.

If this thesis is scarcely conspicuous for its originality, it must at least be said that here it is more trenchantly set forth and more convincingly buttressed with references to the *Acta Borussica* and with a more complete command of the historical literature than in any other volume that has come to this reviewer's attention.

If this study leaves much to be desired in the matter of perspicuity and organization, this is owing partly to the nature of the subject and partly to the author's determination to exclude any discussion of the institutional structure and the functional tasks of

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the Prussian administrative system. Curiously enough, despite the author's effort to avoid institutional analysis, his discussion of Cocceji's reorganization of the Prussian court system (pp. 123-134) and his remarks on the *Landrath* (pp. 165-167) are among the most brilliant and penetrating passages of the entire volume. Less satisfactory are his comments on the introduction of civil service examinations in Prussia in 1770. Since at one point the author states that such examinations wrought no substantial changes in the Prussian bureaucracy (p. 78), and in another place indicates that they had a profound effect (p. 180), the reader must conclude that Rosenberg has no precise knowledge as to what the new examination commission actually achieved. This subject has never been adequately explored; but this much is certain: the examination commission of 1770 introduced into the Prussian service a new type of university-trained candidate whose educational level in economics and law was vastly superior to that of his predecessor earlier in the century. Some years ago, when the Prussian State Archives were not yet closed to Western scholars, this reviewer read several scores of examinations written between 1770 and 1790 by young aspirants to the service on the assumption that they would reflect the psychology of the Prussian bureaucracy even better than the colorless documents printed in such profusion in the *Acta Borussica*. He found that, while the new merit system did not exclude the traditional regimental quartermasters and *Auditeure* entirely, the overwhelming majority were university students who had studied cameralism and law. Some of them paraded physiocratic ideas and were openly critical of the Prussian system of taxation. Indeed, it is no accident that when Stein set about reconstituting this bureaucracy in 1807 there was a considerable body of able and knowledgeable officials at his disposal.

Readers will be grateful to Rosenberg for having brought to light certain aspects of the old Prussian bureaucracy rarely discussed by his predecessors. His Postscript, which has strangely homiletic overtones, seems, however, to be addressed to a German rather than to an American audience. This reviewer, too, is convinced that between the Prussian legacy and the National Socialist régime there is a demonstrable historical connection. But is it not a serious tactical error on the part of a scholarly author to break off abruptly his discussion without taking the trouble to document his thesis? True enough, the old Prussian myth rested on a number of unproved assumptions, but this aspect of this extremely able historical critique did not escape a similar fate.

WALTER L. DORN

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The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition. Translated with notes and an Introduction by GEORG G. IGGERS. Boston, Beacon Press, 1958.—xlvii, 286 pp. $4.95.

Socialism and Saint-Simon. By EMILE DURKHEIM. Edited with an Introduction by Alvin W. Gouldner; translated by Charlotte Sattler. Yellow Springs, The Antioch Press, 1958.—xxxi, 240 pp. $5.00.

The body of ideas analyzed in these two translations is generally related to the thought of Henri Saint-Simon: the first is a series of lectures delivered by his followers in 1828-1829 in a hired hall on rue Taranne in Paris to win converts to a new ideology; the second, a course at the Faculty of Letters, Bordeaux, in the academic year 1895-1896 by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim. The *Doctrine de Saint-Simon* is a synoptic presentation in a cogent manner of what his disciples, and particularly Bazard, the most brilliant of them, considered the heart of their Master's system. This Exposition came before the wild eruption of the more fanciful "cultist" elements under Enfantin's hegemony. As Professor Iggers correctly emphasizes, when Saint-Simonism came to exert a potent ideological influence in nineteenth-century thought, these lectures rather than the dispersed original publications of Saint-Simon were the form in which the ideas penetrated. Making this work available in English fulfills an eminently useful purpose. As for the method of presentation, that is another matter. After a preface of G. D. H. Cole there follows an introduction by the translator which adds nothing to our factual knowledge of the Saint-Simonian movement, but baldly reaffirms a position which a number of researchers into the origins of totalitarianism have begun to assert. "The all-encompassing authoritarian character of the Saint-Simonian conception of the state, which brings the Saint-Simonianism of the *Doctrine* and the *Globe* in closer relation to the spirit of modern totalitarianism than to early nineteenth-century liberalism, conservatism, or socialism, has never been fully understood." This is a counterpart of the commentary which transforms Rousseau into a totalitarian, and those who fancy one thesis may find comfort in its pendant.

When one reads the Saint-Simonians today, their cumbersome mechanics of administrative organization, like those elaborated by Saint-Simon himself, by Fourier and by Comte, is far less meaningful than their dramatic introspection, their anguished probing into the emotional crisis of their society. For all of them this was defined as primarily a crisis in man's capacity to love. Morally this meant the all-pervasiveness of egotism and

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a tragic sense of isolation, politically and sociologically a state of universal conflict on all levels of existence. In the free flowering of an individual man's "capacity" the Saint-Simonians saw the prospect of re-creating those moral relations of love and cohesiveness which would end antagonism and bring into being the good organic society. The unfolding of a man's capacity to feel, to act and to think was the highest form of self-fulfillment. The Saint-Simonians were patently far better at a diagnosis of their psychological predicament than at either political reform or historical prognostication. These young romantics thought of themselves as a "beat generation" who had transcended their own despair and had become converted to the moral sentiment of humanity. To associate their new religion with twentieth-century totalitarianism is farfetched. The translation of the brilliant historical preface to the 1924 edition of the *Doctrine* by Bouglé and Halévy would have rooted this work in its authentic historical locus; we can be grateful however for the inclusion of some three hundred and sixty of their informative footnotes.

The commentary of Durkheim on Saint-Simon, like the juxtaposition of two master painters who have been wrestling with essentially the same problem, helps to understand both of them better, though the translation of this work, which Mauss had originally published in French, is of course more significant for our understanding of Durkheim than of Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians. (A vast literature on the movement has accumulated since 1896.) Durkheim was naturally attracted by Saint-Simon's characterization of "critical epochs", so akin to his own concept of *anomie*. Toward the end of the lectures Durkheim also proposed to his listeners an agency for the rebirth of new moral norms in the revival of the professional corporations of the *ancien régime*, an idea which is not alien to the Saint-Simonian grouping of professional capacities. But while Durkheim treated Saint-Simon's alternativity of organic and critical periods with sympathy, he refused to sharpen the lines between the two. He optimistically foresaw the possibility of prolonging salutary traits of the critical period in the midst of an organic age. The end of *anomie* did not spell either the elimination of critical variability or total submersion in the organic norms of an age.

Professor Gouldner's introduction relates this work to the rest of Durkheim's writings and makes a plea for the resuscitation of the older body of sociological theory. However, in his attempt to explain Durkheim's choice of Saint-Simon over Comte as the father of sociology, he ventures a number of reflections in his own right on what he calls "Comteianism" which bear reconsideration. The four volumes of the *Système de politique positive*

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might somehow restrain the intellectual historian from describing Comte as a man who "was basically concerned about the *consequences* of moral beliefs for social consensus and who had contributed little to an empirical understanding of the social forces fostering their development." Finally, the publishers of this book should decide upon the identity of Durkheim's socialist friend Jaurès, who appears variously as Jaures, Juares, and Juarès.

FRANK E. MANUEL

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Spain: A Modern History. By SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1958. New Edition. —xiv, 736 pp. $7.50.

The grand old man of Spanish letters has given us another magnificent revision of his major work on Spain. It was originally published in 1930 simply as *Spain,* with no subtitle. Since then, edition has followed edition until now it has grown to nearly twice its original size. Though his treatment of the Civil War period is unavoidably controversial, the book remains the best single-volume history of Iberia in print. It covers the history of the peninsula from prehistoric times to the present—no mean feat in itself. It reflects a deep psychological insight into the character of Spain's tragic people, and throughout, it reflects the author's understanding and deep love of his country. Best of all it is a delight to read.

This book should be carefully read by those, like this reviewer, who became deeply attached spiritually and ideologically to the cause of the Republic, and who suffered through the tragic agony of its defeat. From the very beginning of the Civil War Sr. de Madariaga was unique among Spanish intellectuals in adopting a position of neutrality toward both camps. From the other side of the English Channel he has maintained this detached intellectual position ever since, and the present edition reflects his conviction that he has been right all along. He writes, not as a passionate young revolutionary whose mind is poisoned by the bitterness of defeat, but rather as a highly intelligent, sensitive and humane elder statesman who is fast approaching the end of his days.

Nevertheless, he has set out for himself an impossible task, for no one in our time (certainly not this reviewer) can be "objective" or "detached" about something so soul-stirring as the Spanish Civil War. Samuel Lubell is reported to have said once that he could quickly tell the political views of any American

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over thirty by simply asking how he felt about the Spanish Civil War. Little wonder that Sr. de Madariaga's book has been criticized as "biased".

In spite of efforts to judge fairly, this reviewer must concede that Sr. de Madariaga is on occasion less than objective, and at times downright unfair. Moreover, at this stage of life he writes less as a disciplined historian than in the past. His history has become personal, and his book is replete with anecdotes, memories, reflections and personal judgments.

We will not always agree with the author, but we will learn much. The time has come to face the fact that the failure of the Spanish Revolution was due not simply to Italian intervention, nor to the recalcitrance of Spain's upper classes, nor to the failure of the other democracies to lend their support. It is time to look beyond half-truths, forget scapegoats, and critically appraise the weaknesses of the Republic itself. Some may even reluctantly admit, as De Madariaga does, that a major reason "for the failure of the Spanish revolution was the revolution itself." Perhaps we can now face up to the tremendous influence of Moscow on Republican policies and leaders. It is both painful and enlightening to read of the rôle played by Marcel Rosenburg, the Soviet Ambassador to the Republic; or of Alvarez del Vayo, the main Communist agent in the Spanish government and the man who turned the Republican army over to Red control; or of Juan Negrin, whose gold consignments to Russia helped ruin the credit of the Republic. This is raw meat to many palates, but the author's rebuttal, stated in the book's preface, will gain our wholehearted approval:

> It may at times seem as if I stressed the errors and shortcomings of the Left more heavily than those of the Right. This was inevitable for two reasons. The first is that in the countries for which I am writing this study, it is about what actually happened in the Left that new light is particularly needed. The second is that it is from the Left rather than from the Right that we expect our future. It is the Left, therefore, which stands in need of criticism (p. viii).

S. GROVER RICH

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